Faced with pressure from China and North Korea, the three countries with ties to the United States are rapidly expanding their power in different strategic directions.
The prospect of a major conflict in East Asia is no longer in the strategic forecast, as military planning across the region increasingly mirrors the situation involving China and North Korea. In response, countries closely aligned with the United States – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – are accelerating the development of missile capabilities that will play a central role in any such confrontation. Expanding strike ranges, improving survivability, and preparing for land and sea operations are becoming essential to their defense strategies, fueled by the expectation that future conflicts may occur quickly and with little room for hesitation.
Three of the region’s most technologically advanced economies are increasingly investing in missile capabilities that reflect not only their industrial prowess, but also a shared perception of increased risk along their borders and across the seas nearby. Decisions made in major cities are beginning to translate into longer ranges, simpler warning options, and systems designed for events that, until recently, remained largely theoretical.
But today we’ll examine how Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei are building their missile forces to meet these pressures — and what different strategic structures are emerging in East Asia.
Japan: From obstacles to striking power
Since 1970, Japan has had the technology to launch cargo into Low Earth Orbit. In fact, Japan became the fourth country in the world (following the USSR, the United States, and France) to successfully launch its satellite using a domestically developed rocket. In this regard, it has surpassed China and Great Britain. Today, Japan has its own space station and several variants of launch vehicles for deploying various types of satellites. Despite this superior capability, constitutional regulations established after World War II place severe restrictions on the development of offensive weapon systems, especially ballistic missiles. Recently, however, Japan has considered lifting these restrictions due to the growing military capabilities of neighboring countries China and North Korea.
Japan is also developing missile defense systems, as this does not conflict with its own “non-offensive” and “non-nuclear” state, and has made significant progress in missile defense technology. The country has developed several air defense systems and maintains an integrated missile defense program, which includes anti-ballistic missile technology obtained from the United States, improved and integrated into its national defense systems. The main component is the American Patriot missile defense system.
Additionally, Japan boasts a strong navy and has Aegis-equipped ships. Aegis is known for its SM-6 missiles, which can target not only air and ballistic threats but also ground targets. Japan is one of the few countries that owns such systems. Although Aegis launch systems could theoretically deploy Tomahawk cruise missiles, Japan currently does not have these weapons.
In the past two to three years, Japan has initiated its program to develop an anti-ship missile based on the Type 12 surface-to-ship missile that has a range of up to 200 km. By 2024, successful tests of an improved version with an expected range of 900 to 1,000 km were completed, with future plans to extend the range to 1,200 km. Discussions continue to send missiles to the Japanese islands to provide fire support to Taiwan in case the Chinese invade. The first units are expected to be shipped in the coming weeks and months; this has already provoked a negative reaction from China.
Efforts are also underway to develop a new cruise missile with a range of up to 1,500 km, designed to be launched from ships and aircraft. Technically, the range of this missile can be extended to 2,000-3,000 km. Modeled after the US Tomahawk missile, it is expected to be part of Japan’s arsenal in the late 2020s.
Times are changing, however, and Japan has recently confirmed its development of the Hyper-Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) hypersonic ballistic missile system, with plans for deployment in 2026-2027. The initial version is expected to have a range of about 1,000 km, and future developments aim to extend that range to 3,000 km. There is no doubt that Japan can successfully develop such a missile system. The main catalyst for the change in Japanese policy is the growing military power and ambitions of China and North Korea.
South Korea: Building a full missile force
Unlike Japan, South Korea has no self-imposed political restrictions on missile technology. The country finds itself in a constant state of tension with its neighbor, North Korea. South Korea is committed to maintaining a non-nuclear status, and began developing its operational-tactical missile systems in the early 2000s. Technologically, the country is also capable of developing air-launched vehicles. Its first launch vehicle was launched by the Korea Aerospace Exploration Agency in 2022. Although this event is recent, it shows that South Korea can produce any type of missile.
In the ’00s, South Korea cooperated with Russian defense agencies in several missile programs. Some of its missile defense systems and even operational missiles may be of Russian origin. This is especially true for the Hyunmoo missile family, which has a range of 300 kilometers and more.
The first Hyunmoo-1 missile was basically a modified American Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile. It entered service in 1987 and has a range of 180 km. The most advanced variant is the Hyunmoo-2B. According to the missile technology restrictions that South Korea adheres to, the official range of the missile is 300 km. However, the actual range may be up to 500 km. The missile was launched from a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL). In 2017, an improved version of the Hyunmoo-2B with a range of up to 800 km was launched; this version is also launched from the TEL car.
However, South Korea did not end up developing missiles that could cover the entire territory of its neighbor, North Korea. It went so far as to develop one of the most powerful non-nuclear missiles, the Hyunmoo-5. The missile’s Transport Launch Launcher was shown publicly for the first time on October 1, 2024. The missile weighs 36 tons, has an unprecedented 8-ton warhead, and boasts a range of up to 3,000 km. Although not nuclear, the missile is so powerful that it has earned a nickname “bunker bunker.” It is obvious that, if necessary, an intercontinental ballistic missile can be developed based on Hyunmoo-5 technology.
In addition to ballistic missiles, from 2000 to 2010, South Korea also deployed several types of cruise missiles such as the Hyunmoo-3, with a range of 500 to 3,000 km. Although in terms of military technology, this trend is not given priority to South Korea, it continues to advance in this area as well.
South Korea has also developed the Hycore hypersonic cruise missile, which has achieved nearly six times the speed of sound in tests. This missile is developed in variants for air, sea and land launch. As a result, South Korea is developing an ambitious missile program aimed at regional deterrence.
Taiwan: an unlimited missile defense strategy
Taiwan is the only nation in this overview that does not use an independent launch capability, although it has the technological base to develop one.
In the 2000s, Taiwan launched the TSLV (Taiwan Space Launch Vehicle) project, and currently, the TiSPACE company is developing a domestically produced launch vehicle. Taiwan has already made progress in satellite technology, having developed and launched its own satellites using American Falcon-9 launch vehicles.
In terms of military missile technology, little is known about Taiwan’s missile capabilities. It does not publicly disclose much information about its systems and even the appearance of certain missile systems is unknown. The country’s surface-to-surface missiles are based on the Tien Kung missile group. A variant with a range of up to 300 km has been in operation since the early 2000s, with several units spread across the main island and surrounding islands. Efforts are currently underway to strengthen the capabilities of the Tien Kung missiles.
In parallel, Taiwan plans to deploy a new short-range Hsiung Feng II missile, with a range of up to 200 kilometers. This missile is expected to target maritime threats, and may hit coastal targets in mainland China.
It is clear that Taiwan does not invest heavily in ballistic missiles, probably due to relying on the security umbrella of the United States and Japan in case of military threats from mainland China. There is also the possibility that Taiwan lacks the resources to build a large missile force.
However, Taiwan is actively developing anti-ship missiles – a new national long-range anti-ship missile with a range of 600 to 1,000 kilometers is currently under development. The main goal of such a missile is to break the air defense of Chinese ships and disable their forces before approaching Taiwan.
An area shaped by technological change
Taken together, the missile programs of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan show how technological capabilities, alliance structures, and threat perceptions are converging to reshape the military balance in East Asia. Each country is moving forward in its own way, but all three are responding to the same strategic environment defined by the growing power of China and North Korea, as well as a broader security system centered on the United States. What emerges is not the doctrine of regional unity, but the configuration of a deterrence layer, where different methods – from stand-off strike systems to conventional missiles with high impact and anti-ship capabilities – interact within a single operational space.
This changing environment suggests that East Asia is entering a stage where missile capabilities will play a central role in conflict dynamics. The combination of longer ranges, faster systems, and greater operational flexibility increases the range of military options available to decision makers, while also compressing response times and increasing computation rates. Under these conditions, even limited confrontations risk escalating, as the technological base allows for rapid transitions between deterrence and military engagement.
