For centuries, outside powers have vied for control in Armenia, a small South Caucasus nation sandwiched between Turkey, Iran and Russia. The upcoming Armenian parliamentary elections are the latest chapter in that struggle.
Last week, US President Donald Trump publicly has been approved Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan ahead of parliamentary elections in a Social Truth post, highlighting the heightened stakes of a race that has drawn unprecedented attention from Washington and Moscow.
More than five years after Armenia’s defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War with Azerbaijan and two years after the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh, a satellite state of Yerevan that called itself the Republic of Artsakh, voters are being asked to decide not only who leads the country, but whether Armenia will continue its turn to the West or fall back under Russian influence.
“The West promotes their interests; Russia promotes their interests. But where are the interests of the Armenians?” noted Tevan Poghosyan, a former parliamentarian and former representative of the unrecognized Republic of Artsakh in the United States, who has been highly critical of the current government’s record.
Last year, after three decades of failed efforts by Moscow, the United States intervened and brokered a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, ending one of the world’s longest post-Soviet conflicts. Washington has also supported Trump’s Pathway for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transport corridor designed to connect mainland Azerbaijan and its region of Nakhchivan through Armenian territory, continue through Turkey and connect the region to wider East-West trade networks through rail, road, and pipeline infrastructure.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, following US Vice President JD Vance’s trip in February, traveled to Yerevan sign a comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement and officially launch the implementation of that method.
Trump’s words are important, said Stepan Grigoryan, a Yerevan-based political scientist, but Moscow’s pressure is what people feel in their daily lives. “The Russian pressure is consistent,” he said. “It hits people in the pocket.”
In recent weeks, Russia has decided on a conventional approach, set restrictions on Armenia’s growing list of exports—including fruits, vegetables, flowers, wine, brandy, and mineral water. According to Western intelligence assessments and investigative reports, the Kremlin has dedication an average of 50 million dollars to influence the election. The operation reportedly combines fake news, curated social media, and AI-generated content that has spread allegations such as that Pashinyan secretly bought luxury properties in France and plans to bury radioactive waste in Armenia, as well as directing accusations of child trafficking at senior officials.
Reports also have he warned Moscow is seeking to mobilize members of the country’s diaspora in Russia, potentially sending thousands of dual citizens back to Armenia to vote for opposition parties.
The campaign has been accompanied by direct warnings from the Kremlin. Speaking on Victory Day, when Russia commemorates the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in World War II, Russian President Vladimir Putin he drew a parallel between Armenia’s European aspirations and Ukraine’s path to the West, warning that such geopolitical choices ultimately lead to instability, conflict and war.
“For three months in a row there has been a campaign against the Armenian government on Russian television channels. Now Putin himself is involved,” Grigoryan said. “And a large number of Armenians with dual citizenship are being sent to Armenia to vote for the pro-Russian forces. This is being advertised almost openly.”
For decades, Russia was the main guarantor of Armenia’s security, maintaining a military base in Gyumri, controlling large parts of the country’s energy infrastructure, and, until recently, manning important border crossings with Turkey and Iran through Russian border guards. But after Russia failed to prevent an Armenian defeat in 2020, Pashinyan has gradually tried to reduce that dependence.
Russian guards have been removed from Yerevan airport and border checkpoints, although they remain on the Armenian border sections. Armenia has frozen its participation in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and strengthening relations with the European Union. In May, Yerevan the host the first ever EU-Armenia summit, bringing European leaders to the country in a highly visible show of support for Armenia’s pro-Western trend and, by extension, Pashinyan.
Yet the changes have been cautious rather than revolutionary. Yerevan has not left the Eurasian Economic Union; Pashinyan still makes trips to Moscow and flies to Iran to buy weapons that no one in the West was willing to give. While Moscow would prefer a friendly government in Yerevan, Pashinyan has managed to prevent a complete rupture.
That, however, has not stopped Moscow from supporting alternatives. Three opposition leaders are leading the challenge to Pashinyan. The most powerful is Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire whose Strong Armenia party has emerged as the main alternative to the ruling Civil Accord. Karapetyan is currently under house arrest after being accused of plotting a coup and calling for the overthrow of the government, charges he denies.
He is joined by former President Robert Kocharyan, a longtime political heavyweight closely associated with Armenia’s pre-2018 leadership, and businessman Gagik Tsarukyan, whose Prosperous Armenia party has gained support through its populist economic message.
“You can choose Nikol Pashinyan, who certainly did some good things but made a lot of mistakes, or choose Russia. That’s how it is,” Grigoryan noted. “There is a lot of pressure on society, on business, so that Nikol Pashinyan is not elected.”
Opposition leaders are careful not to portray themselves as pro-Russian. Instead, they wrap their message in the language of a “pro-Armenian” foreign policy, calling for balance between Russia and the West. While they criticize Moscow for failing to protect Armenia during the Karabakh conflict, they also argue that Pashinyan has damaged relations with a country that remains Armenia’s biggest economic and security partner.
“Pro-Westerners blame others for supporting Russia; pro-Russians blame others for being pro-Western—it’s been the same in Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, all over the former Soviet Union,” Poghosyan said. “All political discussions turn into blaming each other, forgetting that we need to discuss the interests of Armenians. Every Armenian knows perfectly well that Russia has not fulfilled its obligations, but in the same way, neither has the West.”
Pashinyan remains the clear favorite despite losing two battles due to a lack of alternatives and the rejection of pro-Russian elites who have overseen corruption and dysfunctional government for decades. His opponents have capitalized on public grief over Karabakh, the concessions Pashinyan made to Azerbaijan, and the Karabakh prisoners there but struggle to explain what they would have done differently. According to the latest International Republican Institute investigationPashinyan’s Civil Contract Party is leading the race with 32 percent support, while Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia won with 6 percent. Yet nearly half of those polled were either still undecided or refused to reveal their preferences, underscoring the uncertainty that still surrounds the June 7 vote.
“The opposition really doesn’t have a positive agenda. The agenda is negative. These people are bad, we have to come and take their place,” said Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan. “And then every ordinary citizen asks: OK, you guys, what are you going to do? Return Karabakh? How? There is apathy among the people, and an opposition that is even less popular than Pashinyan.”
Pashinyan’s resilience owes much to his personality. Unlike the previous officials who ruled Armenia for much of the post-Soviet era, he presents an image of an ordinary Armenian. Her social media feed is full of videos of her eating pirozhki (dumplings) on public transport, listening to old post-Soviet songs, and dancing while French President Emmanuel Macron sings “La Bohème.”
He can be hot-tempered and outspoken, often saying in public what others prefer not to say. Those traits have helped him survive political battles that could have ended other careers, including fierce confrontations with the leadership of the highly popular Armenian Apostolic Church.
At the heart of his campaign is the idea of a “Real Armenia” – a forward-looking vision that asks voters to accept the loss of territories as a painful reality and consider what the country could still be. Studies show increased support for the government’s handling of the refugee crisis caused by the exodus of Armenians from Karabakh and the resurgence of public confidence in the direction of the country, suggesting that many Armenians may do so.
Pashinyan’s Civil Contract is widely expected to come first, but analysts say that alone may not be enough. Under Armenia’s constitution, a party that gets about 45 percent of the vote can benefit from a “solid majority” clause that guarantees it a majority in parliament. If the Civil Pact does not meet that threshold, however, the combined strength of opposition forces could exceed that of the ruling party, opening the door to post-election coalition talks and a possible challenge to Pashinyan’s hold on power.
“If you listen to the positions of the opposition on various issues—Russia, the United States, Europe—it’s clear that they support Russia. And unfortunately, they’re not the only ones who support Russia. It seems to me that they’re just carrying out the Kremlin’s orders,” Grigoryan explained. “If, God forbid, Nikol Pashinyan fails, the entire Trump plan, the EU plan for Armenia, and the peace plan with Azerbaijan will be completely destroyed.”
Pashinyan has made questions of war and peace a key element of his campaign. He has positioned himself as the only leader who can complete the peace process with Azerbaijan and repair relations with Turkey and, therefore, as the only guarantee against another war. For a country still struggling with the trauma of defeat, the issue of peace overshadowed almost every other issue on the ballot.
Even with a peace agreement with Azerbaijan largely negotiated, the way forward remains difficult. Among the remaining issues are the imposition of Soviet-era borders—many of them deliberately created to keep ethnic and regional conflicts alive—and Azerbaijani demands to amend Armenia’s constitution to remove language Baku interprets as denoting territorial claims.
“Pashinyan’s team says, ‘If we are not elected, you will have a war. We are a peaceful party. We will continue our relations with Azerbaijan. We will continue to sign agreements with Azerbaijan,'” Iskandaryan said. “‘If not for us, you will have a war.’ So, as a result, there is a kind of referendum. Are you for peace? Yes or no?”
If elsewhere in Europe Trump’s endorsement can be politically toxic, in Armenia it could prove useful. Russia’s position there has been declining rapidly since the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and many Armenians see closer ties with Washington as a source of opportunity. If that translates into votes, it could be a rare victory for Trump that is also a defeat for Putin.
