Welcome to Foreign PolicyOverview of China.
Highlights this week: The Chinese Communist Party announces new laws for local government officials,, Trump-Xi meeting it is postponed until May, and Beijing will introduce de facto drone ban.
Welcome to Foreign PolicyOverview of China.
Highlights this week: The Chinese Communist Party announces new laws for local government officials,, Trump-Xi meeting it is postponed until May, and Beijing will introduce de facto drone ban.
Official Seizure of Xi-22
Last Friday, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released two powers for leaders. They must first “firmly hold power and central leadership, the unity of the Central Committee (of the CCP) and the great Comrade Xi Jinping” and second “consider the internal conditions and increase their efforts and creativity in work.”
These statements firmly capture the central dilemma for Xi, China’s president: He wants total loyalty and obedience, but also loyalty and innovation. Even if Chinese officials are encouraged to avoid complex ideas, they are expected to devote themselves to study Xi Jinping thought. When they are told to abandon outdated rules, they must follow every order from above.
This tension has been a recurring theme in Xi’s campaign against “formality” and “bureaucracy” in Chinese power, which he posits as twin threats to the legitimacy of the CCP.
In 2019 articleXi called the threats “bad,” blaming them for incidents of “non-separation, abuse of power, detachment from truth and the crowd, behavior of empty words and ingenuity, rigid thinking, compliance with outdated rules, overcrowded organizations, overstaffing, procrastination, negligence,” and more.
Like many CCP leaders before him, Xi seems convinced that new laws and rhetorical campaigns can solve the organization’s entrenched problems. In practice, however, the incentives presented to leaders lead to the opposite.
Basically, the penalties for violating party authority are greater than those for following strict laws. From 2017 to 2022, approx 410,000 people were punished with formality and bureaucracy—but this represents only a small fraction of the 20 million Chinese government officials. The punishment is small compared to those of dishonestywhich are more severe and more sweeping.
Ambition and talent can be dangerous at the top. Xi often cleaned ability heirs– among them Ma Xingrui. Once a rising technologist who held top posts in Shenzhen and Guangdong, Ma was appointed party secretary of the highly sensitive Xinjiang region in 2021 and was abruptly removed last year. Mother’s right hand man is now under investigation for bribery.
The main priority of officers at the local level is to protect themselves, especially from the outside feeling insecure or ideologically threatened. The surprising result is organizational culture dominated by the box-ticking behavior that Xi decries.
It didn’t have to be this way. Although bureaucracy has existed for a long time, in the past several decades—especially under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s—the CCP has also seen significant experimentation and change. From Xi’s perspective, however, the laxity undermined central authority, fueled public anger over corruption, and allowed the masses to escape party control.
Some authoritarian systems have combined strict loyalty with internal competition, encouraging subordinates to innovate in serving the leader’s goals. But Xi’s power rests less on personal charisma than on the apparatus of an institutionalized, rule-bound party.
The result is an ongoing dilemma in which Xi seeks officials who are yes-people and problem-solvers. It’s a difficult balance to strike—and one that’s unlikely to be achieved.
What we’re after
Summit postponed. While the war in Iran continues, US President Donald Trump says his meeting with Xi has been has been rearranged for May 14 and 15. This new timeline looks promising.
The White House seems to be eager to end the war that the United States is in somehow losebut the enemy still has votes. As long as the dispute dominates the headlines, any publicity Trump hopes to get from a deal with Xi is unlikely to materialize.
The conversation can also be discouraged by unproven claims that China is sharing intelligence with the Iranian military to help target US forces.
Iran and China have to collaborate on sensitive intelligence issues in the past, and China has clear incentives to do so again. Beyond the potential benefits of US sanctions, Tehran can return information with valuable insights into US capabilities.
The few remaining China hawks in the Trump administration may use such reports to argue against engagement with Beijing, but the more likely outcome is that the White House simply ignores them and continues to push for a summit.
The fight against pollution. China’s new environmental lawpassed during Bi-Sessions earlier this month, continues its successful campaign to curb pollution over the past decade.
Driven by strict regulations and heavy investment in green technology, China has made significant improvements in water and air quality. However, major challenges remain, such as groundwater pollutionand overall production continues to rise, with Beijing aiming to peak before 2030.
It’s worth noting that public anger played a major role in pushing authorities to address air and water pollution, but Xi has since suppressed the environmental movement that led to those changes.
Most Read FP This Week
Technology and Business
Ban on drones in Beijing. China has been working to develop “low economy“—the growing use of drones for transportation and everyday services—with one obvious exception: the capital. In Beijing, new laws that take effect in May will go into effect. effective banning the use of drones, even bringing drones or important elements to the city.
Fear of drone attacks is widespread, and many countries establish strict no-fly zones around sensitive sites. But Beijing is a big city, and government buildings make up only a small part of the urban core. An additional caveat here reflects concerns about the leadership’s physical security as well as protecting information—for example, about the size of their private mansions.
Military-industrial complex. China’s military protests have spread to the country’s vast defense and industrial sector, much of which is controlled by state-owned enterprises.
Tan Ruisong, a former executive of the China Aerospace Industries Corporation, was convicted and sentenced last week for corruption. charges. As usual, the money involved is huge: Investigators found that Tan amassed more than $89 million over nearly two decades.
In the coming months, we may see more executives, even retired ones like Tan, brought to court. Yet, as with the military, there is little reason to assume that the successors of those purged will be susceptible to corruption.
