“Cooperation has no boundaries.” Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin used the phrase in February 2022, making a celebratory reference just weeks before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. More than four years later, the relationship between the two countries seems to be improving. Putin’s recent trip to Beijing, his first international visit in 2026, was the latest reminder of this relationship.
But the visit also showed how Beijing’s relationship with Moscow has grown. With Russia in an unwinnable war and weighed down by a faltering economy, China is deciding what a partnership looks like and what exactly “borderless” means. It is Xi, not Putin, who drives the proverbial bus.
“Cooperation has no boundaries.” Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin used the phrase in February 2022, making a celebratory reference just weeks before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. More than four years later, the relationship between the two countries seems to be improving. Putin’s recent trip to Beijing, his first international visit in 2026, was the latest reminder of this relationship.
But the visit also showed how Beijing’s relationship with Moscow has grown. With Russia in an unwinnable war and weighed down by a faltering economy, China is deciding what a partnership looks like and what exactly “borderless” means. It is Xi, not Putin, who drives the proverbial bus.
Big picture it is clear. China and Russia have long had problems with American supremacy and they are join forces to deal with it. They see the West shrinking and a more pluralistic world emerging, with US President Donald Trump—to use Lenin’s term—serving as history’s midwife.
This set of ideas translates into policy. Since 2022, Beijing has given us a way to save the Russian economy, provide a hydrocarbon market and distribute critical goods, such as machinery, and dual-use goods, such as electronic components. Moscow’s defense industry – in particular, those that make drones and missiles that attack Ukrainian cities – could not survive without China. And thanks to energy exports, the Russian economy has been able blunt the effects of Western sanctions. Russia even runs a business surplus with China.
The economic and strategic relationship is sustainable and will win the war in Ukraine. They all talk of “Kissinger’s back” – Washington listing Russia as an ally in pressuring China – misses the mark. In contrast, Putin is clearly courting Xi, just as Trump did during his high-profile visit to Beijing.
Yet Putin’s pilgrimage to Zhongnanhai also made it clear that Russia is there not getting the deal he wants from China. In fact, Putin returned empty-handed. In particular, there was no major announcement about the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. This natural gas connection, designed to transport 50 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas annually over 2,600 kilometers (1,616 miles) from western Siberia to northeastern China, is primarily licensed by Gazprom and China’s CNPC.
If implemented, the project would roughly double the current amount of gas that China buys from Russia, which it handles around five of Chinese imports. However, as ever, the devil is in the details: The Chinese run a tough business on prices and take-or-pay rates. Russia had hoped that closure of the Strait of Hormuz jeopardizing large quantities of liquefied natural gas flows would soften Beijing’s position, but so far, these hopes have been dashed.
At the end of the day, Russia, having largely lost European markets, it needs more China than the other way around. Beijing is profit from the increased investment to the reactors, which generate approx 40 percent of its electricity. China also has large reserves of coal. Gas—which is mainly used in industrial production and for residential heating—can replace some of that.
As in Europe, the Chinese are looking to natural gas as a transitional fuel to ease the switch from coal to renewables. As a result, its use is highly dependent on price. And Beijing also believes that flexibility is essential to secure stable and cheap gas. This means that Chinese companies are establishing centers and signing long-term contracts with of Australia, Malayand Indonesian suppliers including those in the United States and Russia. All this means that they have alternatives to the Siberian Power 2 pipeline.
The Chinese leadership certainly remembers the precedent set by Power of Siberia 1. Negotiations lasted more than a decade, but eventually, Putin accepted China’s terms. These include lower prices than those paid by Gazprom’s customers in Europe, with Russia bearing the financial cost of laying thousands of kilometers of pipeline. What caused Putin to waver was the bad relationship between Russia and Europe and the United States following the annexation of Crimea. China took advantage then and has more power now.
Russia’s oil exports, which are important to its government budget and overall fiscal balance, mirror its gas exports. China is now a country the main market for Russian crude. It buys 50 percent of Russian oil exports, representing 18 percent of Chinese imports. In the midst of this heavy trade, Beijing has managed to squeeze discounts from Russian companies, which are subject to G-7 sanctions. Despite the closure of Hormuz, crude from the Urals is reported sell at an increasing discount. Here too, Russia needs China more than China needs Russia.
The asymmetry between the two countries is reflected in the structure and dynamics of their trade relations. Russia exports goods: oil, gas, agricultural products and minerals. What comes back is electricity, cars, industrial equipment, and consumer goods. Moreover, Chinese companies have basically replaced Western, Japanese and South Korean companies that left Russia after 2022. share of new Chinese cars sold in Russia rose from less than 20 percent to 57 percent between 2022 and 2025. Chinese car companies have frequently teamed up with Russian outfits that took over Western-owned assets. Now, for example, the former Volkswagen plant near Kaluga collects examples for the Chinese manufacturer Chery.
China’s investment is not of the kind that brings about technology transfer or increases Russian productivity. Instead, the Russian economy has entered a mode of low growth. Now, even Chinese companies that have invested in Russia are worried lose business medium The decline of Russia’s economic fortunes.
There are those in Russia who see the evil of connecting their country’s wealth with increasingly dominant China. Prominent foreign policy analyst Dmitri Trenin has said“It is very important for us to maintain balance in our relationship and to remember that Russia is a great power that cannot be a small partner.”
From this perspective, Russia sees its relationship with India, which includes economic and political dimensions, as a hedge against China’s overdependence.
Likewise, strategists are undoubtedly aware that Beijing’s support for Ukraine is misplaced. China officially insists it is neutral, offers ironic support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and maintains ties with Kyiv. And Moscow knows that if there is a solution, Chinese contractors will be lining up the next day for construction projects in Ukraine.
Finally, Russian businesses also do not enjoy Chinese competition, especially when Chinese companies benefit from the indirect or direct blessings of the Kremlin. Sergei Chemezov, head of the state-owned defense industry consortium Rostec, has been one of the voices of doubt.
Once the war in Ukraine ends, Russian concerns about the volatile nature of the relationship will gain more traction. However, Moscow’s room for maneuver will be much reduced by then. After surpassing the EU, China will remain Russia’s main economic partner. Chinese technology will have penetrated further. People-to-people links will have expanded, as China has is becoming increasingly popular destination for Russian travelers.
More importantly, Putin’s aversion to major geopolitics and civilization wars against the West will ensure that Beijing remains his indispensable ally. In short, Beijing has options, but for the Kremlin, there is no limit to the apparent relationship.
