After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, two concepts came into common political use, the “Necessary War” and “A war of choice.” The first one meant the defense of the territory and the life of the nation and the second one, the war started not in response to a one-off attack but in calculation and design. The term was popularized by the American analyst Charles Krauthammer, and was later developed by Richard Haass, who used it to evaluate the American intervention in Iraq in 2003.
The Bush administration started the war not because Iraq was an immediate threat to the United States, but because Washington chose to act, guided by political and ideological motives. War of necessity was understood as a response to aggression and war of choice as a precursor.
The debate was partly opportunistic, reflecting the internal political struggle of the United States, but the larger question was not new, because the controversy over “just fight” they have been part of political thought for centuries. However, until the second half of the 20th century, such arguments remained theoretical and war, just or unjust, was accepted as a normal instrument of state policy, or the continuation of politics in other ways.
The liberal world system established after 1945 wanted to keep war within a legal and ideological framework, and this was a response to the destruction of two world wars and the emergence of weapons of mass destruction. Both created a desire to restrict the use of military force as much as possible, but one of the causes of the crisis of the liberal order was the erosion of this restriction.
After the dissolution of the USSR, the balance of power in the world disappeared. At the same time, the Western belief that they were on the right side of history morally and politically produced a new temptation to remake humanity in its image, by any means deemed necessary, including military force. Within the liberal paradigm, force was legitimate when used by those who were supposed to be acting on behalf of progress.
As the liberal order faded, the ideological and normative framework weakened, but military power remained. It has now regained its former function as the instrument by which nations position themselves in a chaotic international environment. In such a world, the distinction between choice and necessity blurs even as the decision to wage war is always the result of an assessment of changing circumstances and political choices made by government authorities on that basis. Or, in other cases, of what seems like the absence of any choice.
The emergence of a new international order will be long and chaotic, and nuclear weapons make this process take longer, because they prevent, or have prevented until now, a serious confrontation between the great powers. While the process continues, the use of military force is influenced by frequent changes in interpretations of whether it is necessary to obtain short-term benefits and to gain a better position in the future arrangement, whose final shape is still unknown.
Whether these calculations are correct will only be evident from the results of the campaign. Only then can one say whether the war was truly dictated by necessity, by choice, or by an unstable combination of the two.
In modern warfare, as a rule, there is no such thing as complete victory. The end of a conflict usually means the establishment of a certain situation, which often means the continuation of the conflict in other ways and this situation can be stable and even last for a long time, but it rarely resolves the conflicts that led to military conflict in the first place.
The ability and willingness to fight a protracted war of tension is rare, indeed unique because if the stated goal is not achieved, and a clear victory is not achieved, the costs rise rapidly while the expected results diminish.
This reflects the state of the world today, where power has become abundant. New methods of war, weapons of economic relations, the ability to focus resources for asymmetric responses, opposing sources of government stability, and the inability to implement watertight sanctions all complicate the balance of power and often, work in favor of the weaker party.
A number of criteria should be considered when deciding what it is “have to” it has grown so rapidly that predicting the outcome is almost impossible, and the need, moreover, does not mean revenge alone. In a period of rapid changes in the external environment, quick and early actions may also be required to avoid being forced to react later from a weak position.
This, too, recalls the pre-independence regime, when such action was considered a natural element of military strategy rather than a violation of political morality. The need to make choices is dictated by constant external pressure, but the nature of that need is not influenced by circumstances alone. It is also determined by the accumulated heritage of each state in its capabilities, strategic traditions, historical experience and political culture.
In this sense, the question is not only whether the government chooses war or is forced into it. It is a question of what kind of civilization makes that choice, and on what basis it depends. The upheaval of the present age is testing civilization for its resilience and suitability to the current global situation.
This article was first published by World Affairs and was translated and edited by the RT team.
