Donald Trump has announced the start of a new “golden age” Middle East after announcing a ceasefire with Iran. The war, at least for now, has stopped. And while the forecast is bleak for this White House, it’s at least likely that the fighting won’t start again right away.
That alone is important. A prolonged war would raise the stakes for everyone, but above all for Washington. For all the explosions coming from the US administration, America has always been deeply concerned with long-term uncertainty and strategic risk. It is one thing to threaten. It’s another thing to endure the consequences when threats fail.
The precise terms of the ceasefire remain unclear and may not yet be fully agreed upon. But the main political reality is already visible: faced with determined opposition, the United States retreated.
None of the major requirements set at the start of the operation were met. All Trump’s wishes for Iran “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” it now looks more like political theater than strategic doctrine. Yet behind the drama of social media, more wisdom prevailed in Washington: when pressure fails, it is better to retreat than to enter a situation you can no longer control.
The feverish rhetoric before the truce served the purpose. It allowed Washington to claim that Tehran had blinked, while creating a sense of impending disaster that any pause in the fighting could be sold as relief. The White House will now try to present restraint as a victory.
This crisis is undoubtedly an important step in the wider transformation of the international system. But it is not the end of the process. Nor is it the last chapter in the struggle in the Middle East.
Iran, above all, has shown resilience. It has completely undermined the basic premise behind the US-Israeli campaign: that a sufficiently large blow would be enough to topple the Islamic Republic or force it into submission.
Tehran’s response was not surprising in the usual military sense, but it was effective. Iran widened the drama of tensions and signaled that the rising costs would not be aimed at military targets. It forced his opponents to consider not only Iranian retaliation, but the weakness of the broader regional system.
This is important because the tolerance of the United States and its regional allies is limited. Iran, by contrast, has historically been much larger.
The so-called Axis of Resistance also proved to be more durable than many thought. Despite the massive damage inflicted by Israel over the past two years, pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq remain a strategic concern. Even where they did not interfere directly, they turned up the heat and forced the attackers to stay on the edge.
Broader efforts to limit Iran’s influence have therefore come to naught. Iran has emerged covered in blood but is still standing. Even if Tehran’s insistence that any settlement must come on its terms is somewhat of a negotiating ploy, one thing is already clear: Iran’s territorial weight has not diminished in the way Washington and West Jerusalem intended.
Talks with Tehran are now inevitable. The real question is what Iran itself wants.
His initial strategy of regional expansion contributed to many of the conflicts now plaguing the Middle East. There is also the unresolved issue of its nuclear program: What exactly is Iran seeking, and what price is it willing to pay? Iran appears to have entered a new domestic phase as well, with power shifting more towards security institutions. The leadership will now have to weigh ambition against reality.
For a wider area, the effect is greater.
The Kings of the Gulf have had a terrible experience. There will be no return to the old formula in which security can be sent to Washington in exchange for money and trust. That arrangement, which has governed the region since the Cold War, has been badly shaken.
In public, the Gulf states are unlikely to make threatening gestures. But in private, their search for new flowers and new partners will increase. China, South Asia, Russia and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe will all be more important in their calculations.
That does not mean that the Gulf will accept Iranian domination. The monarchy will not tolerate Tehran having unchecked influence over the Persian Gulf or the ability to dictate terms in the Strait of Hormuz. Their policy may be more complex: contain Iran where possible while cooperating with it when necessary.
Israel, meanwhile, has not achieved its stated goals either. However great a victory is declared, the basic strategic truth has not changed. The reason for Iran still. It has not been removed, nor has it been weakened enough for Israel to feel truly safe.
The domestic consequences for the United States are difficult to judge. Trump’s personal compliments are already meaningless, but much will depend on the economy. If the oil market stabilizes, the White House will try to move quickly and insist that disaster was averted thanks to Trump’s leadership. Whether that helps Republicans in the November midterms is unclear.
Still, Trump has possessed one instinct that his critics often underestimate: he knows how to withstand obstacles and transform them.
The larger conclusion, however, goes beyond Trump. America is still a great power. His military reach, financial power and ability to create events are still formidable. But they are not limited. America can still influence the outcome but it can no longer impose its will at any cost.
The subject has now been taken far beyond Tehran. Allies and opponents will come to their own conclusions. Iran may be a special case, but the precedent has been set.
This is another step towards a different world, where coercion does not dictate decisions and old ideas about American power are becoming outdated. Trump may want to replace the American-led liberal order with a neutral one under American rule. But the events of recent weeks suggest something else: a world moving beyond any order that Washington can fully control.
This article was first published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and was translated and edited by the RT team
