The new leaders of Tehran are rising to the top, and the first memorandum of understanding provide Iran with substantial short-term financial relief—and potentially more over time—without demanding immediate concessions on its nuclear or missile programs. Indeed, all Iran has to do is allow vehicles to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and even in Tehran it is working on a give a fee in another name. Iran’s success, however, masks an important change: The country is now less dependent on proxy forces like Hezbollah to intimidate its enemies.
The agency remains useful to Iran, but is no longer central to its deterrence strategy. Instead, Iran is learning that threats to global energy markets and vulnerable US allies can generate pressure on the US more quickly and more reliably than Hezbollah rockets or militant attacks. That doesn’t make Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Houthis irrelevant, but it does change their role: They are now part of a broader cover of coercion rather than Iran’s main shield. Indeed, Tehran is now operating to save them, rather than the other way around.
The new leaders of Tehran are rising to the top, and the first memorandum of understanding provide Iran with substantial short-term financial relief—and potentially more over time—without demanding immediate concessions on its nuclear or missile programs. Indeed, all Iran has to do is allow vehicles to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and even in Tehran it is working on a give a fee in another name. Iran’s success, however, masks an important change: The country is now less dependent on proxy forces like Hezbollah to intimidate its enemies.
The agency remains useful to Iran, but is no longer central to its deterrence strategy. Instead, Iran is learning that threats to global energy markets and vulnerable US allies can generate pressure on the US more quickly and more reliably than Hezbollah rockets or militant attacks. That doesn’t make Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Houthis irrelevant, but it does change their role: They are now part of a broader cover of coercion rather than Iran’s main shield. Indeed, Tehran is now operating to save them, rather than the other way around.
Before the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas against Israel and the subsequent war, Iran relied on regional allies to deter and intimidate its opponents. If the United States and Israel attacked Iran, Hezbollah, and his more than 100,000 rockets and fighters fueled by the war years in Syria, it could rain fire on all of Israel and threaten a border invasion. If Israel invades Lebanon, Hezbollah can defeat it or at least fight Israeli troops to a stalemate, as the group did in 2006 warwhen it also bombarded Israel throughout the 34-day conflict. Hamas, too, could join any conflict, as could other Iranian-backed groups in Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, or elsewhere. These groups, along with Iran’s missile program, were the country’s way of attacking its enemies.
The agency also provided Iran with a cheaper form of electricity supply. Tehran was able to disrupt peace talks between Israel and Palestine in the 1990s—which it saw as an attempt by the United States to isolate Iran—by supporting the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Their attacks it helped push the anti-pacifist candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu, until his first term as prime minister in 1996. More broadly, these groups gave Iran a kind of influence in most Muslim countries, even though its conventional military and economic forces were weak.
Tehran also worked with allies, especially Hezbollah, to carry out terrorist attacks on US and regional targets. In 1983, Hezbollah and an Iranian-backed Iraqi proxy killed six people in a series of coordinated attack in Kuwait to punish it for supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. In 1996, Iranian-backed terrorists to be killed 19 members of the US military when they bombed the towers of Khobar in Saudi Arabia. Iran also worked with Hezbollah the goal Iranian dissidents and rebels in Europe.
All these were reduced after October 7. Although Hamas remains alive and is the strongest Palestinian actor in Gaza, it is militarily weak, with most of its leadership and forces dead and an array of rocket weapons destroyed after years of war with Israel. In its 2024 campaign, Israel killed or wounded thousands of Hezbollah fighters through airstrikes or secret means, such as blowing up Hezbollah’s harps. It killed Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, and other senior military and political leaders – and it has. most of their successors. Although estimates are rough, Hezbollah’s estimate of 150,000 rockets is now lower. 25,000 or less.
When Israel and the United States attacked Iran in 2026 and declared their goal to be change of government-the real potential threat-Hezbollah firing missiles and drones at Israelbut it did not launch an all-out attack, and its results for Israel were limited. The attacks seem to suggest his desire to show solidarity with Iran rather than escalate the war. Hezbollah did not release much of its remaining missile arsenal, attempt to infiltrate fighters into Israel, or otherwise fully mobilize what was left of its arsenal. Other representatives were largely silent: the Houthis in Yemen confined themselves to a minority signal missiles strike over Israel.
Although Israel had nothing to do with this, the biggest blow to Iran and its allies was the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria in 2024 and its replacement by a government led by former jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa. Syria and Iran once worked closely to support Hezbollah and put pressure on Israel. Sharaa, bitterness about Iran support for Assadis hostile to Iran and Hezbollah.
These agencies are ongoing and will continue to be in effect. The Houthis in Yemen proved to be an important tool for Iran. Hezbollah will try to rebuild its power, and the United States has accused Iraq-based Kataib Hezbollah. planning terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe.
However, the allies did not prove to be an effective deterrent against the US and Israel. Indeed, if anything, Iran’s allies became the reason for Israel to strike Iran itself. Almost immediately after October 7, Israeli leaders he started blaming Iran for the attack. Even like Iran it did not cover the actual operationIran’s efforts to finance, support, and train its allies made the clerical regime guilty. For Israel, October 7 turned the tables: If the allies were attacking Israel anyway, then there was no need to hold back against Iran.
Iran may also need to pour in scarce military and financial resources to get Hezbollah back on its feet. After the defeat of Hezbollah in 2024, Iran supported the group to reform his army. Fears that Iran could use some of its sanctions relief to support militant groups like Hezbollah are legitimate, but that would be a diversion of much-needed funding.
Perhaps most importantly, Iran needs less allies. By showing it can close the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has raised the price of energy around the world, including the United States, where it is. Terrible Republican who fear being blamed for high prices at the pump. In addition, the tax and fiscal relief adjusts the fiscal coercion of the United States, which has long been one of the basic forms pressure on Tehran.
In addition to targeting the Gulf, Iran could attack US allies in the Gulf. In the recent war, Iran attacked energy equipment, hotelairports, and US military bases, among other targets. This, in turn, has caused some Gulf states to pay Iran allowing their ships to proceed undisturbed. Others will put pressure on Washington, fearing another attack if war resumes.
Therefore, Iran believes that it is strong enough to defend Hezbollah, not the other way around. As Israel fights Hezbollah in Lebanon, Tehran threatens to do the same to terminate his participation in peace talks if Israel does not stop its attacks. Iranian leaders seem confident that the United States will survive, but they are willing to risk abandoning a good deal and much-needed financial relief.
For years, Iran relied on allies to reach, influence, and deter at low cost. Today, however, Iran’s allies are as much a liability as they are an asset. Even more powerful allies like Hezbollah need Iran’s support but don’t offer more security in return. These groups will continue to threaten Israel, the United States, and their allies, but they no longer inspire the same caution as they did in the past. The post-Oct. 7 Middle East is that the axis of opposition to Iran still exists, but it seems to be less able to carry out the task it was originally built: to protect Iran itself.
