Whatever the prospects for the July 7-8 NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, the geography favors Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan so much that he is certain to emerge victorious—if NATO summits can have winners at all. Following a disaster Iran wasthe clock and the hall are very good. US President Donald Trump told reporters that he was coming to Ankara only for Erdogan—another small symbolic victory.
The Turkish powerhouse enters the event with high hopes and ambitions: Developing his position as an experienced politician, if not even acting as a broker between Europe and the United States, is probably the most important thing on the list. Access to important US economic channels, including a possible currency exchange system; securing Turkey’s return to US defense supply chains, including the sale of F110 jet engines to Turkey’s KAAN aircraft program; and forcing Turkey’s cooperation in the new European Union defense procurement system, which is highly valued. 150 trillion ($171 billion), are probably at the top of his wish list.
Whatever the prospects for the July 7-8 NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, the geography favors Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan so much that he is certain to emerge victorious—if NATO summits can have winners at all. Following a disaster Iran wasthe clock and the hall are very good. US President Donald Trump told reporters that he was coming to Ankara only for Erdogan—another small symbolic victory.
The Turkish powerhouse enters the event with high hopes and ambitions: Developing his position as an experienced politician, if not even acting as a broker between Europe and the United States, is probably the most important thing on the list. Access to important US economic channels, including a possible currency exchange system; securing Turkey’s return to US defense supply chains, including the sale of F110 jet engines to Turkey’s KAAN aircraft program; and forcing Turkey’s cooperation in the new European Union defense procurement system, which is highly valued. 150 trillion ($171 billion), are probably at the top of his wish list.
While the geopolitical demands of the moment are weighing heavily on policy makers in Europe and Washington, Trump’s agreement with the journalist’s question whether he would arrive with “a large gift bag” for Erdogan is not a typical Trumpian pandering to strongmen. Rather, it is realpolitik—almost Kissingerian in its calculation. There is little more Trump can do. Why?
Washington is standing region—and indeed, in both regions that Turkey connects to, Europe and the Middle East—is at the lowest level. The alternative security architecture is changing, and Trump doesn’t seem inclined to bring the Americans back on board, at least not to the degree that allies in both regions need. Turkey appears to be an important part of Trump’s vision of a new Middle East, and Washington has few viable alternatives.
Perhaps the most important is the Russian factor. As the Europeans build up their defense capabilities, they need it badly what the Turks can offer. This includes “hard” hardware – such as special types of ammunition, high drone productionand other weapons-related manufacturing capabilities—including “hard” geographies. Turkey sits on the southern side of Russia; powerful projects within the Caucasus; borders Iran; and, of course, controls two major taboos.
Add to this a trivial matter “soft” power.-maintaining open channels to Moscow and Tehran, as well as very good relations with Syria-and Turkey seems more important to the NATO architecture today than it was even during the Cold War.
However, Turkey has been NATO’s problem child for many years. One can point to negative consequences on Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense systems or holding it for a long time Sweden’s NATO participation. Erosion of civil rights and the broader state of Turkey’s democracy under Erdogan remain a major point of contention.
But what will be most important in this meeting is Ankara’s position on its power projection:Blue CountryWith this aggressive maritime strategy, Erdogan’s Turkey claims to spread over many areas of the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, providing ideological energy for frequent swings against Greece. It is deeply rooted in Erdogan’s political transformation over the past decade, driven by his international cooperation— by his international cooperation.others would say fascist – groups. A close reading of his speeches shows that these are not side words; it is an important part of the glue that holds his home union together. His rhetoric against Israel, on the other hand, along with his support for Hamas, is old and goes back to his Islamic roots. But anti-Israel rhetoric goes down well with extremists at home, too.
But for Erdogan to get what he wants at the summit, ways to improve Greece will need to be found, as this NATO and EU member could block important improvements in trade and defense cooperation systems. The question is: How can Erdogan afford to stop the incitement without selling out his huge fan base at home?
What outside observers often fail to understand about Erdogan is that he is essentially a great politician. He is not only a skilled speaker and a sharp strategist – capable, to be sure, of big mistakessuch as Turkey’s entire foreign policy in the Middle East during the Arab Spring—but also an expert reader of the chamber of domestic politics. He has shown time and time again that he knows exactly how to make the most of adversity. He used the attempted coup of 2016 to purge Turkish society to an astonishing degree and thus lay the foundations for his “great presidency.” Strange diplomatic maneuvering in the years since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war made it possible for Erdogan to expand his geopolitical sphere.
If the Blue Homeland doctrine must be tactically defeated in Ankara to achieve its broader goals—such as in the form of an informal agreement to limit offshore oil and gas exploration in disputed waters or even a more formal agreement on parts of the sea border with Greece—he will make up for it with negotiations at home. In public meetings, he will lash out against Western rebels while at the same time proclaiming the eternal and unstoppable power of Turkey.
Erdogan and his allies have created a framework for the debate about the supposedly huge “game” being played on Turkey’s future by an unnamed foreign interest party. This narrative rewrites history and can be estimated to include the Treaty of Sèvres, the late Ottoman Empire, or even all the time since the Crusades. It’s designed vaguely enough to include all kinds of countries and individuals—like the former Chancellor of Germany. Angela MerkelFormer President of the United States Barack Obamaand a billionaire George Soros– either as players or as puppets of the real enemies of Turkey and the Islamic world. It often carries very antisemitic undertones.
This statement has evolved into a catch-all statement: Turkey’s economy is faltering and inflation is rising—a game. Gezi protest-game. The revolutionary test of 2016 – obviously, the game. But also, often enough, various forms of internal resistance will be organized within the game—from the philanthropist Osman Kavala, still in prison to this dayto student protesters, independent journalists, and major political parties. They, too, are portrayed as willing or mindless participants in a grand conspiracy against Turkey.
Erdogan specializes in demonizing and shifting blame to his domestic audience, deftly navigating the narrow space where he can satisfy his base and hard-line coalition partners at home while still playing ball with his allies abroad. Denial from his NATO and EU allies is another example of the runaway “game,” intended to be the mainstay of his rhetoric of humiliation.
You can choose your preferred label for his regime from the industry’s smallest terminology: “non-governmental democracy,” “voting democracy,” “democracy,” “electoral dictatorship,” “electoral authoritarianism,” or “democratic authoritarianism.” But wherever you place Erdogan on the spectrum from democracy to outright dictatorship, the coming months could be crucial for Turkey’s direction. Erdogan’s presidential term will end in 2028. According to the constitution he has created, no one can hold the presidency of Turkey for more than two terms.
However, if the parliament is dissolved before his time, a constitutional loophole allows him to run for a third term. Will Erdogan be able to organize early elections to qualify for another term? How will he get there? Did he feel compelled to dismantle the last remnant of Turkish democracy in the process?
Erdogan is faced with fashion”A problem arises”—he cannot allow himself to be voted out of office.
Run up the Ankara summit has already provided an easy excuse for a a new wave of arrests targeting opposition figures. But NATO—like the EU, the United Nations, and other Western-dominated institutions—is ill-equipped to deal with authoritarians. The same tactics these leaders use to consolidate and legitimize their rule turn the conventional diplomatic mechanisms used by NATO into fuel for their domestic propaganda – in this case, game.
Yet Erdogan’s ultra-nationalist, grievance-mongering rhetoric will not be enough to secure his position for long. The alternatives to his continued success could be dangerous – possible future scenarios in which he will not get what he needs in the elections, from internal unrest to a military presence in the eastern Mediterranean and closer alignment with Russia, China and Iran. Ultimately, the use of force he will use at the conference, and the concessions he will undoubtedly make, may be the most dangerous outcome for the alliance.
And then there is another dilemma, this one facing NATO: What if Erdogan’s Turkey slips into totalitarianism? Can the coalition include and work with an entrenched authoritarian regime in its ranks? And more importantly, can Washington and Europe afford to expel such a Turkey—not that the mechanism to do so exists?
The most likely outcome is that a solution will be found to include Turkey in the EU’s new defense procurement system, bypassing a potential Greek veto. This, along with other initiatives—from Trump’s “big gift bag” to various financial programs designed to stabilize Turkey’s economy—could give Erdogan the resources he needs to hold early elections and secure another term. If that happened, NATO would not have to deal with the reality of a sovereign member state; the dilemma would be directed to the next generation of leaders.
If Erdogan wins the summit in Ankara, it will be seen as a geopolitical victory: Europe, Washington, and Erdogan will all get what they desperately need. But it certainly won’t be a victory for Greece or Israel, where, at the very least, Erdogan’s hostile rhetoric of a decade ago will continue to raise concerns. It probably wouldn’t have been a victory for the Turkish people either. But the union would stand firm—stronger than it had been in a while.
