“Our Europe is dying,” said French President Emmanuel Macron he warned his audience at the Sorbonne in 2024. “It can die, and it all depends on our choices.”
Macron’s doom and gloom is not far off. Liberal democracy and the rule of law have gone backwards, along with Europe itself. European Union-style international governance and win-win economic cooperation, governed by mutually agreed principles, no longer exist. in style in a world where superpowers led by powerful people compete for influence. Once a beacon of the old order, the United States now has more in common with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey than the Scandinavian countries interested in democratic accountability. At the same time, nativists and populists are making electoral gains across the EU—as well as in the UK—calling for a change in politics and the abolition of globalization and European integration.
“Our Europe is dying,” said French President Emmanuel Macron he warned his audience at the Sorbonne in 2024. “It can die, and it all depends on our choices.”
Macron’s doom and gloom is not far off. Liberal democracy and the rule of law have gone backwards, along with Europe itself. European Union-style international governance and win-win economic cooperation, governed by mutually agreed principles, no longer exist. in style in a world where superpowers led by powerful people compete for influence. Once a beacon of the old order, the United States now has more in common with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey than the Scandinavian countries interested in democratic accountability. At the same time, nativists and populists are making electoral gains across the EU—as well as in the UK—calling for a change in politics and the abolition of globalization and European integration.
This article was taken from Europe’s Race: Russia, China, and Turkey Challenge Regional Order by Dimitar Bechev (Oxford University Press, 224 pp., $29.99, July 2026).
Conflicts between the United States and Europe along with the challenge of many people from within have certainly dimmed the Europeans’ ambitions and ability to act abroad. Europe immediately decided to change the world in its image. These days, its inherent vulnerability makes it fair game for poachers.
But while Europe has been facing many external adversaries, it has also shown a remarkable capacity for change. If you look at the different strategies that have been adopted to deal with the three adversaries—Russia, China, and Turkey—it shows how.
Similarity between Russia, China and Turkey are mentioned a lot. All three countries share a royal history and, to varying degrees, retain royal characteristics. The legacy of empire faces Janus: It includes a memory of greatness but also a complaint about decline and loss, usually with the West playing the part of the historical villain. And all three countries are ruled by authoritarian strongmen: Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Erdogan. For many analysts, these figures are a sign of a new era of superpower politics that is upon us.
But while all these powers have competed with Western hegemony in international affairs, they have done so in different ways. Russia has used military power: in the former Russian space but also in the Middle East and even in sub-Saharan Africa. China, for its part, seeks to transform its economic power into political influence in all parts of the world. In its efforts to compete with the West, Beijing is advocating an alternative style of governance that combines authoritarianism and technology, and amassing vast powers to exercise its hegemony in East Asia. Turkey, for its part, has abandoned its long-standing ambition to be part of the West. Instead, it is rebuilding itself as a powerhouse in its own right, claiming leadership over Sunni Muslims in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Eurasia.
All these methods lead to different ends. Russia wants to radically reform the European order to the point of blowing up the EU. China, for its part, wants to see Europe drawn more deeply into its economic cycle while remaining neutral in its growing conflict with the United States. Turkey continues to seek inclusion in the European system, including a better agreement with the EU, but on its own terms. China and Russia have also pursued changes at the institutional level: whether it is replacing the EU with a superpower concert (Russia) or a China-centered hub-and-spoke arrangement, such as the 14+1 forum. Inevitably, Russia poses the greatest challenge, weakening the prohibition against gaining territory by military conquest and using hard power to subdue its neighbors.
Accordingly, Europe has embarked on three specific strategies to resist pressure from these three powers: deterrence, stabilization, and cooperation. European leaders have used military force to prevent Russia from using force to achieve political goals. At the same time, they have focused on courage and economic independence to “de-risk” China. And finally, they worked to sideline Turkey through emergency agreements, institutional ties, and loose new international platforms, such as the European Political Community.
This toolbox is not limited to those three situations. After developing the right capabilities, Europe will be in a position to deter military or “hybrid” threats from, for example, an Iranian missile or a North Korean cyber attack. Similarly, “de-risking” in the areas of trade and technology will be seen as important in response to Donald Trump’s US as it is to Beijing. Finally, the EU has been using a strategy of selective cooperation against all its neighbors, from Tunisia to Azerbaijan and Moldova.
In taking these steps, Europe has not abandoned its values, but it has become less similar to its opponents. First, European nations and even EU institutions are embracing hard power. The Security Institutions of the European Union (SALAMA) allocated 150 billion euros for collaborative projects in the field of security. Nowadays, the EU commissioner monitors projects to develop new capabilities in areas such as satellites, sensors, cruise missiles, air defense and drones. Europe has recognized the need to be able to defend itself against Russia independently of the United States—a tall order, but not an impossible goal.
Second, at a time when the United States is turning protectionist and China is eager to become fully self-sufficient, Europe is similarly singing the praises of “strategic independence.” That includes shifting supply chains away from China, including electronics, essential minerals and pharmaceuticals. The Anti-Coercion Instrument that comes into force in 2023 is intended to prevent major foreign powers – mainly China but potentially the United States as well – from becoming dependent on political concessions.
Finally, the EU has become more comfortable using the language of jurisdiction and spheres of influence in its wider territory. The war in Ukraine has caused a geopolitical value of expansion. Bringing in new members and expanding relations with neighbors is not a voluntary exercise that reflects Europe’s natural tendency to spread the gospel of democracy and good governance. Rather, it is a matter of security. Ukraine already acts as a bulwark against Russia—and is likely to remain so for decades to come.
Ability to learn studies and course changes are not cause for complacency. Europe is faced with the difficult task of preventing the dissolution of its alliance with the United States, managing the challenge of China, and stopping the new imperialism of Russia. It can fail on one or more sides.
Even if it is disrupted, internal differences and divisions will prevent the EU from graduating to superpower status. Europe will not automatically save the liberal international order either. But Europe has the full potential to learn from bad experiences, strengthen itself, and defend itself in a world that opposes its values and interests. In the era of Trump, Xi, and Putin, there is no other choice. As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney reminded attendees at the World Economic Forum in Davos, middle powers need to join forces to be at the table. Otherwise, they will be on the menu.
