On April 11, while the cease-fire was in effect between the United States and Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu released a video. claim a “historic success” for his war strategy. But critics at home and abroad saw things differently. Israel’s deadly April 8 attack on central Beirut—dubbed “Bloody Wednesday” by panicked Lebanese—came in clear defiance of the US-Iran ceasefire deal. Israelis in scope explain weariness and frustration in a perpetual war that never seems to bring victory or security and that often seems more focused on protecting Netanyahu’s political career than the country.
But the Israelis’ confusion is about more than just Netanyahu. It represents the failure of the government’s ambitious strategy of regional reform through unrestricted military intervention after the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023. Israel’s steady expansion of targets and the power of airstrikes aimed not only to control the conflict but to end it: the complete destruction of Hamas, the disarmament of the Hezbollah or Iranian government. In every theater, outright victory has eluded Israel despite unprecedented and excessive violence, violations of international norms and laws, and excessive human suffering. Netanyahu’s claims of success based on undermining the power of the opposition are in fact an admission of defeat—a return to the very doctrines he hoped to abandon—and a troubling indicator of where Israeli policy may go in the future.
On April 11, while the cease-fire was in effect between the United States and Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu released a video. claim a “historic success” for his war strategy. But critics at home and abroad saw things differently. Israel’s deadly April 8 attack on central Beirut—dubbed “Bloody Wednesday” by panicked Lebanese—came in clear defiance of the US-Iran ceasefire deal. Israelis in scope explain weariness and frustration in a perpetual war that never seems to bring victory or security and that often seems more focused on protecting Netanyahu’s political career than the country.
But the Israelis’ confusion is about more than just Netanyahu. It represents the failure of the government’s ambitious strategy of regional reform through unrestricted military intervention after the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023. Israel’s steady expansion of targets and the power of airstrikes aimed not only to control the conflict but to end it: the complete destruction of Hamas, the disarmament of the Hezbollah or Iranian government. In every theater, outright victory has eluded Israel despite unprecedented and excessive violence, violations of international norms and laws, and excessive human suffering. Netanyahu’s claims of success based on undermining the power of the opposition are in fact an admission of defeat—a return to the very doctrines he hoped to abandon—and a troubling indicator of where Israeli policy may go in the future.
Before October 7, Israel largely believed it could manage its regional conflicts through what it referred to as “mowing the grass”: short, intense military campaigns that weakened rivals such as Hamas and Hezbollah while strengthening deterrence. The attacks were often brutal. Beirut still bears the scars of 2006, and Palestinians in Gaza suffered repeated Israeli attacks and heavy civilian casualties in the decades before October 7. But they were naturally holding back. They typically sought to inflict significant damage in a short period of time while avoiding escalation, relying on the Iron Dome missile defense system to minimize the effects of retaliation, avoiding targeting state actors such as Iran or Syria, and ending with a US-imposed ceasefire once Israel decided enough damage had been done.
The October 7 attacks, in which Hamas fighters breached the border fence from Gaza and killed nearly 1,200 people, broke the strategic consensus in Israel that these conflicts could be managed through prevention, limited military campaigns, and the willingness of local actors such as the Palestinian Authority to impose self-interested restraint. The assumption that even dangerous enemies like Hamas and Hezbollah would avoid provocations in order to maintain their own power and organizational vitality, drove policies like Netanyahu’s. encourage Qatari sponsorship for Hamas, it went from falsehood to scandal in an instant.
Israel’s new strategic doctrine would end threats, not just in Gaza but across the region, rather than simply contain them. These expectations went beyond military rule. Destroying Iran and its regional allies once and for all would open the door to establishing a new regional order, the Pax Hebraica under the unchallenged rule of Israel. The new order would build on the Abraham Accords of 2020 and create permanent alliances and a robust security architecture, including most if not all Arab states on Israel’s terms. Palestine would disappear from the agenda forever.
If October 7 convinced Israel’s leaders of the need for such a strategic change, the subsequent war in Gaza taught them that they were happy to continue their regional war. The unconditional support of the Biden and Trump administrations during the two years of the disastrous war against Gaza showed that nothing – not even policies described as genocide – would end the military and political support of the United States. With no restraint from Washington or international institutions, and little real push from the Arab powers, the only deterrent to Israeli action will be military.
And there, Israel saw few real challenges. Iron Dome’s success against missile attacks kept the costs of retaliation low, while Israel’s technological superiority and access to American aid allowed it to attack almost at will. The beheading of Hezbollah’s leadership in September 2024 served as a proof of concept and a critical moment of empowerment. The technical success of the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and the maiming of thousands of Hezbollah fighters seemed, at least for the time being, to remove the primary threat to Israel and Iran’s most powerful weapon. The 12-day war against Iran in June 2025, in which Israel’s missile defenses largely held up and Iran refrained from retaliating across the Gulf, reinforced that apathy. Likewise, Israel’s ability to bomb Syrian soil at will after the fall of the Assad regime at the end of 2024. With full air power and deep intelligence penetration of its enemies, Israel came to believe that it could strike its remaining enemies with little risk or cost.
That vision today is in ruins. Israel has found itself unable to impose its will on Lebanon, hampered by a resurgent Hezbollah and the predictable costs of a ground invasion. An all-out air war against Iran this year, even with the participation of the United States, failed to topple the Islamic Republic or end its ability to respond and resist. Iran’s retaliatory attacks, backed by a stronger Hezbollah front than the Israelis expected, have strained Israel’s missile defenses to the limit and taken a toll economically and physically. As a result, Israel must now revert to a strategy of conflict management, mowing down the grass at higher rates of death and destruction without any means of achieving the lasting resolution that the new strategy had promised. The costs of repeated military campaigns are higher than ever, though, in ways the Israelis refuse to acknowledge. Threats of war on Gaza have turned public opinion against Israel in much of Europe and the United States, while its reckless intervention has convinced many Arabs that Israel should be seen as a threat rather than a security partner.
Israel assumed that displaying power would make it a more attractive ally to the Gulf states, not realizing how threatening that power would make it appear. Israel’s attack on the Hamas conference in Doha in September 2025 was not widely appreciated, showing Gulf leaders that Israel could easily undermine their country’s authority as it did their common enemies. The fear was reinforced by Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and Iran as well as its destabilizing activities in Syria.
Israel refused to recognize the importance of regional or international legitimacy for any coherent security structure. It did not provide a positive vision or common purpose to strengthen the alliance with the Arab states, instead it continued to aggressively annex the West Bank in ways that made it difficult for Arab leaders to justify cooperation. This interacted with regional politics as well. The Saudi split with the United Arab Emirates in December 2025 was prompted at least in part by the perception that the Israeli-Emirati alliance had become too strong and too reformist. In particular, Saudi Arabia opposed what it saw as the UAE promoting separatist movements and non-state actors in Libya, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Israel’s attacks on government capacity in Iran since February 28 and Lebanon are raising the same fear in Riyadh and throughout the region—of chaos and government failure that could serve Israel’s short-term security interests while fueling the flow of refugees and extremism in other countries.
Iran’s retaliation against the Gulf states has now increased the Gulf’s anger against Iran and exposed the limits of the security guarantee of the United States and Israel. But their return to dependence on the United States and Israel is likely to be short-lived. Gulf leaders had good reason to complain that the United States and Israel started a war without consulting them, putting them in an existential threat. US bases became targets instead of shields; US defense systems could not defend critical oil and gas infrastructure; The United States was remarkably unprepared to keep the Strait of Hormuz open for passage; and today, many of its foundations have been destroyed. While Iranian missiles and drones have hit all the countries of the Arab Gulf, Tehran has directed its fire at the UAE and Bahrain – Israel’s partners in the Abraham Accords. The UAE, for its part, has taken a more aggressive stance, pushing Washington to escalate the war even as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have backed Pakistan’s mediation efforts.
It is impossible to know, of course, where the next phase of the war may go. But in a basic sense, after Oct. 7 strategy has already failed. For all the harm it has inflicted on its enemies, Israel has not managed to get rid of any of them—not even Hamas. Its expansion and violence in Gaza and Lebanon have caused a generational conflict between the Europeans and the Americans who represent its most important source of foreign aid and have changed Arab perceptions of Israel’s potential as an ally. Netanyahu’s critics at home are right when they say that he has led the country into endless and pointless wars while offering real alternatives to regional chaos and international isolation.
