A few weeks before the US-Iran war began, the Houthis promised that in the event of a conflict, the Red Sea would run with the blood of their enemies. In speech after speech, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the group’s leader, told his followers that any attack on Iran would result in a swift and devastating response. A movement that had taken two years disrupt international shippinglaunch ballistic missiles in Israeland identifying as the most committed member of the “opposition axis” staked its allegiance on one proposition: If Iran is hit, we hit.
Iran has been hit repeatedly for more than a week. The Houthis have not struck.
Over the course of months, the Houthis he watched Israel kill their prime ministera dozen members of the cabinet, and their head of work. They saw the co-leader of the agency Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah die in Beirut and then see The main leader of their guard died. The infrastructure of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that built their arsenal is being demolished in real time. A movement that took two years show invincibility now counting from a very weakened position.
Meanwhile, popular sentiment continues to rise: On March 6, thousands filled al-Sabeen Square in Sanaa, chanting in Persian for Iran’s dead leader. Public meetings were organized in every state. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi apparently encountered a time when he it promised join the war “at any time.” But no missile was fired, no ship was hit, and no drone crossed the Red Sea.
The reasons relate to the structural changes the Houthis have undergone over the past decade, as well as the group’s strategic goals for the future.
Between August and In October 2025, Israeli airstrikes in Sanaa killed Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi, about a dozen cabinet members, and Army Chief Mohammed al-Ghamari. These were precision operations targeting individuals, not bombing attacks targeting infrastructure. They used the same intelligence-led tactics that were sent to kill Nasrallah in Beirut.
Members of the group’s senior leadership now understand that once they initiate a visible military operation, they provide signatures that enable targeting: communications, movement, and electronic production. Holding meetings does not produce those signatures. Throwing missiles does.
Case in point, Red Sea Campaign 2023-2025 it was the most effective military operation ever carried out by the Houthis. It disrupted international shipping, forced an international naval response, and elevated the movement from a regional insurgency to a global security concern. But it also used their best weapons systems and exposed the infrastructure that supported them.
Therefore, by the end of 2025, a sustained strike by the United States and Israel it contained damaged launch sites, storage facilities, and command nodes. Ghamari’s loss was not merely symbolic; technical commanders with irreplaceable expertise were killed with him. The naval blockade hampered the supply of advanced equipment from Iran. And the arrest of alleged members of Saudi-US-Israel spy network in November indicated that the Houthis’ operational infrastructure had been compromised—regardless of its actual scope.
Then there is the destroyed arsenal. Between September 2024 and early July 2025, UN experts be counted 101 Houthi ballistic missiles were fired at Israel, of which 38 failed directly. In a single raid in July, US Central Command seized more than 750 tons of equipment of Iranian origin going to the Houthis, including hundreds of missiles, warheads, seekers, drone engines and radar systems. Supply chain research to 2026 by Century International found that more than 80 percent of the items seized before reaching the Houthis in 2024-2025 were for making inputs rather than finishing weapons. This was evidence that the pipeline had moved from full smuggling systems to maintaining domestic concentration. But the finder, electronic guidance, and engine remain obstacles, and each of those needs to be ordered.
The Houthis can still launch. Their capacity, however, has decreased, and each launch shows positions that have already been planned. The movement has pushed the “domestic manufacturing” narrative, but the details of their best weapons still follow Iranian dynasties that require external components. With Iran itself under constant attack, the pipeline that built the Houthi arsenal is under more pressure than at any time since the movement’s inception.
The aggravating factor is that the Houthis are not an independent group that only enjoys the support of Iran. They have been seen in Tehran. Their military capabilities it was built by Iran and Hezbollah. Their strategic posture was shaped by Tehran’s priorities. Their position in the axis of opposition was given by Iran. None of this erases the roots of the Yemeni movement, but those roots alone did not produce the arsenal, doctrine, or regional profile that defines it today.
But now the supreme leader of Iran is dead, and his wife the son has taken his place. The election of Mojtaba Khamenei as the new supreme leader on March 8 gave the Houthis reason to believe that the government would survive. Within hours, Houthi media referred to him as “Imam,” and pledged allegiance. The appointment was a sign that the IRGC could rebuild itself.
But even if that relationship is rebuilt, the political landscape in which the Houthis are fighting has changed. Throughout the Arab world, during the Red Sea campaign, Zaydi militias from the highlands of northern Yemen became the face of the opposition to Israel at a time when every Arab country looked away. But the Iran war has thrown that out of the equation. Iran’s missiles are now landing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emiratesand killing Arab civilians in major Arab cities. Israel and the United States are attacking Iran and not the Arab countries. If the Houthis retaliate on behalf of Tehran in this context, they are no longer fighting for Palestine. They are fighting for a country that attacks Arab cities. The same Arab public that celebrated them for standing up against Israel is unlikely to celebrate them for standing up to their neighbours.
With Iran’s position very shaky, the Houthis are now starting to look at their future. Over the past several months, the group has carried out a nationwide campaign that has not received any attention in the Western media. In every province they control in northwestern Yemen, the movement has been running military training courses brand like the “Flood of Al-Aqsa” programs. Hundreds of fighters have graduated from these courses. Government ministries, universities, hospitals, telecommunications companies, water authorities, airport staff, and sports teams have all been transported by bicycle. Armed tribal groups have declared “general mobilization.” Hundreds of public parks per state are scheduled each week.
This is not missile power. It is a ground force designed to generate activity—not precision—, and it is designed for a war that has not yet begun, over who controls Yemen’s northwest coast, its territory, and its 20 million people. The words point to the sea. Mobilization directs landing.
The anti-Houthi coalition has also been breaking down in ways that favor the movement’s long-term position.
Southern Transitional Council (STC) government announcement in January revealed the depth of dysfunction between Saudi and UAE-backed forces in southern Yemen. The Houthis happily covered every detail of this to fall-the closure of the STC headquarters, Saudi officials who are in charge of Aden from the Bir Ahmed military base, STC leaders to be locked up for hotels in Riyadh.
The war with Iran has brought Riyadh and Abu Dhabi even closer as Iranian missiles rain down on both their territories. Saudi Arabia has been reported he warned Tehran that the continuation of the strikes could lead to the opening of US operations centers. The disintegrating coalition over Aden is closing ranks as missiles hit Riyadh, but launching a Red Sea offensive now could risk uniting the coalition against the Houthis at a time when it is even more divided.
Every day that the Houthis hesitate as they maintain a posture of imminent action, the threat generates value without consumption. Transportation insurance premiums are still raised. Saudi planning must account for the possibility of a southern attack. A motivated Houthi force remains open to exploiting any opportunity—in Marib, towards Aden or Shabwa, wherever the vacuum grows. Group mobilization built trust. Its restriction removes the value.
None of these it means that the Houthis will not take action to protect the IRGC. But think about what they are protecting. The Houthis of 2015 were rebels; they had territory but no government, no institutions, no international profile, no Red Sea power. The Houthis of 2026 run ministries, control ports, operate the tax system and university network, maintain diplomatic relations with the United Nations, and negotiate indirectly with Riyadh through Muscat. There is no transfer option for Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The mountain caves that sheltered the rebels cannot protect the government body. The logical calculation, for now, is that subjugating the Yemenis is safer than fighting the Americans.
There is also the issue of controlling what they hold. The Houthi economy is fragile, sustained in part by coercive tools that depend on military loyalty: the fuel restrictions that they targeted the ports of Hadramout by attacking tankers with drones to prevent shipping from government-controlled territory; an obvious threat to Red Sea shipping; the ability to punish opponents who challenge their sources of income.
If that ability appears to be significantly diminished, the coercive architecture that finances and disciplines their condition begins to break down. After all, the Houthi regime uses two currencies – coercion and conviction.
For years, the Houthis shared the burden of governing 20 million people with the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations, which provided health care, distributed food, and provided basic infrastructure that the movement could not or would not provide. The arrangement suited the Houthis, as they remained in control while others bore the cost of keeping people alive. But their campaign of detention, blockade, and hatred against international organizations has driven many of them away. The Houthis are now bearing the full weight of governance alone, facing a people who are so dishonest they are tired.
Meanwhile, the Houthis see a bulwark in the collapse of independence, an arsenal under pressure, a leadership under scrutiny, and a coalition of enemies targeting Iran rather than Yemen. The question that should concern policy makers is not why the Houthis are silent. It is what they have been quietly building, and what it will cost to deal with it.
