The United Arab Emirates was long considered an untouchable island of stability, peace, and prosperity. But since the start of the US-Israel war against Iran, the UAE has been pushing the UAE with missiles and drones because of its close and long-standing security partnership with the US. Now, the UAE, including its crown jewel, Dubai, has been badly hit. Although businesses are trying to hold on, thousands of residents have fled, and tourism has ground to a halt. Maritime trade—including exports of oil and liquefied natural gas, as well as essential food and other imports—has largely come to a halt as a result of Iran’s move to close the Strait of Hormuz. This is all the more dubious because energy exports, along with the financial, technology, logistics, and services industries based in Dubai, are the lifeblood of the nation. Beyond the economic costs, the UAE’s high isolation from the region’s turmoil has been shattered for years to come—perhaps irreparably.
Another place bears uneasy parallels with Dubai and the UAE: Singapore. The city-state at the crossroads of the Indo-Pacific also serves as a global financial and tourism hub. Because of its small size—roughly the size of Bahrain, with a population of just over 6 million—it largely lacks its own natural resources and thus relies heavily on unfettered trade to provide essential goods. Like the UAE, Singapore has a strong, albeit loose, security partnership with Washington. Although Singapore does not allow US troops to be stationed on its territory, it purchases most of its military equipment from the United States, conducts joint military exercises with the US military, and provides maintenance and equipment support to the US Navy at Changi Naval Station.
The United Arab Emirates was long considered an untouchable island of stability, peace, and prosperity. But since the start of the US-Israel war against Iran, the UAE has been pushing the UAE with missiles and drones because of its close and long-standing security partnership with the US. Now, the UAE, including its crown jewel, Dubai, has been badly hit. Although businesses are trying to hold on, thousands of residents have fled, and tourism has ground to a halt. Maritime trade –including sales of oil and liquefied natural gas, as well as essential foodstuffs and other imports—it has largely stopped due to Iran’s massive closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This is all the more dubious because energy exports, along with the financial, technology, logistics, and services industries based in Dubai, are the lifeblood of the nation. Beyond the economic costs, the UAE’s high isolation from the region’s turmoil has been shattered for years to come—perhaps irreparably.
Another place bears uneasy parallels with Dubai and the UAE: Singapore. The city-state at the crossroads of the Indo-Pacific also serves as a global financial and tourism hub. Because of its small size—roughly the size of Bahrain, with a population of just over 6 million—it largely lacks its own natural resources and thus relies heavily on unfettered trade to provide essential goods. Like the UAE, Singapore maintains a strong, albeit quiet, security partnership with Washington. Although Singapore does not allow US troops to be stationed on its territory, it purchases most of its military equipment from the United States, conducts joint military exercises with the US military, and provides maintenance and equipment support to the US Navy at Changi Naval Station.
Perhaps most tragically, Singapore sits along a strategic waterway that could be used for military purposes, just as Iran has blocked part of the Strait of Hormuz. The latter has now become a major part of the war. Singapore’s strategic strait, the Strait of Malacca, presents the most extreme vulnerability: Winding along Singapore’s southern coast, the strait is the main sea artery connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans. It is the most heavily trafficked sea route in the world, carrying between a quarter and a third of global trade. This usually includes estimated 23 million to 29 million barrels of oil per day, or about 30 to 45 percent of the global marine oil trade.
Malacca is not only busier and more geographically important than Hormuz; it is also thinner and therefore more susceptible to disturbances. At its narrowest point, the medium Iran and In Oman, the Strait of Hormuz is about 21 miles wide. That contrasts with the 1.7 to 1.8 miles for the narrow part of the Strait of Malacca between Singapore and Indonesia. Singapore’s problem is having a close security partnership with the United States while adjoining A geographic chokepoint can be a dangerous combination.
As the superpower rivalry between the US and China escalates, both nations have considered how the other side might try to control or close Malacca on its terms, as Iran is now doing in Hormuz. Chinese experts have a word to describe the Achilles heel of the Chinese economy: the Malacca dilemma. Asimated 60 percent all Chinese businesses transportations this channel. Even more alarming for Beijing: About 80 percent of China’s crude oil imports also go through that channel.
Beijing would have to figure out how to continue importing oil and other natural resources, to supply its economy and stay at war with the United States. In the case of a successful U.S. blockade of Malacca, Beijing would have to use other sea routes—especially the Sunda and Lombok sea routes through Indonesia’s farthest south islands—which would increase travel time and cost. As a possible alternative, Beijing has sought to build a canal across Thailand’s Kra Isthmus. It has also invested in oil and natural gas pipelines, as well as strategic petroleum reserves.
Washington should pay close attention to the Straits of Malacca as well. The idea of maintaining freedom of navigation in strategic waterways—including the Red Sea and now Hormuz—remains a central element of US policy across multiple administrations. Without full access to Malacca, the US Navy would have little flexibility in redeploying maritime assets.
In a recent example of how the Strait of Malacca facilitates US military deployment, Trump ordered a US Marine expeditionary force based in Okinawa, Japan, to the Middle East—perhaps for ground operations to capture Iran’s Kharg Island or its shores along the Strait of Hormuz. The short sea route through Malacca already takes one to two weeks; if that route were blocked, the Marines would take much longer to reach their destination.
Singapore’s strategic location and close security cooperation with the United States open the possibility of China making attacks against Singapore as part of any war plan, to prevent the city’s government from blocking Chinese trade and supporting US military operations. During the current war in the Middle East, the UAE is facing the same situation—being part of Iran’s war plan—with dire consequences.
Of course, there are also good reasons for China not to attack Singapore. The city-state has a shared Chinese culture and strong people-to-people ties, is neutral, and maintains a working relationship with the Chinese military. That said, China sees a war against Taiwan — not to mention against the United States — as one, which could remove its reluctance to attack regional neighbors perceived as allied with the enemy.
This was Iran’s explanation for attacking the UAE. After all, it is Oman that actually borders the narrow part of the Strait of Hormuz, but Iran has barely reached the country. What may contribute to the difference is that Tehran clearly sees the UAE as firmly tied to the United States.
Ultimately, Singapore is less like Oman and more like the UAE. That should be a cause for concern if a superpower conflict were to come in the Indo-Pacific. Singapore’s best option is probably to stay the course and step up its role as a facilitator of negotiations between major powers, with the aim of avoiding war altogether. The city-state should also quietly cooperate with allies and partners in the exercise of environmental planning, including through the Five Power Defense Arrangements (a security forum that joins Australia, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore), as well as other partners such as India, Japan and the United States. Above all, Singapore must remain vigilant about its geopolitical future. The stakes are too high.
