The new Mohammad Javad Zarif Foreign Affairs the essay is read as a way of peace. It is best understood as an attempt to convert Iran’s battlefield losses into a narrow US-Iran deal: nuclear limits and maritime access in exchange for sanctions relief and regional integration. Under the winner’s formulation there is an offer for an upgrade of less than 3.67 percent, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Additional Protocoltransfer all enriched materials to a multinational coalition, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and accept a non-aggression pact with the United States. These are not the conditions of the government to press its profit. It is the conditions of the government that wants to freeze what is left before the situation gets worse.
The deal could appeal to the White House, which is eager to calm energy markets and announce a breakthrough. It shouldn’t. Because Iran has directly retaliated against Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, any lasting settlement must go beyond upgrades and sanctions relief to include Gulf security as part of the agreement itself. It must be worthy of the self-promotion that produced it.
Five weeks of US-Israeli strikes have damaged Iran’s military infrastructure to a degree that no previous combination of sanctions, covert action, or diplomacy has achieved. Iran’s supreme leader has been killed, along with dozens of top military and intelligence officials. Iran’s missile production capacity, air force, navy and air defense network have been greatly reduced. Zarif himself admitted that Iran’s nuclear program did not prevent the attack, a remarkable admission from the man who negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal—which tells us more about Tehran’s position than its claims of victory.
Yet the most important product of the campaign is not what it did inside Iran. It is what it revealed about the area. The war exposed the structural weaknesses of the Gulf states that host US military power but had no voice in its use. Iran attacked these countries not as enemies but as US speeches. The political consequences of that difference will define the post-war order.
Critics will note, rightly, that Tehran was already on the way to a key agreement before the first strike. Guardian exposed that Britain’s national security adviser, Jonathan Powell, judged Iran’s pre-war proposal at the February talks in Geneva as “stunning” and sufficient to continue negotiations. The British team reportedly expected more progress at technical talks scheduled to take place in Vienna on March 2, two days after the strike began. But the comparison between that offer and what Zarif is proposing now is instructive. Before the campaign, Iran proposed a three-to-five-year moratorium on upgrades and remained controversial on inspections. After five weeks of strikes, Zarif has proposed permanent sanctions, full ratification of the Additional Protocol, and full material transfers. The campaign lowered the bar on what Tehran would accept.
Internal trends point in the same direction. As Afshon Ostovar is memory in Foreign Affairsthe campaign decimated the top ranks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) while leaving Iran’s hardline leader, Pezeshkian, and former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Khatami, largely united. The New York Times He has described Iran’s leadership as paralyzed, while the decision-making and communication infrastructure is disrupted to a large extent, thus fueling anxiety and internal power conflicts. Zarif’s essay reads like an outward expression of this divide: the pragmatist wing explaining the conditions to Washington before the IRGC can be reunited.
Meanwhile, Tehran’s style of public denial and private involvement speaks for itself. Iranian officials insist there are no ongoing negotiations, even if they accept a 15-point U.S. proposal through Pakistani mediators, communicate through Oman and Egypt, and allow an oil tanker to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed told the media that Iran had received a message from a “friendly country” about Washington’s request, but noted that it did not mean it was in talks with the United States. The difference is political, not practical. A government that believes it is winning does not ask its opponent to stop the escalation. It climbs it.
The most revealing feature of Zarif’s essay is what it leaves out. Its entire framework is bilateral: Iran and the United States are negotiating modernization, sanctions relief, a non-aggression pact and the reopening of the strait. The Gulf states are only seen as targets of Zarif’s disdain, mocked for their security style, known as US shields, and taught to reject Tehran’s previous offers of regional security plans.
Zarif wants to direct the endgame in a US-Iran song that restores Iran’s pre-war economic status while leaving the Gulf states standing on the sidelines of what they will be expected to achieve. His proposed regional security network, which lists Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen, is an attempt to integrate Tehran into the post-war architecture before it is built without Iran at the table.
A leaked message from Zarif said that the UAE and Israel are “one and the same” and urged to prioritize strikes against the UAE. One does not propose regional security cooperation with countries that have at the same time advocated bombing. The confusion reflects the purpose: Zarif’s regional regime is active, an instrument of Iranian influence, not a true version of collective security.
The Gulf states that took retaliatory measures against Iran did not wait for Washington or Tehran to decide their position after the war. They are already explaining their demands, with special additions.
UAE Ambassador to the United States, Yousef al-Otaiba, to put it directly in The Wall Street Journal: “A simple ceasefire is not enough.” Any effective outcome must address Iran’s full range of threats: nuclear capabilities, missiles, drones, proxy networks, and blockades of international sea lanes. Advisor to the president of the UAE Anwar Gargash explained the geopolitical impact of an Iranian strike on the Gulf states as “enormous,” and cementing Tehran as a major threat shaping the Gulf’s strategic thinking. Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, Abdulaziz Sager, he said that the Gulf’s message to Washington is no longer clear but clear: Any agreement with Iran must directly address and guarantee the security of the Gulf.
These are not peripheral sounds. They represent the policy consensus that passes through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). internal division on technique. Current reports indicate that Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait have pushed for a quick end to the war, while the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain want a solution that imposes more sanctions on Iran. But in that scope, the basic emphasis is the same: The Gulf states must be in the room, not waiting outside it.
The scale of what these nations have taken justifies the demand. Only the UAE has it share more than 438 ballistic missiles, 2,012 drones, and 19 cruise missiles. Dubai International Airport was hit. Burj Al Arab was destroyed by intercepting dirt. Qatar shot down two Iranian bombers and saw off Ras Laffan, the hub of its liquefied natural gas exports. he hit and drones. Doha has sent 11 official letter for the United Nations Security Council to record Iran’s attacks on its soil. The most recent, on April 2, a deep-sea missile attack on a QatarEnergy-chartered oil tanker in Qatar’s economic waters; The attack came after the Security Council was poised to pass resolution 2817, which condemned Iran’s attacks on the Gulf states. Qatar has clearly exercised its Article 51 right of self-defense and reserves the right to seek compensation for all damages. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has given what the director of the International Energy Agency to be called “the world’s greatest energy security challenge in history.” Saudi Arabia has vowed to use military force against further Iranian aggression. Ukraine has signature 10-year defense cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, leveraging its counter-drone expertise—a sign of how the post-war security architecture is already moving forward.
A deal that would address enrichment while leaving Iran’s missiles and drones unfettered will be seen by Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha as trading their security for Washington’s priorities. U.S. intelligence has confirmed damage of only about a three of Iran’s missile arsenal. The conventional threat, not the nuclear program, affected the population and infrastructure of the Gulf. Any solution must reflect that reality.
First, missile, drone and maritime sanctions must be part of any plan, not a postponement for future negotiations. Iran’s ability to force sailors, speedboats, mines, drones and cruise missiles is what closed Hormuz and hit civilian infrastructure in six countries. Postponing these issues, as Zarif’s proposal does, can only postpone the next crisis.
Second, a formal consultation process must be established that prevents a repeat of February 28, when the Gulf states realized they were at war by hearing loud explosions. Hosting US forces cannot mean absorbing strikes for a war the host did not approve of. This is a prerequisite for continuing the basic settings. The benefits here are mutual: Washington has few alternatives with infrastructure, territory, and political stability, and the Gulf states know it.
Third, Iran must formally reject the use of force against the Gulf states, not just against the United States. Zarif’s bilateral non-aggression pact is insufficient because it leaves Iran’s relationship with its neighbors undefined. A non-aggression regional framework, including all GCC members and Iran, would be more durable than any bilateral entity, and would test whether Tehran’s professed interest in regional cooperation is genuine or necessary.
Fourth, any agreement that lifts sanctions against Iran without addressing the economic damage that the Gulf states have taken will breed the kind of hatred that guarantees another crisis. The Gulf economy, built on energy transport and connectivity, has been hit by shipping disruptions, rising insurance premiums, damaged infrastructure and investor flight. A settlement that restores Iran’s economic access while leaving its neighbors to bear only the costs of reconstruction is not a peace deal. It is a subsidy for the next phase of coercion.
Zarif’s proposed oil alliance, which invites China and Russia to jointly manage Iran’s nuclear facilities, highlights a deeper problem with his system. It is an invitation to great power competition over Iran’s nuclear empire. Beijing, which issued an unusual document five point proposal this week, he has no incentive to serve as a neutral defender. Moscow, which provided Iran with intelligence and training before the war began according to to the British mind, it has even less.
The US military campaign created a force that no previous administration had achieved. The question is whether the settlement will be worth it, or whether Washington will allow Zarif’s narrative, rather than strategic reality, to dictate the terms.
