Colombia’s June 21 runoff election between left-wing candidate Iván Cepeda, of the ruling Historic Pact party, and right-wing businessman Abelardo de la Espriella, of his Defenders of Homeland movement, matched the pattern of recent elections in South America.
Following de la Espriella’s endorsement by US President Donald Trump, and with his victory on Sunday, Colombia now joins Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and most likely Peru in the rising political tide approaching Trump in the region.
There are reasons to worry that this new wave of Spanish Trumpistas will consolidate executive power at the expense of democratic government checks and balances, as has already happened. under the President of Salvador Nayib Bukele and President Daniel Noboa in Ecuador.
But these leaders will eventually leave office, either through term limits or defeat at the ballot box. A long-term threat to democracy in Latin America is that the center in many countries’ politics has disappeared.
De la Espriella won by a whisker (49.7 percent to Cepeda’s 48.7 percent), and his inability to even get a majority points to a rough road ahead—not just for the new president-elect but for Colombia’s administration and political community as well. Such right-turning sprints are not unique to Colombia and “El Tigre”, as he likes to refer to himself.
In two other recent elections—Chile and probably Peruwhich remained too close to call at the time of writing—voters chose the far right option. However, the election was also fierce and highly divisive, pitting far-left candidates against far-right candidates. The parties and presidential candidates of the center were largely irrelevant.
The absence of a center has made the winners political orphans. Chilean President José António Kast, elected in December 2025, is already surrounded by party divisions and popular opinion. The next president of Peru, no matter who he is, will face the same frustrations. De la Espriella faces a more difficult task yet, and one that may play into his authoritarian tendencies.
Such public opinion-marked more feelings of resistance to power than a general ideological shift—does not bode well for the region. For one, it will make the electoral contest more combative. As ideological choices become more intense, the space for consensus on difficult issues of institutional reform will become more difficult to build and maintain. Social risk and political violence can climb. And the task of finding and maintaining a consistent foreign policy – all the more important in an era of intense geopolitical competition – is made more difficult.
Twenty years ago, the outcome of Colombia’s election this weekend would have been unthinkable: an untested outsider like de la Espriella winning a surprise victory with a brand new party in the middle of a crowded field. In the first round of elections, the talented lawyer and successful businessman beat the former governor of Antioquia, Sergio Fajardo, as well as the centrist candidate Paloma Valencia of the Democratic Center party.
Unthinkable, too, would be the notion that Valencia, the candidate anointed by former President Álvaro Uribe, would be considered the middle choice. It’s a sign of how bad Colombian politics has gotten.
De la Espriella capitalized on his victory public concern about the rise in crime and violence after outgoing President Gustavo Petro’s plan to negotiate peace with gangs of criminals and ex-insurgents who control about 40 percent of Colombia’s countryside failed. Crime and insecurity now high rank among the main concerns of Colombian voters. De la Espriella tapped into those fears, promising an iron-fisted approach that would build new high-security prisons; launching military attacks in areas held by criminal groups, possibly with the support of the United States; and delete criminals like “cockroaches and mice.”
However, Colombian voters are largely disenchanted with de la Espriella and Cepeda, the candidate of Petro’s current government. In a investigation conducted before the election, 51.7 percent of voters rejected Cepeda and 46.6 percent rejected de la Espriella. Disapproval will hang over the future resident of Casa de Nariño, the presidential palace of Colombia.
Furthermore, the ranks in Congress describe friction; the established party that supported de la Espriella, the National Salvation Movement, won only one seat in the 183-seat Chamber of Deputies in parliamentary elections in March, while in the Senate, it won only four seats in the group. and another party.
Given his high levels of popular disapproval, his movement’s thin representation in Congress, and the growing trend of instability not only in Colombia but across the region, de la Espriella’s four-year term will bring an uphill battle with parliament. The most conservative and radical parties in the original Colombian Congress turned out to be a thorn in Petro’s side, blocking or seriously weakening his party. pet social programsincluding health care reform and a plan to strengthen workers’ rights.
March parliamentary elections gave Cepeda and Petro’s Historic Pact 24 percent of seats in the upper house and about 20 percent in the lower house. There is likely to be a charge.
Other governments in the region that have emerged from divisive presidential contests have had to contend with an opposition parliament and fickle electorate. Kast, Chile’s conservative president, has already seen his popular approval slip 29 percentwhile 55.6 percent of respondents expressed disapproval about five months after winning the second round election in December. This trend is in line with that of his predecessor, the centrist Broad Front President Gabriel Boric, who also saw his approval rating drop. 39 percent months after being sworn in. It remained in the soils throughout his four-year tenure.
The pro-Trump cast had championed a candidate at the lower end of the ideological spectrum than Boric. Jeannette Jara, leader of the Communist Party, represented the Broad Front coalition on the left of most of the group.
The close second-round contest between Peru’s ideological extremes is also controversial. Whoever loses – right-wing Keiko Fujimori or left-wing MP Roberto Sánchez – is almost guaranteed to reject the results. At last count, less than 40,000 votes separated the two candidates, Fujimori slightly ahead; The official results will be announced in July, after Peru’s electoral authorities have completed their close count.
This time, it is Sánchez, the left-wing candidate, who has gathered his base to denounce the election. In the last election—which Fujimori lost to Sánchez adviser Pedro Castillo—Fujimori, the daughter of former dictator Alberto Fujimori, denounced the election results and incited protests. Regardless of the end of the ideological spectrum, candidates in Peru appear immune to allegations of electoral fraud in close contests.
To deal with the volatile nature of the election, the government implemented several reforms before this latest election. They worked – to some extent. In order to control the power of the balanced national parliament, the government revived the Senate. Electoral authorities also placed a cap on the number of votes required to gain representation in Congress to reduce partisanship.
Although these reforms were aimed at reducing the number of parties in power, more than 30 candidates competed in the presidential race, and parliamentary elections held in April included a total of six parties in the Chamber of Deputies and in the reconstituted Senate.
Now, Fujimori’s Popular Force party holds 32 percent of the seats in the lower house and 37 percent in the upper house. Sánchez’s party, Together for Perú, claims 25 percent in the lower house and 23 percent in the Senate—putting both parties in the thick of things in Congress.
In a political system that is on fire nine presidents in 10 years—mainly due to removal from power, including President Pedro Castillo, who was dismissed and removed after the coup attempt he made by dissolving the troubled parliament—this creates problems for whoever will run for the presidency after the official counting of the final votes. The last elected president to complete his full term was Ollanta Humala, who completed his term in 2016. He left office with 15 percent certification level and is now in prison on corruption charges.
The division of the election is coming in a difficult time, especially Chile, Colombia and Peru facing major challenges to reduce the rate of economic growth, decline in production and dissatisfaction of citizens. The lack of a center prevents the kinds of technological policymaking, long-term planning, and policy consistency that are critical ingredients for success.
Efforts to reform electoral laws and create incentives for coalitions, as has been done in Peru and Colombia through voluntary presidential primaries, are long overdue. Citizens’ frustration with the failure of previous elected governments to provide better social services, greater social mobility, and a decrease in crime and greater security, as well as highly publicized cases of corruption, have led voters to abandon traditional political parties and their leaders.
Worse, with public concerns about crime and insecurity increasing, the different versions of leaders and parties have created negative effects. The left proposes peace talks and dealing with the causes of crime; justice puts forward a tougher approach to suspected criminals, with all the accompanying threats to human rights. Oscillating between the two achieves neither short-term nor long-term goals. It also complicates sustainable, cross-border, regional cooperation as companies and criminals become transnational businesses. Trump was recently created”American shield” The plan—while accurately identifying the problem—remains a coalition of governments that share the politics of the American president.
Election paralysis may be the best outcome. The biggest risk may be the acquisition of executive power by presidents who are not good at negotiating with uncooperative parliaments, enduring major shifts in popular opinion and a political culture that is increasingly moving toward zero-sum politics. The best outcome will be the rediscovery of the center and a common agenda across the political spectrum to solve major social, economic and security challenges.
As Trump intervenes to increase his allies, that level of consensus building is unlikely. But if recent electoral history is any indication, then many of those allies will be out in the next wave of anti-incumbency. Perhaps then pragmatic, political problem solving will prevail.
