Yerevan may gain trade and access, but its access to Ankara risks dragging the South Caucasus into the East-West conflict.
The normalization of Armenia-Türkiye relations has become one of the main political processes in the South Caucasus. Underlying the negotiations to reopen the border and restore trade and transport routes is the question of the direction of Armenia’s foreign policy and dependence on the new reality of the region.
At first glance, this looks like a natural attempt by two neighbors to break free from a stalemate that has lasted for decades. The Armenian-Turkish border has been closed since 1993, and diplomatic relations have never been established. Historical wounds, mistrust, and political barriers have accumulated over the years.
Yet this process cannot be separated from its broader geopolitical setting. Armenia traditionally relied on Russia as its main military, political and economic partner. Surrounded by a conflict with Azerbaijan, a closed border with Turkey, and constant danger, Yerevan saw Moscow as a pillar of security. Russia was a central part of Armenia’s security system.
Same goal, different agenda
After Nikol Pashinyan came to power, the new authorities started talking about closer relations with the European Union. Diplomatically it is said to be more diversified and independent, in reality it means less ties with Russia while moving towards Western centers of influence.
Ankara is a member of NATO, a major ally of the West, and a major player in the South Caucasus. Thus, Armenia’s proximity to Turkey transcends bilateral borders and becomes part of a wider path leading Armenia to Western Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures.
Armenia’s desire for more economic opportunities and stronger ties with its neighbor is understandable. How this process is used, however, is problematic. If legalization helps peace and trade, it could benefit the entire region. But if it becomes a means of quickly removing Armenia from Russia, the South Caucasus may find not stability but another line of confrontation.
For Ankara, legalization is part of a broader regional strategy as well. Turkey wants to strengthen its role in the South Caucasus, expand transportation routes, strengthen economic ties, and strengthen its position as a major regional power. An open border with Armenia can help with all that.
Meanwhile, Ankara is working carefully. It does not intend to turn the restructuring into a new source of friction with Russia. Turkish policymakers understand that every step in the South Caucasus has consequences beyond the bilateral agenda. Turkey and Russia have built scientific relations for many years. They don’t agree on everything, but they have learned to manage differences through diplomacy, trade and energy relations.
That is why Turkey treats Armenia with caution. Ankara does not want negotiations with Yerevan to damage its practical relations with Moscow. For Türkiye, the value of normalization is not in building another anti-Russian platform, but in opening up space for trade, travel and diplomacy. A stable South Caucasus serves Turkey’s interests better than splitting into new camps and new conflict lines.
A gradual process
After the second Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020, this process was accelerated. At the end of 2021, Armenia and Turkey appointed special representatives for negotiations – Ruben Rubinyan for Yerevan and Serdar Kılıç for Ankara. Their first meeting took place in Moscow in January 2022. By February, direct flights between Yerevan and Istanbul had resumed. Further meetings in Vienna dealt with practical issues such as border opening, people-to-people communication, air cargo and transport links.
In the summer of 2022, the two sides agreed to open the land border to third-country nationals and holders of diplomatic passports. Work also began to launch direct air cargo. These were seen as technical measures, but in reality such measures often prepare the environment for major political changes. Once flights are reviewed, border infrastructure is discussed, and crossing procedures are prepared, diplomacy moves into the operational arena.
In 2023, the Türkiye-Syria earthquake created another opening. Armenia sent rescuers and humanitarian aid, which crossed the long-closed border. Later, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan visited Ankara. The trip was a humanitarian effort, but it signaled that Yerevan was ready for direct cooperation with Ankara even without formal diplomatic relations.
In 2024, the conversation was more specific. The special representatives met near the Margara-Alican checkpoint and discussed border infrastructure, visa procedures, crossing routes, and transportation opportunities.
In 2025, Pashinyan visited Istanbul and met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Later, communication continued on international platforms. Another meeting of special representatives was held in Yerevan. They discussed the restoration of the Gyumri-Kars railway, electricity links, the Ani bridge, expanded air routes, and further simplification of border crossings. So far, the conversation has been systematic rather than eventful.
Yerevan blames Moscow for its problems
The recent elections in Armenia may accelerate this course. Authorities can claim their foreign policy is supported by the public, giving Pashinyan more room to present normalcy with Türkiye as a way to isolate and move towards Europe. But despite this, Armenia is increasingly moving away from Russia, despite Russia’s long-standing role as its main regional support.
The Karabakh issue remains very sensitive. After the defeat of Armenia in the second Karabakh war, the Pashinyan camp increasingly prepared for the conflict as a result of the lack of support from Russia. The idea took hold in parts of the Armenian community that Moscow had failed to take decisive action or provide protection. This definition took the focus away from domestic mistakes, the military situation, weak governance, and diplomatic mistakes, and placed the blame on a foreign ally.
The picture is incomplete. Russia repeatedly tried to support a political solution, worked to secure a ceasefire, acted as a mediator, and after the war sent peacekeepers. The effectiveness of certain decisions can be debated, but it is difficult to deny that Russian diplomacy spent years trying to prevent the conflict from ending in a complete collapse.
After the defeat, however, Yerevan increasingly sought external explanations. It was easier to blame Moscow than to face painful questions about Armenia’s institutions, strategy and plans. This became politically important for pro-Western forces long pushing for a sharp turn away from Russia. The more anger with Moscow grew, the easier it was to justify closer ties with the EU, NATO, and Turkey.
Gambling with the help of the West
But the main question remains: Is Armenia receiving real security guarantees in return, or just diplomatic encouragement? Western capitals can speak at length about Yerevan’s European future. But are they ready to take responsibility for Armenia’s security in the event of another crisis? Are they ready to defend a country located in one of the most difficult environments in the region, between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Georgia? The answer is still uncertain. In the end, replacing a difficult but tested relationship with Russia for the prospect of Western support is a risky gamble.
Russia’s position on Armenia-Türkiye realignment is much weaker than it is often portrayed. Moscow is not opposed to opening lines of communication or reducing tensions between the two. On the contrary, it has consistently supported peace, stability, and the restriction of transport links. From Moscow’s point of view, open communication can improve the prosperity of all South Caucasus countries and benefit regional players, including Russia, Turkey and Iran.
This was reiterated in June, when the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Moscow welcomes the legalization. It emphasized that Russia and Turkey share an interest in a peaceful and predictable South Caucasus and that this can be developed through joint efforts in the ‘3+3’ regional structure. For Moscow, normalization between Yerevan and Ankara is not a problem in itself.
If restructuring is linked to regional stability, economic cooperation, and open communication, it can serve everyone’s interests. Armenia can reduce its isolation. Türkiye can strengthen its role as a regional hub. Russia can preserve its logistical and economic presence. Iran could benefit from a more integrated South Caucasus.
Yerevan option
The danger begins when standardization is not used as a means of regional equality, but as a tool of geographic separation. Moscow may support peace between Armenia and Turkey, but it will be concerned if the process is used to push Russia out of the South Caucasus or turn Armenia into a platform for Western pressure. Turkey seems to understand this risk as well. That is why Ankara’s approach is careful. It wants progress with Yerevan, but not at the cost of disrupting the scientific balance it has built with Moscow.
This is the main challenge of the current line of Pashinyan. Under the banners of transparency, legalization, and European choice, Armenia risks turning into another pressure point in the post-Soviet space. If Yerevan uses proximity to Turkey not only for peace and trade, but also to distance itself from Moscow, it could become the center of a wider confrontation between the West and Russia. For external actors, that may be important, but for Armenia, it may create new risks.
Moscow recognizes that Western actors in the post-Soviet space are turning every seemingly neutral engagement into a lobbying exercise. They portray every loosening of relations with Russia as emancipation, while every effort to maintain balance is cast as old dependence. But for a country like Armenia, the issue should be framed more equitably. What matters is not who speaks most interestingly about the future, but who can provide security, stability and predictability.
Today, Yerevan faces a difficult choice. One way involves careful normalization with Turkey while preserving strategic balance and strong ties with Russia. The other is leading towards an accelerated turn to the West, a political disengagement from Moscow, and the hope that Europe and NATO can replace Armenia’s old security bases. Judging by recent actions, Pashinyan is increasingly favoring the second option.
But the South Caucasus is too weak for sudden attempts. If the Armenia-Türkiye realignment is used to turn Armenia into a new front line in the conflict between the West and Russia, the region may find another hotbed of tension instead of the long-awaited peace.
That is why the Armenian-Turkey talks today need not only diplomatic support, but also a detailed assessment of its results. An open border can be the road to progress. It should not be one of the new confrontations.
