Since the US and Israel launched coordinated military operations against Iran on February 28, the war has continued unevenly.
The two countries have gained air superiority against Iran and reduced its offensive capabilities, and Iran’s navy has been unable to counter US naval forces in the Gulf. Meanwhile, the United States they have lost three birds for friendly fighting, and Iran has hit US military installations and embassies in the region. Israel faces similar attacks, and the White House secretly admits that the US will have trouble interrupting all Iranian drones.
Since the US and Israel launched coordinated military operations against Iran on February 28, the war has continued unevenly.
The two countries have gained air superiority against Iran and reduced its offensive capabilities, and Iran’s navy has been unable to counter US naval forces in the Gulf. Meanwhile, the United States they have lost three birds for friendly fighting, and Iran has hit US military installations and embassies in the region. Israel faces similar attacks, and the White House secretly admits that the US will have trouble interrupting all Iranian drones.
The conflict has escalated into a regional war that raises serious questions about stability in Iran, US national security, and the domestic political situation in the US. On the international stage, it also raises questions about nuclear proliferation and China’s behavior towards Taiwan.
This week, researchers from the Teaching, Research, and International Policy Project (TRIP) at the William & Mary Institute for International Studies and the University of Georgia. examined international relations (IR) scholars working in American colleges and universities about their views on the Iran war and its effects.
The results we report below are based on the responses of 949 experts interviewed between March 3 and March 5. (Read full report (see top line results for all questions.)
While public opinion polls show that most Americans do not support the US decision to attack Iran, the IR experts we surveyed are more skeptical. The scholars believe that the decision to use military force will affect the security of the United States, increase the risk of terrorist attacks against the United States or its allies, and increase the possibility of China attacking Taiwan.
IR Experts Strongly Oppose Iran War
Our survey asked IR scholars if they support the US decision to attack Iran. The answer was unequivocal: 86 percent of respondents oppose organized strikes, with 70 percent strongly opposed. Only 10 percent of experts support an attack on Iran, and the remaining 4 percent said they neither supported nor opposed the decision.
Professional opposition to Iran’s war mongering is unacceptable among the American public. A Reuters/Ipsos poll found that while respondents could indicate they don’t know whether they support military force against Iran, a majority of Americans (43 percent) disagree, while 27 percent approve. In a CNN In a survey that forced respondents to choose, Americans were unwilling to approve of the war, with 59 percent reporting disapproval.
US President Donald Trump has expressed hope that the war will lead to regime change in Iran and “freedom” to the people of Iran. But the Secretary of Defense of the United States Pete Hegseth maintains that the goals of the United States in Iran are the youngest. IR experts judge that Hegseth’s hedge about the outcome of the war is more likely than the president’s larger goals.
About 23 percent of respondents think the conflict will improve the chances of democracy in Iran. Conversely, 32 percent of experts worry that US attacks on Iran will definitely reduce or possibly reduce the likelihood of a democratic regime in the next five years, and another 46 percent say US military action will not affect the likelihood of a democratic Iran.
Increased Security Risks
Given their opposition, it is not surprising that IR experts expect that a war with Iran will adversely affect US national security. Asked whether an attack on Iran would “make the United States safer, more insecure, or have no effect on U.S. security,” 81 percent of respondents said the attack would “definitely” or “probably” make U.S. security less secure.
The survey underscored IR scholars’ concerns about the risk of terrorism targeting the United States, with 89 percent of respondents indicating that US military operations in Iran will definitely or probably increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks against the United States, its interests, citizens, or its allies in the coming year.
Trump has given moving point for war, but the stated primary reason for the decision to attack Iran last June—and repeated earlier this week—was to prevent the Iranian regime from acquiring a nuclear weapon. This may be successful in the short term, but what are the lessons of this war for other states that may seek nuclear weapons?
IR experts are pessimistic: Only 16 percent of respondents think that a US attack on Iran would probably or definitely reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation by one or more countries in the next five years. Most experts (57 percent), meanwhile, believe that the attack will probably or definitely increase the likelihood of nuclear proliferation by one or more countries in the next five years.
Is China Watching?
Some observers worry that a war with Iran will make a Chinese invasion of Taiwan more likely. For one, the United States and its allies are decrease in the speed of their shares of advanced offensive and defensive weapons that may be needed to counter China. And some say that war “to stretch the boundaries of self-defense” in ways that will make it easier for China to justify efforts to take Taiwan by force.
On the contrary, some figures continue to confront Iran militarily will make Taiwan safer. A few weeks before the war, Senator Lindsey Graham said that removing the Iranian government from power would make the United States more deterrent against China. more reliable.
We asked our respondents to consider, equally, how the US attack on Iran will affect China’s calculus on Taiwan in two different time horizons: next year and five years from now. In the short term, nearly half (48 percent) of IR scholars expect that a war with Iran will have no effect on the likelihood that China will use military force against Taiwan. About 31 percent said they believe the conflict increases the likelihood of China going to war with Taiwan, while 8 percent said it would decrease that likelihood.
In the long run, IR scholars care more. 45 percent of scholars believe that a war with Iran will increase the possibility of China using force against Taiwan in the next five years, while almost 35 percent expect no harm and 5 percent believe that the war will reduce the possibility of Chinese aggression in that period.
TRIP conducted another survey of IR experts just prior to The United States attacked Iran’s nuclear sites in June last yearincluding questions about the possibility of different retaliatory measures from Iran in response to what was at the time still a hypothetical US attack.
Recent events have confirmed those predictions, which include: a 35 percent chance that Iran would respond by targeting other countries in the region, a 63 percent chance that it would launch an attack against U.S. forces, a 66 percent chance that it would attempt to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and a 68 percent chance that it would launch a cyber attack against the United States.
If the experts are right about the current war, the American attack on Iran was ill-advised. Although Trump has shared conflicting or inconsistent goals, IR scholars doubt that this military action will achieve any of those goals—and will instead reduce US security and increase the risk of attacks on its interests, citizens, and allies.
