China’s test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile on July 6 surprised many. But amid the confusion about what the test meant, an interesting conversation was emerging. Was the missile JL-2 or JL-3? That open source analysts were asking this question is evidence of how much technical information about the People’s Liberation Army is now available to researchers.
Cold War are often provided as compared to US-China relations today, but the massive Soviet military machine had to be viewed through a lens darker and blurrier than the Chinese buildup. The old methods of intelligence gathering have not been completely replaced; surprisingly, modern versions of the U-2 spy planes that performed dangerous reconnaissance missions in the Soviet Union are still in service with the US Air Force. But traditional intelligence-gathering tools on foreign military forces are now being greatly supplemented by sources that are freely available on the Internet.
Intelligence collection and analysis was the exclusive focus of government and research institutions. But the information revolution has produced a flourishing of open-source intelligence and an international community of military analysts. Their trick is to change our understanding of the largest military buildup of any nation since World War II.
Beijing likes normal to show off his military prowess, launching new technology with gusto. Last year’s military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, for example, was a gold mine for analysts.
Sometimes these official releases reveal more than intended. Videos released by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been analyzed in detail. Even a glimpse of the background can be revealed, allowing quick access to video, which can indicate where new military equipment has been built.
Despite the so-called “Great Firewall,” information comes from unofficial sources on the Chinese internet as well. Shanghai’s waterfront is frequently photographed by passengers aboard passing planes, revealing details of the ship’s new designs. One such photo revealed that China’s next aircraft carrier is likely to be nuclear-powered because the two square sections built into the spacecraft are so close together. mechanical restraints.
A driver passing by the airport recently took high-definition dashcam footage new fighter jet when it landed. We currently know more about China’s goals for next-generation fighters than we do about the United States because multiple images of two Chinese prototypes have appeared online. Meanwhile, the US F-47 remains shrouded in mystery.
That these pictures are posted online shows that the castle is not completely secure. But there is likely collusion going on, too, with Chinese authorities turning a blind eye to these unofficial releases because they recognize their propaganda value. After all, influencers who spread these images are often motivated by nationalism, the desire to show the progress of their nation.
There are clear limits, however. Chinese social media enthusiasts often practice self-censorship, blurring aircraft serial numbers and other sensitive information in the photos they post.
Published scientific papers continue to reveal new areas of research and military applications. But another new source of open-source intelligence is satellite imagery. As launching and operating commercial satellites has become cheaper and the quality of the images they produce improved, “geospatial” intelligence has ceased to be a government-only concern.
Companies including PlanetLabs, Vantor, and BlackSky offer dedicated satellite service for those who can afford it, while the US Geological Survey EarthExplorer provides free service updated with NASA’s Landsat program. Open satellite imagery has allowed civilian researchers to track the Chinese construction of everything aircraft carriers for missile depots to China’s new great army headquarters outside Beijing.
China is not the only one that wants to control the information environment. The rise of open source intelligence capabilities presents an opportunity for the United States as well. When the media, think tanks, or independent analysts reveal commercial satellite images of previously unknown Chinese bases or weapons, it is reasonable to consider the possibility that the US government has given them clues about where to look.
The rise of open source intelligence on PLA has widened the scope of organizations and individuals using it.
Some of the most important work is being done by experts in American research organizations such as the Rand Corporation, China Aerospace Research Institute, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studiesand China Institute of Maritime Studies. Independent analysts such as Rick Joe, Andreas Rupprechtand Alex Luck also analyze the wealth of satellite information from China’s ships and facilities to examine the finer details of its military expansion.
This ecosystem is a good example of how skills and expertise are increasing in the digital age. The Internet has had many unintended consequences, and largely due to social media, the effects of the information revolution are now viewed with skepticism. But PLA viewing is one area where the internet works as its original founders intended. It certainly has its share of propaganda and misinformation, but it also breaks down analytical silos and democratizes expertise by undermining the hold of watchdogs who previously shut out unqualified professionals.
Although PLA observers receive information about military platforms that would have made their predecessors working in the Soviet military envious, they do not have the same open and ready access to doctrinal, strategic, or logistical information. Researchers who want to understand American thinking on such issues have no shortage of specialized publications available to them—from Journal of Advanced Military Studies for Army lawyer. There are few such publications available to Chinese researchers, at large blind spot in PLA research.
That’s why much of the progress in open-source analysis of the PLA has focused on assessing its capabilities—but not so much its motives, which are harder to discern. Here we can draw on the classic distinction between riddles and riddles. The first is a problem with a definite answer that can be raised with new information, while the latter does not have a definite answer and additional information may not bring more certainty. An example of a puzzle would be, “How many bombers does China have?” where the secret is, “What does China plan to do with them?”
Russia’s all-out attack on Ukraine shows how clarity about capabilities does not help improve decision-making. Despite clear evidence and warnings from the US intelligence community, some Ukrainians and much of Europe refused to believe that Russia would invade. As a result, Moscow still got a surprise.
This should be a difficult lesson for security authorities in Asia. We know a lot about China’s ability to invade Taiwan. Beijing cannot hide the rapid expansion of its range of rockets and short-range missiles, and there is clear evidence that it plans to use civilian ferries in the invasion. Last year, we even saw pictures of the ship mobile bargeswhich would allow China to place large numbers of heavy vehicles ashore.
Furthermore, invading Taiwan would require months of preparation, including laying out a large array of assets. In the current information environment, this would be impossible for China to hide, but as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown, this does not mean certainty about its goals.
The task of understanding China’s intentions is not only more difficult than assessing its capabilities, but also more urgent. Powers can take decades to build and therefore can be studied in detail and with some amusement. The nation’s will, on the other hand, can change suddenly.
To understand what a government can do with its military assets, it is important to understand what those assets are you can do it. For example, while China’s military is heavily focused on Taiwan, it is also building a fleet of ships and aircraft better suited to long-range power projections than cross-strait conflict—aircraft carriers and cruisers, amphibious assault ships, long-range bombers, and more. While these platforms would certainly have their uses in Taiwan’s emergency situation, they are better suited for more remote operations.
China long ago abandoned Mao Zedong’s ambitions to start a communist revolution abroad. But the country’s military prowess nonetheless points to more self-defense ambitions. In analyzing the military intentions of any foreign power, it is wise to follow Walter Gropius’ approach to architecture: Form follows function.
Recently, we published report on effect China’s modern military for the defense of Australia. We argued that China’s long-range strike capability is robust and growing. We deliberately avoided saying what China could do with this capability, but nevertheless, our report was provocative strong reaction from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, which, according to Global Times. this, Times it was reported, it was a “strategic miscalculation.”
Whether intentionally or otherwise, China confused ability with intent. Our paper was very focused how China could use force against Australia and say nothing why could do that. Whether one is pessimistic or lazy about China, fearful or complacent, this is important work. Good policies are built on a foundation of facts. Intelligence analysts, warships, academics, and enthusiasts watching China’s rise as a military power all recognize the importance of this work but also understand its limitations in knowing what Beijing plans to do with its new powers.
So if Beijing really feels misunderstood, if it really cares about its intentions being interpreted correctly, then maybe it could be more transparent about them. For quote China’s ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, “Rumours stop when people have enough information.”
