The Iranian regime is suffering a major blow from the US-Israeli military campaign, but it is not on the verge of collapse. A protracted war lasting several months will increase the likelihood of such a war, but now it seems that the war will be over before then, with the current Iranian government ready. This means that the Islamic Republic may emerge weaker but more violent, aggressive and vengeful.
What would that mean? Nothing good—for the United States, Israel, the Gulf, or Iran.
The Iranian regime is suffering a major blow from the US-Israeli military campaign, but it is not on the verge of collapse. A protracted war lasting several months will increase the likelihood of such a war, but now it seems that the war will be over before then, with the current Iranian government ready. This means that the Islamic Republic may emerge weaker but more violent, aggressive and vengeful.
What would that mean? Nothing good—for the United States, Israel, the Gulf, or Iran.
At the domestic level, the survival of the Iranian regime will not buy it any new legitimacy. It is a question of when, not if, protesters will return to the streets to protest again. It is impossible to do that as long as the bombs are falling. But the large reservoir of opposition to the government will not disappear; no temporal effect of round-the-flag will change this. The rise to the position of the main leader of He insulted Mojtaba Khamenei a lot it will increase the widespread hatred.
However, the administration has made it clear that it will not tolerate any opposition, during or after the war. Given its great weakness and the apparent consolidation of power in the hands of extremists, future crackdowns will be as brutal as the crackdown that killed thousands, and perhaps tens of thousands, of people in January.
Beyond its borders, Iran will have to adjust some aspects of its foreign policy while struggling to maintain others. It is likely to be encouraged by indications that it could almost completely close the Strait of Hormuz and significantly affect global energy prices. Having lost several of its projected power assets, it will therefore quickly invest in rebuilding the capabilities it needs to threaten maritime shipping again, particularly its missile and drone programs. It will also enthusiastically remind anyone listening that it can renew its campaign in response to future pressures or threats.
For two decades, the so-called Axis of Resistance – an Iranian-led network of disarmed activists in the Middle East – was widely seen as one of the main obstacles to the Islamic Republic. The axis, however, has suffered a major blow, with Hamas and Hezbollah weakened and the Assad regime in Syria left. There is one exception: the Houthis in Yemen are the only members of the axis to be in a better position today compared to 2023. This will make the Houthis more important in Tehran’s eyes. Their growing regional influence, which now extends to the Horn of Africa, as well as their demonstrated ability to pressure Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and target naval vessels in the Red Sea, strongly suggests that the Islamic Republic will continue to support them and is very likely to increase this support.
The Iranian regime’s violent retaliatory campaign against the six Arab states of the southern Persian Gulf will leave a painful history and make their long-term security challenges more difficult to manage. They will still be on the front line against the Islamic Republic and will not forget the thousands of drones and missiles sent from the northern shores of the Gulf. That will increase their dependence on the United States, especially to restore their air defense. But many in the region will also remember that the Trump administration started this war against their wishes and thus continue their efforts to change their security partnership.
A weaker and more aggressive Islamic Republic also affects Russian and Chinese interests in the Gulf. Russia and China will suffer from the weakening of an ally with whom they have had a close relationship for decades. But both could benefit from growing frustration with the United States among the Arab Gulf states. With Washington viewed as increasingly unreliable, these countries are likely to continue to strengthen their ties with Moscow and Beijing.
After the war, the Iranian regime’s campaign to suppress the opposition will undoubtedly spread beyond its borders, with implications for countries with large Iranian diasporas. In the past, the combination of greater government risk both domestically and geographically and the intensified mobilization of the diaspora (during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in 2022-23, for example) led to a major international crackdown. As Iranian diaspora communities in North America and Europe mobilize against the post-war regime, they should expect to be victims of a more aggressive campaign than usual of pressure, threats, intimidation, slander and misinformation. European governments, in particular, should be ready to protect their citizens and residents.
Ultimately, a weakened but vindictive Islamic Republic, under the strengthened control of extremists, will distrust the United States even more than it already does. It will be remembered that in June 2025 and February 2026, Washington used diplomatic talks as an excuse to prepare for war. Tehran will be harder and less likely to agree on what it sees as the most important pillars of its deterrence posture, particularly its missile and drone programs. It is highly unlikely to adhere to an agreement on its nuclear program and may even decide that further development with its nuclear program, even testing a nuclear device, is the only way to prevent future attacks.
At the same time, Iran’s ability to maintain regional power will be reduced due to the heavy losses that US and Israeli airstrikes bring. Its missile and nuclear programs have been severely damaged, its economy will be more troubled than ever, and popular discontent will continue to represent a permanent threat to the government. But the fundamental tension between Iran and the United States will not be resolved. Future rounds of violence between the United States and Israel, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, are therefore likely.
Consider Lebanon, where Israel has also locked itself into a cycle of repeated “grassroots” interventions by repeatedly striking Hezbollah after the group strikes again. This has been a tragedy for the people of Lebanon. But the consequences of such a cycle would be far worse in Iran, not only for the 92 million Iranians but also for regional stability. Additionally, the period between the end of the current war and the next round of violence is likely to see an escalation of various gray zone and all-out tactics, including cyber attacks, sabotage, and Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks abroad.
The United States went to war against the Islamic Republic in pursuit of a laudable but ambiguous and incoherent hope: to weaken the regime and possibly overthrow it. Optimism, however, is not a strategy. The war risks leaving in power a weak but worst government that will be a great threat to its people and to its neighbors.
