It took a crowd outside the office of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky less than a week to get the leader to reverse the recent decision. On July 15, Zelensky fired Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, a technocrat who had digitized Ukraine’s government and was trying to do the same for his army, and named General Oleksandr Syrskyi, a Soviet-school commander whom Fedorov had pressured the president to fire, in his place. A week later, Zelensky changed course.
Ukrainians call the protests the “Cardboard Maidan,” after the 2014 protests that ousted a corrupt president. Every evening for a week, crowds of people gathered near the president’s office, holding signs made by hand from boxes and calling on Zelensky to remove Syrskyi and return Fedorov. Soldiers and veterans joined students and activists, and the gatherings spread to other Ukrainian cities.
Zelensky heard them, at least in part. He announced Syrskyi’s dismissal and named Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as the new army chief. Drapatyi, part of a new generation of military leaders, was a combat commander who led the military breakthrough in Mariupol in 2014 and later helped organize the defense of Kryvyi Rih and the liberation of the west bank of Kherson province.
But while Zelensky has acknowledged the fact that the military needs to change, he has not yet decided whether Fedorov should be given the authority to lead the change. The president has given Fedorov vacant government posts, but protest organizers said protests would continue until he returned to his old position.
“He made a digital passport, everything digital,” a source close to the president said Foreign Policyrequesting anonymity due to the sensitivity of the subject. “This is the only good thing left after we left power. So, I think he’s become somewhat untouchable.”
Zelensky thought otherwise. He fired Fedorov after a meeting with the military leadership, which came as part of a shakeup that also saw Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko removed and replaced by Serhiy Koretsky, the former head of Ukraine’s state-owned gas company Naftogaz. The explosion was instantaneous. Colonel Pavlo Yelizarov, one of Fedorov’s own appointees, resigned from his post as deputy commander of the air force. Two prominent advisers—Serhii Sternenko, a drone fundraiser, and Serhii Beskrestnov, a military technology expert—also resigned.
Fedorov introduced himself as Ukraine’s first minister of digital transformation, the man behind the Diia mobile app that made passports, driver’s licenses and other government services easily accessible. In a situation long defined by paper files, queues, and petty bribes, he built an institution that Ukrainians could benefit from and experience. The success of Ukraine’s digital transformation gave Fedorov a free public space that few others in the Zelensky administration had. When he took over Ukraine’s Defense Ministry in January, he brought a similar approach to the war with Russia: more drones and less Soviet behavior.
Fedorov also brought enemies. Behind the scenes, he played a key role, along with other senior officials, in pressuring Zelensky to remove Andriy Yermak, the head of the Presidential Office who tightly controlled access to the leader and, as many in Kyiv have long complained, did not forget the grudges. Yermak resigned in November 2025, when Zelensky finally followed the advice of his advisers and turned to foreign pressure.
The second front for Fedorov was the high command of the army. He wanted Syrskyi and the generals around him to be replaced by young commanders who had proven themselves in battle, and whom the soldiers would trust with their lives. Fedorov had a plan to rebuild the army with technology instead of manpower, and an array of drones powerful enough that Ukraine could stand as a bulwark and block Russian advances – with or without a signed peace.
Zelensky has put it as the inevitable end of the feud, saying publicly that Fedorov and Syrskyi could not work together and that he shared the blame. Syrskyi took command of the army in 2024 and later came to include the war of rebellion.
Born in Russia and trained at a military academy in Moscow during the Soviet years, Syrskyi lived his life in Ukraine and gained real fame early in Russia’s great war, commanding the defense of Kyiv and the 2022 assault on Kharkiv—Ukraine’s most spectacular success in the war. But it was Bakhmut’s staunch defense that repaired his reputation, and when he replaced the beloved Valerii Zaluzhnyi as commander-in-chief in 2024, he inherited a tired army without much success to direct. He had a reputation among soldiers, fair or otherwise, for wanting positions to be taken at any cost and for using soldiers’ lives to protect the land saved long ago. In the farewell speech, Syrskyi recalled that he lived in this war since 2014 and had the honor to command the defense of Kyiv.
“People realize that Syrskyi has a lot of success,” said Mykhailo Zhernakov, director of the Kyiv-based DEJURE Agency. “But many people within the system, as well as people who look at it from the outside, associate its name with the old style of command. The people of Ukraine are very tired of the past, and they found a new quality. It’s not about the names themselves. It’s about the style. It’s about how we work and how we fight. If, as a country, we would follow the law, we would not have this crisis, but that’s why many decisions are made.”
This is the second time since the full invasion started in 2022 that the citizens of Ukraine took to the streets in large numbers and at that time and now Zelensky has surrendered to their demands. Last July, when he signed a law that affected the independence of anti-corruption agencies, protests followed, and he backed down within days. The streets have learned that Zelensky is listening, and even under martial law, with the election suspended, the protests remain the only effective check on power.
Ukrainians have continued to demand a clean government since 2014. But many in the government remain concerned about the possibility of running the country in a transparent and non-corrupt way, with a firm understanding of post-Soviet politics in which everything is a plan, and everyone has a price. That culture has been repeatedly challenged by a society that expects more from the country it is fighting to preserve.
Fedorov, activists have said, clashed with that post-Soviet culture, too. They cited the digital and competitive procurement systems he introduced, saying that moving large arms contracts away from voluntary programs threatens vested interests. Others saw Fedorov’s record as a combination of genuine achievement and public relations promotion, arguing that his ambitions had taken him beyond the proper role of minister of civil defense.
“He had two major achievements: shutting down Starlink for the Russians and greatly expanding the use of medium-range drones,” a senior Ukrainian government official said of Fedorov’s success, adding that Fedorov was a victim of his own impatience and was going too far. “He wants to control the army. He wants to plan the operation, the military field. He thinks he is the minister of war.”
Initial reactions within the government suggest that officials downplayed the furor over Fedorov’s dismissal. When asked how long the protests would take, one senior official predicted that they would need “just a few days to die.” Instead, the protests grew, expanding their demands, forcing Zelenskyy to rethink the military leadership.
What does Fedorov want next? He has been a loyal soldier to the president, but his popularity has become politically dangerous for Zelensky. “The president is giving him another job, but that’s not a big step,” another source in the Ukrainian government said. “He is ambitious and wants to be in politics, so I would think he will be ready for the election.”
Soon investigationconducted shortly before news of Syrskyi’s removal emerged, found that 72 percent of Ukrainians opposed Fedorov’s removal, while 5 percent supported it. The survey showed that trust in Fedorov nearly doubled from 35 to 65 percent, while trust in Syrskyi dropped from 39 percent to 23 percent. The majority, 55 percent, wanted Syrskyi out. And in the hypothetical presidential election, Fedorov got the third place with 13.4 percent, behind Zelensky with 22.3 percent and Zaluzhny with 14.9 percent.
This is not the first case of prominent people in Zelensky’s government being pushed aside. In January, Zelensky appointed Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the celebrated intelligence chief he chose as his main challenger, an administration post that carries more power and more blame. Over the years, the chief of staff absorbed much of the political damage of the administration and stalled reforms and palace intrigue linked to Yermak, allowing Zelensky to remain at the top of the machine he commanded.
Another case is that of Zaluzhny, the so-called iron general who was credited with planning the invasion of Russia—even when few in the government believed that war was coming—and later stopped Moscow in 2022. As his standards surpassed Zelensky’s in early 2024, the president removed him from command, citing the need for an ambassador and sent him to London. Zaluzhny has stayed away from opposition politics, offering occasional and careful criticism. Isolated in England, he fades into political life, and his actions may fade with him.
Fedorov now faces a similar choice. He could accept Zelensky’s offer, remain within the system, and risk his popularity fading into a non-authoritative role. He can refuse, move to the opposition, and try to turn his protest and record in government into an independent political force. Or he can be reinstated and decide to continue as a team player.
Whatever Fedorov chooses, his political future will not be decided soon. Elections are still far away during the war in Ukraine. A more immediate judgment will come forward. Ukraine has been able to slow down Russia’s development and has been able to said that it has retaken 700 square kilometers this year.
However, Russia continues to attack Ukrainian cities with missiles and drones, and Ukraine is facing an air defense shortage while its military personnel problem remains unresolved. Technology and innovation can help Ukraine, but they cannot be a substitute for soldiers. Fedorov has argued that reforming the command structure and improving conditions could entice more Ukrainians to serve and, if he is reinstated, he will be expected to prove it.
