The United States and Iran have returned to a state of war over the flow of ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Basically, however, the two sides have one ultimate strategic goal: to reopen the channel in both directions. Their dispute is over how much control each side will have in the post-war management of this worldwide shipping space. Those gaps can be closed, and it would be highly imprudent for the United States and Iran to continue their bombings.
The war of the past year has already shown to both sides that military options are limited. As they play knee-jerk to strengthen their grip on the Strait of Hormuz, they risk a larger war that could include Israeli attacks on critical Iranian infrastructure and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, closing another major shipping lane.
The United States and Iran have returned to a state of war over the flow of ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Basically, however, the two sides have one ultimate strategic goal: to reopen the channel in both directions. Their dispute is over how much control each side will have in the post-war management of this worldwide shipping space. Those gaps can be closed, and it would be highly imprudent for the United States and Iran to continue their bombings.
The war of the past year has already shown to both sides that military options are limited. As they play knee-jerk to strengthen their grip on the Strait of Hormuz, they risk a larger war that could include Israeli attacks on critical Iranian infrastructure and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, closing another major shipping lane.
For the Iranian regime, the gate has become a symbol of victory over the United States and Israel and a guarantee of its continued existence. Its ability to cut off access to the strait has proven to be a weapon of great disruption to the world economy—and arguably its greatest deterrent against future attacks. Any US president will need to think twice before pursuing a regime change war against Iran.
The more US President Donald Trump redoubles pressure on Iran, the more Tehran tightens its position on the ocean. In the early days of the April ceasefire, Iran he announced the strait “open” to all commercial shipping through the “scheduled route,” implying that it would remove the de facto tariffs imposed during the war and facilitate passage. But on the same day, Trump he demanded The United States would continue its naval blockade, causing resistance from the Iranian army, which watched this as a violation of the ceasefire. Iran reversed course, temporarily closing the strait, and established a new “Persian Gulf Straits Authority” in May to more formally regulate commercial traffic.
Such interest followed the recent memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two countries. Iran translated article 5 as giving it the right to manage navigation in the strait during the 60-day arbitration period. In contrast, the United States extended support to ships using the southern route through Omani territorial waters, which is already employed. wisely during the period of the Iranian ceasefire. But Tehran realized that Washington was introducing this route as a new normal, reducing Iran’s control over the strait, its leverage in negotiations, and its future deterrence. Iran responded by firing on ships using the Oman route.
By doing so, Iran was willing to run the risk of the collapse of the MOU. As one Iranian commentator close to the negotiating team recently said he explained on state television, “Either we endure this tribulation, or we go and become witnesses for it one by one.” Indeed, this led to the largest US strike inside Iran in months, prompting Trump to announce the end of the ceasefire.
While maintaining control over the strait is now a red line for Tehran, it has already shown openness to negotiating with Oman on the extent of that control. Finally, Iran understands that compromise is important. Unless shipping returns to normal, Iran itself will remain constrained by the US naval sanctions that Trump has reimposed. China, which buys about 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports, also depends on the reopening and has not endorsed Iran’s approach to controlling the passage. Beijing may therefore be the most influential party in pushing Tehran towards a middle path. Moreover, the more Iran disrupts the trend, the more it reduces its future value as other nations diverge from it.
These factors open the way for compromise. Mediation efforts should first focus on establishing a temporary transit arrangement for the next four to six weeks until a permanent solution supported by the region is found. One option would be for a new Omani-Iranian joint control center (with the US green light) to grant security clearance to an equal number of ships to use the northern and southern sea lanes free of charge, as expected under the MOU. Another important step would be a public agreement between the United States and Iran to de-escalate the conflict in the sea, including a halt to military cruises that could quickly trigger new clashes.
During this confidence building period, the US and Iran should agree on a mine permit system in nature traffic separation scheme adopted by the United Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1968. Before the war, this plan was the preferred route because of its safety and depth. However, ships have avoided it since Iran declared it unsafe, amid concerns that the area was mined by Iran.
Iran rejected bomb disposal and a European-led maritime mission, despite its advanced capabilities already positioned for rapid deployment to the strait. Tehran is unlikely to entrust such a sensitive task to NATO troops. Instead, it can accept help from states it considers neutral or friendly, including Japanwhich has a high mine-sweeping capacity. A third party—trusted by the international shipping industry—will need to ensure that the sea area is mine-free before shipping begins.
In the long run, a regional service charge structure—which benefits Iran and reflects its role—is inevitable. Trump has legitimized this concept by announcing a robber 20 percent of the price tag for ships wishing to sail through Hormuz. Although he quickly backed down after a push by US allies in the Middle East, Trump is likely to insist the US also participate in any future regional tariff arrangement.
To be enforceable, this would need to be in line with international law, with fees covering services such as pollution control, security and navigational assistance. Politically, it will also need to be supported regionally and fully involve the maritime states. International actors should encourage Tehran and Washington to accept third-party management of such a fund. The IMO, which already manages the trust fund for the Strait of Malacca, will be well placed to play this role.
Using another entity would give the Strait of Hormuz management system more credibility and stability. Iran should also be open to such a structure because it would improve the chances of getting the US sanctions relief required for commercial operators to pay fees to Iran.
The longer the stream remains a contentious issue, the more entrenched the two sides become—trapping Tehran and Trump in an ongoing cycle of war. It would be foolish for either side to abandon the MOU and continue the high-profile fighting of recent days. Nor does it seem to achieve what a year of constant bombing has failed to achieve. Eventually, both sides will have to return to diplomacy, but after wasting more resources and lives while potentially undermining their current capabilities.
