In the midst of an expanding regional war, one thing—understandably—went largely unnoticed. After Hezbollah attacked Israel and took a big revenge on that country, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Nabih Berri, has been approved Cabinet decision to ban Hezbollah weapons.
This is important. Hezbollah is, of course, an armed group whose power ultimately rests on violence. But with that, the group is more dependent on its political assets for cover in protest pressure to disarm from the Lebanese state and the international community.
In the midst of an expanding regional war, one thing—understandably—went largely unnoticed. After Hezbollah attacked Israel and took a big revenge on that country, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Nabih Berri, has been approved Cabinet decision to ban Hezbollah weapons.
This is important. Hezbollah is, of course, an armed group whose power ultimately rests on violence. But with that, the group is more dependent on its political assets for cover in protest pressure to disarm from the Lebanese state and the international community.
With Berri’s latest move, such a cover could weaken and isolate Hezbollah at the worst possible time. This could embolden enemies who want to wipe out his militia, especially Lebanon’s prime minister and president. Indeed, the Lebanese army has already been reported it has started an unprecedented campaign to arrest Hezbollah members after the government’s decision to ban its weapons. This development is fragile, but meaningful.
New, a a lawyer by traininghe is the officer who stayed the longest in Lebanon. He has been the speaker of parliament for 34 years and shows no sign of stopping despite being 88 years old. Although he is the ultimate establishment politician, Berri has a distinguished past as a member and later party commander. Amal militiaa Shiite militia group that aimed to fight Israel as well as empower the Lebanese Shiites.
Unlike the Islamic Republic of Iran’s brand of Shiite extremism, Berri’s Shiism was secular in ideology despite having a sectarian identity. Indeed, Berri and his men fought a series of battles against Hezbollah for control of Beirut during the Lebanese civil war. Despite Amal military lossesBerri’s formidable position in Lebanese politics was strengthened during the Syrian invasion, which he preferred Amal. With the support of Syria, Berri obtained the speakership of the parliament, and built a large network of funding and corruption. As a result, Berri became an indelible part of Lebanese public life and a very wealthy man.
After a while, Hezbollah came to cover Amal. The death of Hafez al-Assad, followed by the ascension of his more pro-Hezbollah son Bashar along with Iran’s unfettered support, helped cement this shift. Hezbollah built a large internet it was dedicated to the provision of public services and also took credit for ending the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 2000 (although Amal played a major role in the fighting). But when Hezbollah used these real and proclaimed successes to dominate Lebanese Shiite politics, Amal, drawing on historical legitimacy and a network of corrupt connections, retained a strong base.
Berri, ever a pragmatist, accepted Hezbollah’s high-profile stance and aimed to raise money and use his speakership to become king, eventually emerging as a swing voter. Yet he had no favoritism or even a hand. As part of his accommodation to the rise of Hezbollah, he was ready prevent the law and when the election was favorable to Hezbollah. In doing so, he created the Shiite camp and the party. Through his control of the legislative agenda, he helped protect Hezbollah on key issues—for example, resisting attempts to disarm the group and eliminate its arsenal.
There are many Lebanese jokes about Berri’s longevity and personal corruption. Both are well earned. Recently, Berri has often been portrayed as a pro-Hezbollah criminal. But this is not the complete picture. Berri realized that the West needed Shiite interventionists in Lebanon, and he it emerged as a key Shiite partner for diplomats seeking indirect access to Hezbollah or simply seeking insight into the Shiite community.
Which brings us to his decision on Hezbollah’s weapons. Given his advanced age, Berri is likely to be concerned about his political legacy. That will include his standing among the Shiite community and his party’s role in Lebanon’s future. Dissociating himself from Hezbollah’s reckless operations—and going so far as to support outlawing its weapons—may indicate that Berri believes Hezbollah is alienating Lebanese Shiites by launching an unnecessary war that disproportionately punishes them.
Israeli operations in Lebanon they are still increasing. The Israeli army is order Hundreds of thousands of mostly Shiite Lebanese fled their homes in Beirut, presumably before punishing airstrikes. There are many rumors that Hezbollah is supported by blood among Lebanese Shiites. Berri is in a better position to know this than the rest of us.
We don’t know how this change might go. Shiite sentiments are hard to predict amid chaos and radical change. They are there report that Israel recently targeted Amal members, whether because they were actively involved in the fighting or simply because of Berri’s affiliation with Hezbollah. This shows the serious ambiguity of Berri’s position. Being a political victim, he can back down. This is more likely if expanding Israeli operations in southern Lebanon will have the effect of strengthening Shiite support for Hezbollah. After all, Berri’s latest antics probably don’t reflect a sincere change in his worldview. He may even have coordinated his statements with Hezbollah. Ultimately, Berri’s calculations and expectations have nothing to do with his credibility and more to do with Israel’s invasion of Lebanon’s Shiite population.
But if Berri doesn’t back off his pivot on Hezbollah, it could weaken the party’s position in Lebanon’s political institutions. The group has long relied on exploiting Berri MPs and ministers the shield weapons and its interests due to hostile policies. Losing Berri would leave Hezbollah politically and militarily exposed at the worst possible time, especially considering the Lebanese Army. promise disarm the group. Since Hezbollah has always had one foot in politics but the other in the “opposition,” Berri has long served as a kind of ambassador for Hezbollah in the Lebanese state, and losing that would further isolate them.
It seems likely of Israel ground war it will bring great harm to Hezbollah. The group, of course, will frame any major Israeli military casualties as a victory. But that does not provide any comfort to the Lebanese citizens who are facing endless suffering.
What does this mean for Berri, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese Shiite community?
Lebanon’s history is full of rapid divisions of political communities. Internet to fight and the invasion of Syria destroyed the country’s Christian political leaders in the late 1980s. More recently, Hezbollah itself to pass Sunni areas of Beirut in 2008, ousting the community’s political leadership and keeping it in a state of long-term depression. Despite his love of money, Berri has always been an ardent if not absolute champion of Shiite empowerment, and Shiite politics have not provided alternatives to Hezbollah and Amal. If he dies without an heir just as Hezbollah is destroyed, his community will be bereaved as well, leaving open the crucial question of who leads Lebanon’s Shiites.
Yet after decades of playing second fiddle to Hezbollah, Berri may now have a chance to secure his legacy, shape Shiite politics, and ensure Amal’s control of the parliamentary leadership, this time at Hezbollah’s expense rather than its benefit. Berri spent decades turning Amal from a true political party to his personal holdings. Although this gave him detailed control over the movement, it complicates the legacy due to the lack of institutional processes within the party. It is unclear whether his choice of successor will be honored after his passing, or whether other political factions will accept another Amal parliament speaker at all.
All of this gives Berri, a typical conservative, a small window to influence Lebanese politics; its relations with Western countries; and perhaps the fate of Hezbollah as well. The result could be a more vulnerable Hezbollah, caught between a hostile foreign military and Lebanese groups and institutions it has ignored, humiliated, or hated for far too long.
