With Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion dismantling the Iranian regime’s nuclear and military infrastructure, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups have expressed interest in joining the war – though American goals they are not dependent on supporting or arming the local army. Iranian Kurdish groups formed a new direction – the Union of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan – stretching Iran’s security forces and control key border areas and strategic corridors. The Iranian Kurdish position also aims to help overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran and recognize it Kurdish autonomy in democratic Iran.
Until now, many analysts and commentators have criticized the participation of the Iranian Kurds in the war. Others say that they should not join the war without firm commitment because the United States (USA) has a record of ‘stop‘ The Kurds. Others fear that arming Iranian Kurdish opposition groups will to stimulate Persian nationalismpromote secession, and help the Iranian regime to strengthen itself.
With Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion dismantling the Iranian regime’s nuclear and military infrastructure, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups have expressed interest in joining the war – though American goals they are not dependent on supporting or arming the local army. Iranian Kurdish groups formed a new direction – the Union of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan – stretching Iran’s security forces and control key border areas and strategic corridors. The Iranian Kurdish position also aims to help overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran and recognize it Kurdish autonomy in democratic Iran.
Until now, many analysts and commentators have criticized the participation of the Iranian Kurds in the war. Others say that they should not join the war without firm commitment because the United States (USA) has a record of ‘stop‘ The Kurds. Others fear that arming Iranian Kurdish opposition groups will to stimulate Persian nationalismpromote secession, and help the Iranian regime to strengthen itself.
These views are exaggerated by calculating strict reality. Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran have served as auxiliaries and allies for decades without formal agreements. Throughout the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), for example, different Kurdish peshmerga groups allied with foreign governments and sometimes against each other to fight. Kurdish militia groups in Syria willingly accepted US and foreign aid to help defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), knowing that this aid was temporary, operational and tactical. The Iraqi Kurds have maintained an important partnership with the United States even though past support was short-lived.
Similarly, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups are not ordinary actors. They will fight if the right incentives and strategic conditions are present. Like other non-state armed groups, they benefit from foreign funding to advance their political agenda, gain quasi-legitimacy, and strengthen their military capabilities.
Concerns about the Iranians “circling the flag” in response to armed Iranian Kurdish opposition groups have been exaggerated. It assumes a national balance that does not exist in the Islamic Republic today. Some opposition groups of the Iranian diaspora, especially those led by Prince Reza Pahlavihave strongly criticized the Iranian Kurdish coalition as separatists who threaten the integrity of Iran’s land. Yet Persian Iranians are divided between government loyalists, reformists, nationalists, and a growing number of anti-regime youth. The non-Persian groups that comprise half of Iran’s population – Kurds, Baluch, Arabs, Azeris – are equally diverse. Iranian Kurds, who represent about 10 percent of Iran’s population, are about 60 percent Sunni Muslims, 35 percent Shi’a Muslims, and five percent ethnic and dialectal groups. This diversity creates complex intergroup relations that transcend ethnicity and segregation.
Therefore, the issue is not whether the Iranian Kurds are ready to fight or whether arming Kurdish opponents will strengthen Persian nationalism. Rather, it is about the effectiveness of the Iranian Kurds as a resistance force.
The main challenge here is military capability. For decades Kurdish peshmerga forces have trained and fought in the mountains and carried out cross-border attacks against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and at times other Kurdish peshmerga forces. Yet Iran’s Kurdish peshmerga – numbering in the hundreds or thousands – have not fought in a full-scale war since the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. These peshmerga forces are lightly armed but lack air defense systems and armored vehicles. They have little experience with modern warfare. Unlike their counterparts in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria, the Iranian Kurdish forces also lack stable leadership (as many leaders have been killed by the Iranian regime) and effective political institutions that can provide strategic direction, build capacity, and ensure sustainability of efforts.
In fact, private groups have conducted successful operations against Iranian government forces for decades. One of the most active and an army capable of fightings is the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) PJAK is an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is a terrorist organization officially designated by the United States, the European Union, NATO, and other US allies. According to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service, from 2015-2025 PJAK attacks accounted for nearly 70 percent of all. confirmed attacks and Iranian Kurdish opposition groups against the regime. PJAK could also draw thousands of PKK fighters from its base in the Qandil Mountains in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Still, PJAK is just one organization. Iran’s Kurdish opposition groups are not a unified fighting force. The six factions that make up the Coalition of Political Forces in Iranian Kurdistan are politically and militarily divided. Conflicts are between conservative and left-wing nationalists, ethnic and urban groups, and/or those affiliated with the two main political parties of the Iraqi Kurds, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Bafel Talabani. Some groups are divided internally. For example, when I visited the camp of Komala opposition forces in Sulaymaniyah in the 2000s, I had to meet two different groups in different places in the same neighborhood. These divisions continue today and affect the loyalty of the group and the loyalty of the local population.
Furthermore, while PJAK is the group with the greatest military potential, it comes with the greatest political risk. PJAK brings a security threat to the government of Turkey, which is a member of NATO and an important ally of the United States. A resurgent PJAK will raise concerns in Ankara, bring new problems to the US-Turkey strategic partnership, increase tensions between Turkey and Israel, and fuel regional instability. Turkey is focused PJAK operations in the past and may continue to do so.
An established Iranian Kurdish resistance force, even in a weakened state, also poses security risks to Iraq. Even before the war began, the Iranian regime and its proxy forces carried out missile and drone attacks against US military bases, diplomatic posts and oil and gas facilities in the country. Iranian attacks on oil wells across Iraq, including an American oil field in the Kurdistan Region operated by an American company. HKN Energythey have stopped production for a while. Iran could also close parts of the 200-mile border it shares with the Kurdistan Region and suppress trade and the local economy. This is why the Kurdish leaders of Iraq do not want to get involved in the war. Iraqi Kurdish officials have insisted that “there is none The Iraqi Kurd has crossed the border” and that the Kurdistan Region “will not be part of the conflict”. The Iraqi government in Baghdad has taken a similar position.
These realities have implications for any efforts to support, engage, and/or support the Iranian Kurds. Iran’s Kurdish opposition groups are ready to fight the Iranian government – despite the narrative of abandonment that says otherwise. Depending on the motivation, type of support, and operating environment, Iranian Kurdish resistance groups can be a good, albeit limited, resource. They can fill the security gap, control areas, protect and stabilize border areas in the west of Iran, carry out attacks, disrupt order and share intelligence. However, to sustain such operations, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups would need targeted military support, training, and coordination with other anti-government actors. Extended aid, in turn, could pose a risk to regional stability and coalition management.
Ultimately, however, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups are unlikely to be effective in achieving their political goals. Any plans to overthrow the Iranian regime and achieve Kurdish independence in a democratic Iran will not be achieved without regional support and local support – which is not available now or likely to be in the near future.
