“Whoever commands the sea commands commerce; whoever commands the commerce of the world commands the wealth of the world, and therefore the world itself.” Created by Sir Walter Raleigh and popularized by the famous strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, this phrase has long underpinned American grand strategy. For decades, the United States has relied on its vast naval power to maintain its military dominance, enforce the security of international trade, and maintain a rule-based international order.
That era is coming to an end.
Although the U.S. Navy has faced few significant limitations, the scope of its dominance has greatly reduced. Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz is the most dramatic example of this change. Iran’s ease with using drones, mines, and cheap missiles to block Hormuz shows that the U.S. can no more guarantees freedom of navigation—even against weaker enemies—through some of the narrowest sea lanes, where geography and the proliferation of cheap weapons puts even the strongest navies at a disadvantage.
The Strait of Hormuz is unique in that there are no alternative sea routes, but it is not the only place where the ability of the United States to ensure the unconditional security of maritime commerce has been challenged. Only in the west, the Houthi forces kept Bab el-Mandeb Sea Gate closed to most traffic for the whole of 2024 (Russia and China secure way saved for their own ships) despite the US military campaign weaken and eliminate the group.
At the same time, the pace of China water expansion and vast shipbuilding capabilities have made America’s unchallenged maritime dominance increasingly inferior even outside the world’s congested areas. The United States retains clear advantages on the high seas, but its freedom of maneuver is now limited even in regional waters, especially in parts of East Asia and the Arctic, where, in an emergency, American warships can be prevented from approaching. close to the enemy coast for powerful anti-ship missiles or underwater drones.
For many in Washington, the end of guaranteed freedom of navigation is an unwelcome prospect. Although these changes present new economic and military challenges, they do not threaten the existence of US security or fundamental interests. The United States can adapt—and even thrive—in a more competitive maritime environment by expanding regional economic networks, investing in stronger supply chains, and shifting greater maritime responsibilities to allies and partners.
Washington has a long time sought after the majesty of the sea for three main reasons. First, naval dominance and the ability of the United States to develop military power around the world are seen as important for national defense and protecting national interests. Second, the ability to guarantee worldwide freedom of navigation for maritime commerce is viewed as a prerequisite for a stable international trading system. Finally, many in Washington believe that free and open seas are a cornerstone of the international peace order.
The loss of the majesty of the seahowever, it does not mean the loss of these benefits.
As a contemporary of Mahan Sir John Corbettand more recently a political scientist Barry Posenhave said, to ensure their physical and economic security, nations only need sufficient naval power to establish temporary control of the main sea routes to reach important economic markets or transfer military assets. In this more conventional view, the United States can still control the maritime domain and intervene directly with force when necessary to defend core interests. In all other cases, however, Washington should shift responsibility for maritime security to local actors and those more dependent on a specific choke point or sea route.
The United States has more than enough naval power today to achieve this goal. Importantly, although no longer as large as it once was, the United States Navy still has sufficient capacity to deploy forces in critical military services or commercial operations and can establish temporary periods of offshore control when necessary. His block Iranian portsalthough of questionable strategic value, it is proof of this capability.
Maintaining the ability to carry out these types of operations, even away from home, is in the interest of the United States, as is ensuring unchallenged access to water in the Western Hemisphere. But the United States can achieve this level even if it accepts a position as one of several major naval powers and surrenders its role as the guarantor of international freedom of navigation.
In particular, when the Houthi forces targeted Bab el-Mandeb, although the United States could not control the strait completely, its warships were still able to use the channel and. driving small caravansas they could defend themselves against drones and missiles. In other words, it can still get temporary access to operations. US Marines may do the same in Hormuz today. That it has not attempted to open the strait by force is most likely a reflection of fewer US interests at stake (Americans are largely protected against serious consequences that the whole world has faced) and the comparatively high costs of the move, rather than the lack of required capacity.
Even without the use of military force, the favorable geography of the United States allows it to respond to maritime disturbances very quickly. And long coastline on the Atlantic and Pacific, the United States can generally access large markets from many directions, and as Arctic ice recedes, northern sea lanes can provide additional options for trade with Europe and beyond.
Furthermore, outside of Hormuz, disruption of one sea route can be managed by adopting an alternative route. When Houthi forces blocked traffic through the Red Sea, shipping companies quickly to be fixed their planned courses and business practices to minimize delays and costs. Future blockages in the Straits of Malacca or in the South China Sea could also be reduced by changing routes through Southeast Asia or the Indonesian islands.
Critics argue that in a more contested maritime order, the risks of conflict and economic turmoil will increase, undermining US security and prosperity as well as international stability. They are worried that in the future, the government on the main sea routes will do gain strength detain ships or levy taxes that increase the cost of doing business. But the return of great competition on the high seas would only be a return to the historical norm.
There is little evidence that these changes will inevitably lead to global instability or the end of the international peace order. If the United States abandons its role as the guarantor of freedom of navigation, other countries may take steps to protect their interests and prevent the emergence of new threats and conflicts on the high seas or the return of old ones, such as piracy.
This is already in play: Countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East are working on it to form an alliance which will provide security in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea after the Iran war; The Nordic and Baltic states cooperate to better manage threats in the country The Baltic Sea and nearby Arctic waters; and countries in East and Southeast Asia are located to work together about ocean issues in the entire region.
Therefore, the maritime order of the future may look very different from the one that exists today, but it may not be more conflictual or violent. In fact, given the weakening role of the US Navy in recent years – especially in the Middle East and Latin America – it could be more peaceful.
United States it can succeed in a world where the seas are contested, but it will need to update its economic and military strategies. The Trump administration should initiate these changes, although completing them may fall to future administrations.
First, the United States should prioritize more detail business and investment relations within the Western World. The Iran war has underscored the dangers of over-reliance on markets far from home, where access can be more easily blocked. As the maritime domain becomes increasingly competitive, investing instead in regional trade networks will reduce the opportunities for such disruption and reduce the potential burden of defending important trade routes.
Some Western countries may be worried about working with Washington due to US President Donald Trump’s overspending economic and forced military across the region. However, the benefits of increased cooperation with the United States may outweigh these concerns, especially if Washington offers favorable terms.
Second, the United States should work to eliminate single points of failure in critical trade routes. Experts have warned for years about the dangers of the Strait of Hormuz and urged exporters in the Gulf to invest in alternative pipes to access the oil and gas market. Going forward, governments and companies should ensure multiple routes—sea and land—for access to essential products and technologies.
Finally, the United Nations should abandon the primary responsibility for securing regional seas and oceans that are not central to its economic well-being, shifting the burden to regional actors and those most at risk to their security or well-being.
In the Middle East, this would mean handing over management of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb to the Gulf states, Europe, and East Asian countries such as Japan and China that are heavily dependent on goods passing through the region. In South Asia, maritime security would collapse IndiaIndonesia, Singapore, and Australia. The United States does not need to dictate these arrangements but should allow them to be realistically determined by the parties’ resources and interests.
Even as it retreats, the United States would still maintain a strong navy capable of gaining access to sea lanes when needed and contributing to international naval alliances where it has interests at stake — for example, and East Asian partners in the Western Pacific. The United States would also maintain the ability to score points in the Western Hemisphere. But Washington would no longer be the sole promoter of international freedom of navigation, nor would it continue to try to maintain unchallenged dominance of the maritime domain, high seas, or territorial waters.
A narrow maritime role would bring obvious benefits. On a larger scale, the United States could maintain a much smaller deployed military, with a smaller defense budget, and would have fewer industrial needs. Filter existing ones aquatic property and personnel may also be reduced, putting the United States Navy on a more sustainable and efficient footing.
On the contrary, the refusal to change with the intention of restoring the supremacy of the US navy – ensuring that no actor can again. restricts freedom of navigation as Iran has done-it would be a self-defeating and financially unsustainable mistake, which could lead to over-proliferation and unnecessary wars.
A more restrained maritime ambition may be politically difficult for Washington to embrace, but the United States is well positioned for change and will ultimately be better for it.
