Recently, when I asked a high-level European diplomat what was the most important thing for him from the meeting of NATO leaders in Ankara, Turkey, on July 7 and 8, he said without hesitation: “This was the first time that all European leaders acted as one group, without some of them breaking ranks and going back to try to please Donald Trump.
This may sound like European countries, long addiction to US military defensethey finally get their act together. However, this new unity does not mean that they are ready to work on a strong European defense and collective resolve.
More Europe transatlantic countries finally they can agree with the US’ gradual withdrawal from European defense obligations. But for now, European countries continue to rely heavily on American defense companies; in 2024 they used 68 billion dollars for defense products in the United States, against only 11 billion on average between 2017 and 2021. Worse, a big rift has appeared between the two largest European economies: Mutual trust between Germany and France, which should be at the heart of any European defense structure, is in the process of breaking down.
This is a problem for all of Europe. European Union began in 1952—with its motto “no more war”—when France and West Germany (along with Italy, as well as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) placed their national defense industries under international authority. They did it for one purpose only: to make another world war impossible. Now, after a long period of peace and decades of military neglect, they are increasingly faced with a hybrid and military threats from RussiaEurope’s former warmongers have begun to reinvest in their national industries—not together this time, but increasingly alone. In the last few months, one Franco-German defense project it has collapsed with a loud noise while others are stuck.
First, fall. Conceived as a demonstration project for European defense cooperation, the Future Anti-Aircraft System (FCAS) project was supposed to demonstrate Europe’s ability to replace national industrial competition for a single target—the French and German fighter jet. His failure, he announced in early June, shows that industrial fragmentation has returned to Europe, hampering cooperation in a common defense plan just when it is most needed.
FCAS, in which Spain also participated, stalled for one main reason: FCAS, in which Spain also participated, stalled for one main reason: The two main contractors failed to work together. The French company Dassault, originally the main contractor, insisted on taking the lead at the time is reported barely allowing its German partner Airbus Defense to enter it. Airbus executives had he explained the problems reach an agreement on intellectual property rights (IP) and patents.
This was a clear case of industrial nationalism undermining defense cooperation. It got out of control because in Europe, there is no existing system for the division of labor in defense projects and, equally important, for the distribution of future benefits (including non-military) from international knowledge and assets. In the absence of law and regulation, the one with the strongest muscles takes it all. This has happened in the past with unregulated (or poorly regulated) industries such as banking and pharmaceutical companies.
The collapse of the FCAS debate shows that European laws on the fair distribution of labor and IP for the defense industry are urgently needed: Considering the threat of Russia and the withdrawal of America from Europe, countries and companies are investing strongly in defense, and establishing joint projects.
For example, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain are working on a Eurodrone. Several countries are building an air defense system, either to help Ukraine or to produce with Ukraine. And just this month, the “anti-ball coalition” that includes Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, England and Ukraine. held in Paris on the eve of France’s National Day to coordinate the efforts of their countries and industries to develop anti-missile systems capable of intercepting Russian weapons aimed at Ukrainian citizens. On July 14, foreign troops marched through Paris to show European resolve—including troops from Ukraine.
The German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, was there. But instead of France and Germany pooling resources to buy or produce weapons together, like in the 1950s, now it’s smaller countries doing this. With funding from the European Union, they put together purchases. Unable to make the weapons they need on their own, integrated projects are their cheapest and best option.
Everything is moving at an incredible speed. The amounts involved are astronomical: European countries have slashed defense spending since the fall of the Berlin Wall in the 1990s and are now starting from scratch. According to recent NATO statistics, between European member states and Canada, defense spending in 2025 was the top 20 percent than in 2024. Although this overactivity creates opportunities, the danger is that it will turn into a jungle where the biggest companies, supported by national governments, will drive others out of the market.
This is why the Franco-German fighter plane project failed. Germany and France have powerful arms manufacturers who seem to be ignoring the decisions of their political leaders to cooperate at the European level. When French President Emmanuel Macron wanted to turn FCAS into a showcase of Franco-German co-production, to symbolize Europe’s new strategic independence and independence, Dassault began to cut off its German partners from everything. The Germans, who picked up half the bill, complained bitterly. The issue was brought several times at the highest political level—until Merz finally had enough and pulled the plug in June. The Spaniards they weren’t even notice.
If France and Germany now rebuild their national defense capabilities, Europe will come full circle. After all, integrating national war machines with American protection ensured 80 years of peace on the continent. If soon European countries will be able to fight a war again for the first time in eight decades, then the only way to take should be to control the national defense industries and put them under the international authority again.
That does not mean that protection cannot be national. As long as countries import and produce weapons and equipment from each other in the EU’s well-regulated defense market and coordinate purchases (so that they can support each other’s weapons systems with compatible software), there is nothing to worry about. Smaller countries are increasingly doing this now. The problem begins when there is no European master plan and, therefore, Germany imports almost German and French factories and French factories.
Have the Germans learned from the FCAS debate? The statement and Airbus boss Michael Schoellhorn that “we want the German industry to play a leading role” suggests that they have not. Some hoped Germany’s answer would be to create a true European alliance with non-German companies. Having become a victim of industrial nationalism, they reasoned, Berlin would not inflict this on others and would instead seek a European solution.
Well, it didn’t: It has launched a new fighter jet program, the Gen 6 Team, with Airbus at the helm, aside several German partner companies. In short, Germany can retaliate by creating a national champion that can compete with Dassault.
The KNDS tank project, owned by French and German companies, is not flourisheither. Here too, Germany is reportedly dissatisfied with co-ownership and has begun building its own tank. The new tank alliance includes other European companies, but is led by Germany, excluding French companies. At the same time, the Franco-German Air Warfare System, sea patrol programit is also dry. And for the space and satellite project (which involves a constellation of 1,000 satellites for observation and communication), Germany cut out a French partner it had previously planned to work with.
With France and Germany—the traditional engines of European integration—fighting in defense projects or even retaliation, the task now is for others to nip retaliation in the bud and push for European legislation for the distribution of work and IP in the sector.
Here, perhaps the Nordics can intervene. In the eye of the global geopolitical storm, countries such as Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, bordering the Baltic states, Benelux, Poland and Norway that are not members of the European Union, feel the urgency of joint projects and – for the first time – are starting to talk and take action in Brussels. Sweden in particular, with its large defense industry, “could emerge as a European defense concentration,” he writes Shahin Vallée, head of the geoeconomics program at the German Council on Foreign Relations, a Berlin-based think tank. Instead of being a “neutral nature on the fringes,” Vallée writes that it is now moving to the main European stage, signing contracts with several companies and countries——————- including France and Germany, but not the two together.
What? Can the small countries of northern Europe form a kind of anchor for the defense of Europe, or in any case, provide enough weight for the ineffective Franco-German defense axis? And how toxic could this dysfunction be for Europe if the right wing takes power in France or Germany?
Many questions remain. One thing is certain: The answers will ultimately show whether Europeans have learned anything from their recent history—or not.
