The Iranian regime’s military strategy has always involved a fundamental bet that it can control escalation. For the better part of half a century, this gamble paid off handsomely. Whether it was taking hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, bombing U.S. Marine bases in Beirut and Air Force bases in Saudi Arabia, or sponsoring allies from Afghanistan to Gaza to Iraq, Iran’s actions, until recently, have not caused serious harm.
This month, Iran placed its biggest bet on its ability to control the escalation. But this time, it seems headed for disaster.
The Iranian regime’s military strategy has always involved a fundamental bet that it can control escalation. For the better part of half a century, this gamble paid off handsomely. Whether it was taking hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, bombing U.S. Marine bases in Beirut and Air Force bases in Saudi Arabia, or sponsoring allies from Afghanistan to Gaza to Iraq, Iran’s actions, until recently, have not caused serious harm.
This month, Iran placed its biggest bet on its ability to control the escalation. But this time, it seems headed for disaster.
In recent confrontations with the United States, Iran has tried to control escalation and pursue the use of tit-for-tat violence. After the United States killed the leader of the Quds Force Qassem Suleimani in 2020, Iran was launched missile attack on two US military bases in Iraq, which did not kill any Americans. Similarly, after Operation Midnight Hammer in June last year, where the United States struck Iran’s nuclear sites, Tehran. he replied and another missile attack—this time on a US air base in Qatar, again contrived to make a point but not to fuel a larger conflict. During these initial iterations, Iran seems to care more about the public statement made by its missiles than any actual military impact.
This time is different. Iran has pursued what can be charitably called an “over-reduce” strategy. Tehran has he hit not only the goals of Israel and America but also another country across the region, including those that have so far been friendly to the regime—such as Oman, Qatar, and Turkey. Moreover, Iran has set its goals beyond military targets to attack oil infrastructure, hoteland airportseconomic vitality of the area. Presumably, Iran thinks that by hurting US allies and partners in the region — not to mention every other country that depends on the region’s oil supply — that will increase pressure on the Trump administration to end the war.
“Get up to lose” strategies, however, rarely work. During the first Gulf War, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein made that bet by launching missiles Israelhe can provoke it to go to war and thus break up—or at least disrupt—the coalition led by the United States and its Arab allies. Instead, the United States went to great lengths to hunt down the Iraqi missile launchers rather than keep Israel out of the conflict. The Scud hunting campaign was working under successbut it worked to keep Israel out of the conflict and keep the coalition fighting Iraq.
Recently, Russia tried such tactics. Of the Kremlin threats of nuclear war may have influenced the Biden administration’s decisions to send military aid to Ukraine, but it did not stop that aid entirely. Most recently, Russia flew drones into Poland last September, to violate NATO airspace, and increase its covert operations in Europe to pressure NATO to end its support for Ukraine. If anything, the moves have only strengthened Europe’s resolve to support Ukraine and resist Russian aggression.
Iran’s strategy of “more and less” will backfire as well. Countries that Iran has targeted, including through its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah—Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—are just as likely to join forces against Iran as they are to push for a ceasefire. After all, Iran’s missile attacks did not just attack US facilities, but the citizens and economies of those countries. There are early signs that Saudi Arabia,, UAEand others measure revenge.
That would increase Tehran’s strategic dilemma. The Gulf states have their own formidable weapons. Saudi Arabia’s defense budget alone was 78 billion dollars in 2025, approx three times that of Iran. Even if these countries choose not to be directly involved in the war, they can help in other ways: providing intelligence or freezing Property of Iran. The door may be open for European involvement as well, as NATO has intercepted missiles over Turkey and a drone was shot down in British base in Cyprus.
Iran’s other strategy is to isolate countries further away. Much of Asia—including China, India, and Japan—it depends on the oil coming from the Persian Gulf, but economic collapse it sounds as far away as South America. Although these countries may not support the actions of the United States and Israel, Iran’s tactics will not be ignored. If the desperate Iranian government starts an international campaign of terror, like some experts predictthat won’t win you any friends either.
Even if these countries were to encourage the United States and Israel to end the war, would they? Iran’s strategy is still based on the dubious claim that these countries have enough leverage against US President Donald Trump or Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to change US or Israeli policies. There is little evidence to suggest that this is the case.
Trump has been an Iran hawk since almost the beginning of the Islamic Republic. In 1980, he made a call military intervention against Iran to resolve the hostage crisis. Since then, he has been it defended with a firm hand—including power—to deal with Iran’s mistakes. During his first term, he walked away from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better known as the Iran nuclear deal, and replaced it with “high pressure” campaign to be the centerpiece of his Middle East policy crown achievement of his first term and last year’s strike against Iran’s nuclear facilitiesimpressive achievement.”
Netanyahu’s record on Iran is fine. He has warned about the dangers of the Iranian regime for more than three decades. Early even he compared the threat from a nuclear-armed Iran to that of the Soviet Union. And, like Trump, he was often skeptical of diplomatic solutions to Iran’s proliferation. Now that Netanyahu sees an opportunity to end the threat militarily, it will be difficult for any local actor to convince him to back down.
All of this has yet to take into account the specific personalities and politics involved. Trump is taking the backlash as a sign of weakness. As we have seen recently with international tariffs, Trump doubles down even when the policy is dislikedreason economic collapseor enters a roadblock. . He and Netanyahu have also shown that they are willing to meet the demands of allies and partners. Both leaders are also in an election year and have reason to believe that a military victory it will be good for their political fortunes. The requests of other regional actors, if they were to come, could be ignored.
If by any chance Iran’s strategy of “further decline” will build diplomatic pressure to end the war – or, more likely, that combination of US decline. public opinion and global economic pressure prompts Trump to reverse course—Tehran will still have inflicted long-term damage on itself. Despite its oil resources, Iran’s fragile economy depends on good relations with the rest of the region. Estimated 60 percent of Iran’s trade is with its neighbors. Before the current conflict, China belonged to Iran bigger business partners, but Iraq, Turkey, and the UAE were among the top five.
Iran sees itself as the natural hegemon of the Middle East with a large population, vast oil wealth, and an imperial history dating back to ancient Persia. But it is difficult for Iran to dominate the region if it chooses to attack friends and enemies alike. Memories are long in the Middle East, and Iran’s actions this month could be repeated for generations. Even if the regime survives US and Israeli bombing, this conflict will emerge poorer, weaker and more isolated than before. In other words, even if Iran wins this war in the narrow sense of the word, its victory must be a Pyrrhic one.
And that is the problem with Iran’s strategic gambling. Roll the dice enough times, and the odds eventually work against you. Iran is about to learn this lesson, and it will have only itself to blame.
