When Iran expanded the war between Israel and the United States by attacking the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, many observers thought that this new state of Iran-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations would last for many years and push the Arab countries closer to Israel. Tehran’s rise seemed to justify Israel’s argument that the Gulf monarchies needed to align with it against their common Persian threat.
Instead, the opposite seems to be emerging. Regional nations have concluded that containing and isolating Iran not only failed but also produced a deadly war that exposed the unreliability and surprising limits of America’s security umbrella. Instead of doubling down on Iran’s isolation, Arab states are writing a new playbook: seeking economic interdependence with Iran while incorporating Tehran into a new regionally-led security architecture.
When Iran expanded the war between Israel and the United States by attacking the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, many observers thought that this new state of Iran-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations would last for many years and push the Arab countries closer to Israel. Tehran’s rise seemed to justify Israel’s argument that the Gulf monarchies needed to align with it against their common Persian threat.
Instead, the opposite seems to be emerging. Regional nations have concluded that containing and isolating Iran not only failed but also produced a deadly war that exposed the unreliability and surprising limits of America’s security umbrella. Instead of doubling down on Iran’s isolation, Arab states are writing a new playbook: seeking economic interdependence with Iran while incorporating Tehran into a new regionally-led security architecture.
“Part of what we are doing now, as regional countries, is to create this regional security system between us and Iran,” Qatar’s Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, told Financial Times. “That will hopefully lead to economic cooperation in the future between all of us – bringing the region back to stability.”
Perhaps most importantly, Saudi Arabia has emerged as the leading force behind this change. While the date has not yet been announced, Riyadh is preparing to host the GCC countries and Iran for talks on a regional non-aggression pactmaritime security, and modeled confidence-building measures 1975 European Conventions of Helsinkiwith the aim of establishing regular meetings of ministers and leaders regarding regional security. The broader goal is a new Middle East security architecture more rooted in regional cooperation and under the military guaranty of the United States.
These developments further undermine Washington’s long-held claim that, absent US military supremacy, the Middle East would descend into chaos. Instead, they strengthen Blocks argue that regional nations will take greater responsibility for their own security as the United States pulls back. In fact, instead of protecting the region from instability, the United States has often been its main source. After all, it was the United States and Israel that launched the last two unprovoked wars against Iran—both while negotiations were underway.
In fact, if the US-Iran Accord translates into a final deal that will lift sanctions against Iran and bless Iran’s regional integration, it will further strengthen this process as it will remove the key motivation for keeping US troops in the Middle East in the first place: the policy of containing Iran. Many indicate that one of the motivations of the Trump administration to involve the regional powers so closely in the negotiations with Tehran is to lay the foundation for transferring the burden of regional security to these dollars as part of the agreement with Iran.
However, while Washington should welcome a regional order that shifts the burden of security from American taxpayers and service members to the region itself, the current approach risks repeating the mistakes of the past. Instead of building a truly inclusive security architecture—aligned against any government and rejecting bloc structures—it can only change the region’s faults. Deterrence of Iran would go hand in hand with further restraint of Israel, pushing it towards international isolation. Instead of replacing the Abrahamic Accords with a more inclusive system, the region risks creating an anti-Abrahamic Accord organized around Israel.
It is often forgotten how isolated Israel was from the West before the Oslo Accords began. Between 1991 and 1994, Israel casual relationships and at least 36 countries, including China, India, and the Holy See. These amendments were made based on the implicit assumption that Israel would allow the establishment of a Palestinian state, an understanding that the Israelis quickly rejected. Although Israel is unlikely to return to its pre-Oslo state of isolation, due to the collapse of its international status the trend may be in that direction.
Of course, Israel has certainly achieved isolation through its disruptive behavior, mass killing of Palestinians, and expansionist policies. Greater regional solidarity to pressure Israel is right and necessary. But neither isolation nor pressure alone is likely to change Israel’s calculations unless they are coupled with a credible path of reform—however that prospect may appear today.
It would be a missed opportunity not to pursue a larger vision—one that seeks not only to stabilize the Persian Gulf through the inclusion of Iran but also to use this change to achieve a Palestinian resolution.
The Better Order Project has paved the way for this. In line with the process of ending the occupation of Palestine on the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations ES-10/24 and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of July 2024 which found that “the State of Israel’s continued existence in the occupied territory of Palestine is illegal” and that Israel has the responsibility to bring immediate security to the United Nations. A council-approved process should begin to create a truly inclusive security architecture. This will be motivated by the Helsinki process, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and based on the principles of collective security, the essence of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of other people (that is, the use of militias), the rejection of the logic of containment, and the non-acceptance of security and the non-acceptance of force and the non-acceptance of force. for all.
A permanent, formal organization should be established to facilitate diplomacy and manage regional security. Initial steps should focus on integrating countries further into existing economic and political arrangements, such as trade agreements and energy cooperation.
Instead of excluding Israel in this architecture, the door to Israel’s inclusion should be kept open but on the condition that Israel fully implements the ICJ’s decision and stops the occupation. In return, Israel would be given something more meaningful than the Abrahamic Covenant ever promised. Instead of legitimizing only with Saudi Arabia, it would find full cooperation in the regional security architecture. This would also require Iran to accept the inclusion of Israel, which Tehran has explained before it would be appropriate if a Palestinian state—or some other Palestinian-accepted settlement—is established.
But the price of acceptance must be clear and uncompromising: not a path to a Palestinian state or a vague political horizon, but the actual establishment of an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 lines.
These two processes should move forward in parallel, but neither should be allowed to hold the other hostage. Israel’s opposition to ending the occupation, for example, should not delay the construction of a new regional security architecture. On the contrary, development without Israel would gradually create a strong incentive for Israeli society to choose coexistence instead of isolation. Israel’s current calculus—that the costs of ending the invasion outweigh the benefits—is likely to change once a regional security order is established and Israelis can clearly see the strategic and economic benefits of fundamental change.
By thinking more, local leaders can ensure that the collapse of the old order leads to something more stable and lasting. They can take this time not only to solve the main source of instability in the Persian Gulf – the isolation of Iran – but also to address the main source of instability in the Middle East: Israel’s continued occupation of Palestine.
History does not give great powers the chance to leave the region on better terms than they entered. This is one of those times. If regional leaders seize the opportunity to create a joint security command, Washington’s wisest course would be to encourage rather than dominate the process. For US President Donald Trump, the reward will not be ownership of a new Middle East, but something more valuable: the distinction of being a US president who realized that the region was finally ready to bear its security—and had the wisdom to allow it. Although Trump started this ill-advised war, he has the opportunity to make a strong axis of peace his defining legacy.
