Mojtaba Khamenei does not play golf and is not known to bench three plates. But when it comes to chest beating, US President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have nothing on Iran’s supreme leader. American and Israeli bombs stopped falling on Iran when Khamenei, elevated after his father was killed in the first attack of the war, announced that the Islamic Republic had attacked Iran. reached “final victory.” Entering, his Central National Security Council he announced that “almost all the objectives of the war” had been achieved. The state media shouted the country’s new power.
In Western countries too, part of the opinion rests on the narrative that Iran has emerged from this war. in a stronger position than it was in just the last six weeks. In this context, the Iranians, having taken over the US-Israeli bombing campaign, launched a decisive attack by closing the Strait of Hormuz, and the resulting shock to the world economy forced the United States to seek negotiations in Pakistan.
Mojtaba Khamenei does not play golf and is not known to bench three plates. But when it comes to chest beating, US President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have nothing on Iran’s supreme leader. American and Israeli bombs stopped falling on Iran when Khamenei, elevated after his father was killed in the first attack of the war, announced that the Islamic Republic had attacked Iran. reached “final victory.” Entering, his Central National Security Council he announced that “almost all the objectives of the war” had been achieved. The state media shouted the country’s new power.
In Western countries too, part of the opinion rests on the narrative that Iran has emerged from this war. in a stronger position than it was in just the last six weeks. In this context, the Iranians, having taken over the US-Israeli bombing campaign, launched a decisive attack by closing the Strait of Hormuz, and the resulting shock to the world economy forced the United States to seek negotiations in Pakistan.
This analysis mistakes tolerance for power. It is true, as many (myself included) have argued, that in this conflict the US is losing by not winning, while Iran is winning by simply surviving. But there is no denying the fact that the Islamic Republic has been badly hit by the US-Israeli bombing campaign. Recovery will require not only time and money, but also a long period of political and geographical stability. These are things that Tehran has little control over.
As for the Hormuz gambit, as effective as it was during the current war, it is far from certain that the strategy can be deployed ad infinitum in future conflicts and produce the same results.
Now, when the tenuous ceasefire is still in effect, it is a good opportunity to count the stocks with cold eyes.
Start with what Iran failed, because it is a long list. The abandonment of leadership it was a big blow to the government. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed on February 28, along with dozens of senior government officials, including top military and intelligence commanders. Many more have died since then.
The replacement of a great leader who spent decades consolidating religious and political power with his unknown son, Mojtaba Khamenei– the extension for a few days of the emergency convening of the Council of Experts – may indicate institutional stability, but not change.
Then consider the damage done to Iran’s military infrastructure and personnel. Even allowing for the possibility of exaggeration by fighters, there is no doubt that the common assets of the navy and the air force have been severely damaged, including many of its air defense components, including radar and detection systems. Its ballistic missile plate, estimated to be about 3,000 in 2022, already reduced by last year’s 12-day war with Israel, and further reduced by the current conflict. In addition, over the course of six weeks, the United States and Israel systematically attacked missile production facilities, storage sites and launching infrastructure.
The human cost of the military campaign remains deliberately hidden by Tehran. Iran’s health ministry has released civilian statistics only—but hidden any reliable accounting of military deaths. What the administration doesn’t want you to know is the extent of what it lost in the draw. Due to the scale of the bombings and the specific targeting of the Iranian military, it is safe to assume that the death toll is more than 3,000 owed by the country’s chief investigator.
And then there is the destruction of civic infrastructure, from bridges to universities, and its industrial base. Iran’s economy, which is already weakened, is now carrying a huge cost of new construction that is impossible to pay from taxes on ships passing through Hormuz. Iran can only hope to raise significant funds if the Trump administration agrees to lift its economic sanctions, which is far from certain.
Nor can Tehran expect much help from its neighbors, many of whom it has largely isolated during the war. This loss cannot be quantified in dollars but it has little weight for that.
Iran’s strategic calculation at the start of the war was that deploying missiles and drones in the Arab Gulf capitals—Abu Dhabi, Kuwait City, Doha—would force those governments to pressure Washington into resigning. It failed in exactly the opposite way. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the president of the United Arab Emirates and one of the most respected strategists in the Gulf, did not mince words. Iran had “deceived its neighbors before the war about its intentions and revealed deliberate aggression despite their best efforts to avoid it,” he said. National. Thousands of missiles and drones targeting civilian infrastructure and energy facilities were ineffective, he added – they were “inert and a strategic failure.”
The result of this campaign has been the mediation of the Gulf states and Washington—remember open readiness of the UAE to join a military coalition against Iran’s threat to Hormuz—and a requirements of the Gulf Cooperation Council that any peace deal completely limits Iran’s missile and drone capabilities.
Tehran spent 40 years fostering tensions in the Gulf, through a policy of intimidation and constant engagement designed to prevent its neighbors from fully withdrawing from the US camp. The controversy is gone.
Against all thisthe “winning” side of the balance sheet is quite clear. One unequivocal strategic achievement that Iran can point to from the current war is the closure of Hormuz. The possibility that Tehran could steal 20 percent of the world’s oil supply – the International Energy Agency (IEA) called it “the biggest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market”—it was always a threat in theory.
But you can Arms of Hormuz used again? The siege was largely successful because it surprised an unprepared enemy. Trump had no contingency plan, no pre-negotiated burden-sharing system with Gulf allies, no coordinated response architecture. Tehran will not always be so lucky with its enemies.
The Trump administration it reduced the risk for Iran to close Hormuz, and recklessly He did not provide conditions for that event. That mistake will not happen again. When they finish the next war, US, Israeli and Arab military planners will take Iran’s immediate action to block the shipping of water through the strait and prepare advance strategies and countermeasures. These could include tighter naval cooperation, preemptive strikes against missile batteries that most threaten shipping lanes, and the use of drones against Iranian speedboats.
And military planners aren’t the only ones who will prepare for the worst. Consumers of important products that pass through the stream – not only hydrocarbons, but also fertilizer and aluminum– will do the calculations, too. China, Japan, South Korea, and India will revise their thinking on emergency supplies with the closure of Hormuz as a base, not a tail risk. Investment in storage capacity will increase, along with the use of alternative fuels.
Producers and distributors, likewise, will prepare for the next shutdown. The two available bypass options for petroleum, Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline to Yanbu and the UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline to Fujairah, currently have a maximum capacity of 8 to 9 million barrels per day. They will be expanded as quickly as Saudi money can buy, and additional investment will go into their defenses against Iranian missiles and drones. IEA, which coordinated strategic reserve release record in the second week of this war, it will prepare emergency programs for the next one.
There’s a bigger problem with the Hormuz weapon, one that Tehran’s planners can’t ignore: It hurts the hand that wields it. Iran exports its oil through the channel, and the government needs that revenue. In this instance, it was allowed to operate his own ships under the Persian Gulf and the Trump administration that wants to reduce the increase in oil prices. A better-prepared and more patient adversary might choose to wait for an Iranian blockade of Hormuz or even turn around and block Iranian exports — as Trump is trying in an unprepared way.
It has long been assumed that the Islamic Republic has a higher pain threshold than its neighbors and can withstand a long blockade. But that hypothesis has never been tested. The combination of all the factors I have listed above—an economy in worse shape than it was before this war began, along with a well-prepared enemy and a well-prepared market—would change the basis of pain for Iran and patience for its enemy.
In the final analysis, Iran’s security doctrine since 1979 has been a series of asymmetric innovations, which each worked for a while and then was neutralized in order. The proxy network that includes Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Popular Mobilization Forces of Iraq was already being dismantled by Israel before this war began. The missile proliferation strategy – the promise that Iran could overwhelm Israel’s and America’s defenses on a small scale – was tested in April and October of 2024 and found to be lacking. A Haaretz investigation concluded that Iran’s ballistic missiles are loaded with substandard components; one commentator asked if they were “toy missiles for children.”
Hormuz could indeed give Tehran a new concept of deterrence. But if the design holds, this weapon, too, will not be changed after its first deployment. The element of strategic surprise is now in effect, and the world will find ways to reduce the costs that Iran can impose.
Mojtaba Khamenei may match Trump with bravado, but the country he inherited from his father has been destroyed, and the prospects for recovery are bleak. All the problems that existed before February 28 are still there, compounded by everything that the war has caused.
He can be a savior. Stronger, he is not.
