Sing, O Muse, of the wrath of Donald Trump, twice elected, highly honored by his cabinet, greatly despised by his enemies. Sing about his ships and his planes and his bombs, and how they hit, but they couldn’t change Tehran’s regime. Sing about his pride, his thirst for glory, and the hundreds of ships caught anchoring in the Gulf…
The Iran war is not a Greek tragedy, but we must admit that it has all the major elements. There is an arrogant president, who listens more to his ego and is driven by the need for greatness and legacy. He wins bad battles, abandons his promises, divides his followers, and brings unnecessary pain and destruction to the world.
Sing, O Muse, of the wrath of Donald Trump, twice elected, highly honored by his cabinet, greatly despised by his enemies. Sing about his ships and his planes and his bombs, and how they hit, but they couldn’t change Tehran’s regime. Sing about his pride, his thirst for glory, and the hundreds of ships caught anchoring in the Gulf…
The Iran war is not a Greek tragedy, but we must admit that it has all the major elements. There is an arrogant president, who listens more to his ego and is driven by the need for greatness and legacy. He wins bad battles, abandons his promises, divides his followers, and brings unnecessary pain and destruction to the world.
And as in many Greek tragedies, the source of this disaster is hubris. Many have expressed how astonishing it is that a president whose election was based on insults against the folly of America’s war in the Middle East would choose to start such a war himself.
But where voters heard Trump criticize an unpopular war, it turned out he was criticizing his predecessors. As US Vice President JD Vance told reporters after last year’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear sites, “The difference is that back then, we had dumb presidents, and now we have a president who knows how to accomplish America’s national security goals.”
We may laugh at such contradictions, but the first year of Trump’s second term largely confirmed this idea in the minds of Trump and those close to him. Airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, the seizure of President Nicolas Maduro from Venezuela, and even a brief air campaign against the Houthis in Yemen were relatively successful punitive missions. It may not have been a major strategic success, but it demonstrated impressive tactical precision with US military forces, produced almost no recoil, and did not plunge the US into any wider chaos.
More confident that he had found a recipe for a good use of force abroad, it was almost inevitable that Trump would pass. Six weeks into the war with Iran, with the economic costs mounting and the administration scrambling to find a way out, we have clearly reached that point.
Now, the question is to what extent Trump’s callousness—unwillingness to consider the second and third consequences of his actions—will hurt American interests in the long run. If the White House can’t find a way out soon, not only will the economic costs begin to plummet, but it is likely to put the United States in its worst strategic position for a decade or more.
The war is immediate the effects are visible to all. Although markets have been more resilient to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz than anyone expected, they have grown nervous since the conflict passed the one-month mark. The price of certain fuel products (ie, jet fuel and diesel) has risen, Asian countries have introduced rationing measures, and the potential for inflation and the potential for recession have increased.
And, of course, there are domestic political costs for Trump’s own party. Republicans, already unpopular in the upcoming midterm elections, could lose the House and Senate. Trump’s approval rating is to fallespecially among young voters—nearly eight in 10 of whom are dissatisfied with his presidency.
All the economic and political effects, however, can be minimized if the war ends soon. Rather, it is the strategic implications that should concern policy makers.
For one thing, it’s almost a joke in Washington at this point to talk about a “pivot to Asia” that never happened. Trump is at least the third US president to fail to address the threat from China as outlined in the National Security Strategy. But it’s not just that the US is targeting the Middle East when it should be targeting China. Rather, it is the actual destruction of its radar and air defenses, interceptors, missiles, and other capabilities.
The defense of U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific—that is, in the Taiwan emergency—depends heavily on those weapons, which are being used at high speed during the conflict in Iran. Given the poor US defense industrial base, those weapons will not be replaced quickly, easily or cheaply. The practical implications of this US containment war in the Indo-Pacific are clear. Deterrence is often defined as a combination of ability and trust; the war in Iran puts America’s power—and its ability to deter China—in doubt.
Then there’s Trump’s own strategy to dominate energy. After coming to power, the Trump administration announced a bold energy strategy that relied on US shale energy production, where the country will act as an important oil player, producing oil and especially liquefied natural gas (LNG) for partners, and helping stabilize world markets. Although not good for the climate, such a move would undoubtedly be good for the US economy, as well as its power and influence.
However, it is likely that another long-term effect of this conflict will be driving countries away from fossil fuels. With regional oil and gas infrastructure under threat, particularly in Qatar, and energy flows remaining restricted in the Strait of Hormuz, countries that based their energy strategies on LNG are increasingly seeing it as a bad bet. Asia’s poorest countries are turning to coal to fill today’s gaps; later, they are likely to turn to Chinese renewable technologies such as solar. European nations, meanwhile, face tough decisions about whether to cut off Russian gas or restart mothballed nuclear power programs. Trump’s energy dominance strategy was never a sure thing, but this war has put it to bed.
The war has also heightened fears about the unreliability of the United States in its role as guarantor of international trade and sea lanes, a role it has played since the end of World War II. In this war, though, the United States has acted more as an agent of chaos in world markets than a stabilizing force.
Indeed, the Trump administration appears to give little thought to the notion that a regime change war against Tehran could lead to Iran trying to block the Strait of Hormuz. But the war has turned what was an obvious threat into a practical reality, and now Tehran has suggested that it will continue to use its commanding position over the strait to demand tolls from ships for safe passage even after the fighting ends. It is difficult to imagine a situation that could more effectively demonstrate the limits of US power and the ability to set international rules of the road.
Perhaps most importantly, the Trump administration is undermining its foreign policy legacy. The administration has always had its internal contradictions, but as its National Security Strategy 2025 demonstrated, it nevertheless managed to unite a world vision that appealed to different constituencies within the Republican Party, a strategy that would serve American interests and involve playing a constructive role in the world. In practice, the administration wanted to ease tensions between China and participate in peace building in Ukraine and elsewhere.
But the war in Iran has derailed Trump’s China summit, strengthened Russia, and undermined talks about the war in Ukraine. It has drawn attention from debates about the transfer of cargo to Europe and revitalizing the defense industrial base. And it has done so for almost no strategic advantage. Although this campaign has destroyed many Iranian weapons platforms and killed Iranian leaders and soldiers, leaders can be replaced and weapons systems can be rebuilt. In the absence of increased damage by ground combat, the war could be a tactical success and a strategic failure at best. If it escalates, then it will be a gaping wound, dragging Trump’s other foreign policies down with it.
Last year, I I was asked what the best and worst case scenarios for a four-year Trump presidency would be. Trump has always been impulsive and difficult to predict, but his foreign policy has also managed to reshape existing norms in ways that may be useful to future policymakers. The best-case scenario for a Trump presidency, I still believe, would be one of creative destruction, where he can dismantle many of the old structures that held American foreign policy in a stalemate, giving future administrations room to build.
Instead, however, we seem to be edging closer to a worst-case scenario, where the damage is so random and so costly that it serves to undermine America’s power, making it more difficult for the United States to build a new and constructive role in the world.
As many heroes of Greek epics learn, pride often goes before a fall. The war in Iran is a strategic mistake of the highest proportions. It not only shows the world that the US is weaker than it is supposed to be, but also drives bad intentions towards the country, while hiding US military capabilities and deterrence credibility in the future. If the Trump administration does not find a way out soon, then the end result could be truly tragic.
