Since the United States and Israel attacked Iran at the end of February, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have found themselves on the front lines of a war they neither wanted nor started. As the ongoing escalation between the United States and Iran shows, neither the April 8 ceasefire nor the subsequent reconciliation agreement succeeded in bringing stability to the region. But while Iran’s targeting of the Gulf states has not ended since the ceasefire, it has changed. Tehran is committed to attacking the United Arab Emirates disproportionately and targeting two small states: Bahrain and Kuwait.
What is common is that before and after the ceasefire, Iran saw the Gulf as Washington’s regional center of gravity. But the intended strategic effect of Iran’s strikes changed: from wreaking havoc on the world economy and forcing a ceasefire to signaling a settlement without provoking a return to hostilities. This is why Iran doubled down on targeting Bahrain and Kuwait. However this was not necessary. Instead, the division between the Gulf and Washington’s strategic alliance created a permissive environment for Iran’s selective coercion. It was the lack of a US or Gulf response to these repeated attacks that set the stage for the current escalation between Washington and Tehran.
Since the United States and Israel attacked Iran at the end of February, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have found themselves on the front lines of a war they neither wanted nor started. As the ongoing escalation between the United States and Iran shows, neither the April 8 ceasefire nor the subsequent reconciliation agreement succeeded in bringing stability to the region. But while Iran’s targeting of the Gulf states has not ended since the ceasefire, it has changed. Tehran is committed to attacking the United Arab Emirates disproportionately and targeting two small states: Bahrain and Kuwait.
What is common is that before and after the ceasefire, Iran saw the Gulf as Washington’s regional center of gravity. But the intended strategic effect of Iran’s strikes changed: from wreaking havoc on the world economy and forcing a ceasefire to signaling a settlement without provoking a return to hostilities. This is why Iran doubled down on targeting Bahrain and Kuwait. However this was not necessary. Instead, the division between the Gulf and Washington’s strategic alliance created a permissive environment for Iran’s selective coercion. It was the lack of a US or Gulf response to these repeated attacks that set the stage for the current escalation between Washington and Tehran.
Bahrain and Kuwait have similar problems. Both rely on the Strait of Hormuz for trade. They are also geographically and demographically small and located between larger, competing neighbors. This makes them vulnerable to becoming borders of conflict and even victims of conquest, as Kuwait found out in 1990. They also all have large Shiite populations. This has increased concerns about Iran trying to fuel the fire of religious division and cause internal instability, which the government of Bahrain. it is owed was the main source of unrest in 2011. Finally, they have not achieved the same level of international influence as some of their GCC counterparts. They do not have the economic weight of Saudi Arabia, the international profile of the UAE, or the diplomatic influence and reach enjoyed by Qatar.
However, no Gulf state can be accused of lacking an effective strategy to deal with these losses. Rather, each represents a different end of the Gulf spectrum. Bahrain has repeatedly come forward with its conservative line on Iran; it joined the Abraham Accords in 2020 and was the only pre-war Gulf state without an embassy in Tehran. On the contrary, Kuwait has prioritized engagement and wants to develop political and economic relations with Iran. Earlier, its now-dissolved parliament passed laws that outlawed even indirect cooperation with the Israelis. In December 2023, Bahrain was only Arab country to publicly join Operation Prosperity Guardian, a Western-led initiative to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. In contrast, Kuwait took a more cautious stance and even temporarily closed its airspace to the United States after the Trump administration launched its operation to open the Strait of Hormuz—Project Freedom—this May.
None of these different approaches kept Bahrain or Kuwait safe before the ceasefire. But their relatively peripheral position in the regional order gave them little respite. Iran targeted the Gulf states because it wanted to cause enough global economic chaos to force a ceasefire. This is why none of the various strategies used by the Gulf states to control Iran have been successful. This also explains why about half of the more than 7,000 missiles and drones that Iran fired into the Gulf between February and June targeted. only one state: UAE, the most connected commercial hub in the region.
After the ceasefire, Iran has continued to strike the Gulf while showing little desire to return to full-scale war. Instead it is using force to demonstrate that it is not yet bowing, thereby strengthening its hand in the ongoing negotiations and predicting further restraint down the line. It uses violence to stop more violence. So it needs to cause some discomfort, but not much. This is why the same characteristics that once prevented Bahrain and Kuwait from becoming Iran’s prime targets now place them in Tehran’s crosshairs. Compared to their more influential Gulf neighbors, Bahrain and Kuwait occupy a dangerous middle ground: important enough for attacks against them to carry strategic signaling value but not enough to be the focal point to warrant US retaliation.
It is not surprising that neither Bahrain nor Kuwait can stop Iran alone due to their small size and low geopolitical weight. The failure is rather more systemic. The basic principle of preparation and strategic logic of the GCC, and the region’s close political and military ties to the United States, means that they should not do it alone. In both cases, collective security should prevent Iran from having the freedom to pick and choose its regional goals.
But the continued Iranian strike is forcing a reassessment of long-held concepts in the Gulf security order, many of which were already being tested during the conflict. Bahrain and Kuwait are major US non-NATO allies. In 2023, Bahrain and the United States signed a Security and Prosperity Cooperation Agreement, similar to a mutual defense treaty. However, Iran repeatedly attacked all the Gulf states from the day after the ceasefire came into effect until early July without any response from the United States other than strong condemnation. This inaction will have done little to assuage regional and international fears that the Trump administration is ready to abandon its allies.
After the United States delayed retaliating in mid-July, Iran increased its attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain while also attacking Qatar, Oman and Jordan. This is a similar forced choice strategy, just one row higher on the ladder. Tehran is once again setting the pace and scope of the conflict, by attacking states that are important to Washington but not enough to make a definitive US response inevitable. This indicates that Iran still does not want to return to an open conflict and instead continues to use force to strengthen its hand at the negotiating table. It also traps the United States in the same dilemma it has faced for several months with Iran’s attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait: Either Washington refrains from responding, which destroys its credibility, or escalates and risks plunging the region into a war that no one wants.
Closer to home, the lack of a consistent GCC response is equally troubling. Before the ceasefire, Iran’s attacks in every Gulf state created a popular sense of solidarity and common struggle. On the contrary, there have recently been rumors that some Gulf states are pursuing their own post-war ad hoc. contracts and Iran and its country partners. There is no evidence to support this claim. However, what is clear is that Iran has continued to target Bahrain and Kuwait. Both countries are now struggling economically due to Iran’s attacks. Credit rating agency Moody’s has been demoted Bahrain’s outlook went from “stable” to “negative” in April, while the same month saw Kuwait export zero barrels of oil for the first time since the 1990 Gulf War.
All these trends are worrying because what happens in Bahrain and Kuwait does not stay there. That Tehran has now widened the conflict and attacked Qatar and Oman for the first time in months, as well as attacking Emirati and Saudi-flagged ships, proves that the GCC states are too close geographically to tolerate the concept of endless mini-conflicts on their doorstep. This is why any concrete bilateral agreement between Iran and the Gulf states would amount to putting a Band-Aid on a potentially fatal wound. More tragically, through its selective use of violence, Iran remains adept at exploiting loopholes and practicing “divide and rule” within the Gulf. It can use any and all intra-GCC competition.
This is why the Gulf states are only as strong as their weakest link. As the similar ideologies of Bahrain and Kuwait show, developing stronger ties with Iran and a posture against Israel is not a magic bullet, nor is taking a more confrontational stance against Tehran and joining the Abraham Accords. When implemented at the individual level, both of these strategies encounter the same structural constraints. The best solution is a joint one. This will involve some compromises in the main strategies and in the freedom of everyone in the Gulf state. While Tehran can target weak states without evoking a coherent political or kinetic response, every Gulf state remains vulnerable.
This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage. Read more here.
