When Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on March 12, almost two weeks after the US-Israel war in Iran began, one picture from the meeting they came out.
In it, Pakistan Army chief Asim Munir sits next to the two leaders in a covert battle. Munir’s attire seemed to reflect a country that balances military mobilization with diplomacy – just as he briefly led a strike in Afghanistan and discussed the Middle East conflict with regional leaders.
On April 7, the United States and Iran reached a fragile two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan, with support from China. In facilitating these talks, Pakistan took a position it had not taken in any previous regional crisis. Now, as it prepares for talks between the two sides in Islamabad, another balancing act of Pakistan is emerging.
Avoiding major conflicts in the Middle East has long been a pillar of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan shares a long and volatile border with Iran, while millions of Pakistani workers live in Gulf countries, sending remittances to help prop up the weak economy. In particular, Pakistan has historically maintained working relations with Iran while strengthening informal economic and security ties with Saudi Arabia.
However, last September, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense agreement which suggested the calculus shift. In addition to security guarantees, the treaty formalizes military coordination, intelligence sharing, and strategic consultation. After the March meeting between Sharif and Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistan backed the pledge, pledging to “always stand firm with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and strive for their shared desire for peace in the region.”
But even as it reaffirmed its commitment to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan moved quickly to position itself as an indispensable partner in the larger conflict. Pakistan’s mediating role and its defense pact seem to be heading in the opposite direction: Playing a loyal proxy to Iran requires neutrality, while the pact with Saudi Arabia implies balance. But perhaps it is because of the defense pact that Pakistan has emerged as an enabler.
If Pakistan’s mediation is successful, it will raise its regional profile and help it avoid a direct military confrontation it cannot afford. If the war escalates and Saudi Arabia uses the deal, Pakistan’s fence will collapse, and it will face a choice it has spent weeks trying to avoid.
Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defense pact formal financial and military equality was maintained for generations. The Pakistani military has surrounded Saudi Arabia as a permanent security guarantor since the 1960s, with officers trained and inducted into Saudi forces and retired generals taking on advisory roles in Riyadh. During the Cold War, Saudi financial flows bolstered Pakistan’s military capabilities, while Islamabad served as a conduit for Gulf money to reach Afghan opposition networks. That history created lasting expectations for both sides, even without a contract.
Therefore, formalizing the relationship was a political gesture as well. Both countries wanted to commit to paper at a time of changing dynamics in the Middle East. In 2020, the Abraham Accords reformed relations between Israel and Arab countries including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, creating a bloc that served to counter Iranian influence. And by mid-2025, Iran’s nuclear program was stronger than ever.
At the same time, Pakistan was dealing with its own economic crisis and needed Saudi Arabia’s help through loans, deferred oil payments, and investments—making a formal agreement worth the diplomatic cost.
“Saudi Arabia is a major source of energy supplies, financial aid, and money from Pakistani workers in the Gulf,” said Sehar Kamran, a Pakistani lawmaker with long-standing ties to Saudi Arabia. “These ties naturally push Pakistan towards closer alignment with Riyadh.”
The defense deal is likely to ease doubts in Riyadh that Islamabad was a reliable security partner. “Under (former Prime Minister) Imran Khan, Pakistan played with a different posture, leaning towards Iran and moving somewhat away from its traditional Saudi alliance,” said Asfandyar Mir, a senior South Asia fellow at the Stimson Center.
“What we have seen since then is a decisive return to Saudi’s first direction. From Riyadh’s point of view, the defense agreement was always understood as part of a broader framework aimed at Iran,” Mir said.
This promise is now being tested in real time. The Iran war has crippled Pakistan’s economy: Within days of the first strike, Qatar halted shipments of liquefied natural gas, causing 21 percent increase in oil prices in Pakistan at that time. (Pakistan it went up diesel prices by another 55 percent and gas by 43 percent in early April.) The Pakistani government also imposed emergency austerity measures, rationing gas supplies to fertilizer plants and raising concerns about agricultural production during the winter crop cycle.
In March, Pakistan announced a four-day federal work week, a two-week closure of educational institutions, and restrictions on non-essential energy use. In response to the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, Pakistan launched a naval escort mission and separately requested that Saudi Arabia provide an oil pipeline through its Red Sea port of Yanbu to bypass the strait.
Saudi Arabia has been attacked by Iranian missiles and drones since the start of the war, but has not formally used a defense pact with Pakistan. Last month, the two sides discussed what the deal calls “procedures to stop” Iranian attacks. The open question for Saudi Arabia is clear: political solidarity now and military preparedness if the escalation crosses the threshold sufficient to establish a truce.
In interview on Bloomberg Television on March 11, Mosharraf Zaidi, Sharif’s foreign media spokesman, was asked whether Pakistan would help Saudi Arabia if the war escalated. “The question is not whether Pakistan can come to Saudi Arabia’s aid,” Zaidi said. Both countries “have always worked on the principle of being there for the other before they need the other. … We will, no matter what and no matter when.”
Pakistan’s commitment to Saudi Arabia is likely to push it to prioritize high-level withdrawal. Moreover, with its army already engaged in Afghanistan, any situation that diverts forces to the Middle East would put a lot of pressure on the Pakistan Army.
Defense Minister of Pakistan Khawaja Asif he warned in the first few days of the war that a weakened Tehran could leave Islamabad open to pressure from many sides, especially if Iran drifts toward India and Afghanistan. By recasting Pakistan’s interest in escalation as geopolitical rather than sympathetic to Iran, Islamabad has so far been able to maintain ties with Tehran without undermining Riyadh.
Indeed, Pakistan has engaged Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt and Turkey, in its efforts to facilitate peace efforts. At the end of last month, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar welcomed Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, along with their Egyptian and Turkish counterparts. Shortly thereafter, Dar traveled to Beijing for talks with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, leading to cooperation a five-point peace proposal which eventually led to a ceasefire.
By keeping yourself As a vital link between the United States and Iran, Pakistan has turned geographic and diplomatic proximity into strategic currency. If its mediation efforts ultimately succeed, Islamabad will emerge from the conflict with a strengthened position in Washington, goodwill in Tehran, and proof of value to Riyadh beyond military personnel. The combination would translate directly into debt relief, energy, and investment.
Senior Pakistani officials speaking in retrospect described Pakistan’s attitude as a modified hedge rather than neutrality – a diplomatic push to manage the Middle East conflict as well as a clear security commitment to Saudi Arabia. Any direct threat to Saudi Arabia, they said, would trigger a robust response under existing defense arrangements.
In practice, the Pakistani military response would begin with air defense and intelligence support, or—in excess– advice or deployment of special forces. A direct attack by Iran on Saudi territory could bring Pakistan’s naval assets to the Gulf and even raise questions about the nuclear dimension of the deal—which both governments have so far carefully avoided.
Currently, Pakistan continues to operate on a two-way street, maintaining contacts with Iran while strengthening its commitments to Saudi Arabia. But if the ceasefire fails – and if the war escalates into a direct confrontation involving Saudi territory – the fence will end. What remains is the mutual protection agreement and the responsibilities that go with it.
