Comments | Boeing went to China to sell planes. Beijing is buying something else



When Air Force One arrived in Beijing, one of the most photographed passengers was the chief executive officer of Boeing, Kelly Ortbergthere is a closing plan. Washington had come to sell the plane. Beijing was buying something else.
The last time this event was played in 2017, China signed the agreement for 300 Boeing aircraft. Since then, it has pursued an industrial initiative aimed at reducing reliance on such orders. The effort has not failed, but it has also not progressed as quickly as imagined. The gap between delay and omission is what gives last week’s agreement importance.
China needs Boeing aircraft. Passenger demand continues to grow in major cities and regional hubs: China’s airlines need hundreds of narrower aircraft in the next decade. Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (Comac), the state-backed manufacturer of the C919, is years away from matching Boeing or Airbus in manufacturing depth and global service capabilities. Prospects for production yet exceed transportation, with Comac relying heavily on foreign components and technical expertise.

Beijing is aware of these restrictions. Aviation cannot be subject to industrial expectations alone. Airlines need reliable aircraft to develop tourism, logistics and domestic mobility. Boeing and Airbus remain functionally indispensable, regardless of the long-term trend.

Yet China’s industrial policy has long accepted short-term dependence as the price of long-term independence. Boeing’s orders bolster fleet expansion while easing pressure on a more difficult question: whether China can build a commercially credible aviation industry before external conditions become more restrictive.

America’s export controls have reinforced this situation. When Washington suspension exports of the Leap-1C engine used in the C919, the immediate disruption was minimal. The lasting effect was political. It reinforced the view in Beijing that reliance on foreign aerospace components carries structural risk. Engine self-sufficiency it is therefore framed less as a technological aspiration than a strategic imperative.



Source link

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *