When Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed in December 2024, Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced that he would embrace a “zero-problems” foreign policy, in hopes that it would help break the country’s isolation and solve some of its economic problems. The prospect of a stable Syria attracted at least $28 billion in investment deals from Middle Eastern countries in 2025, and. even more has been safe until now in 2026.
The continuation of that trend amid the current war with Iran has boosted Syria’s geopolitical and economic centrality—that it could become a potentially transformative conduit for energy flows, commercial trade, and technological connectivity connecting Asia and Europe through the Middle East’s hub. With the Strait of Hormuz still closed and insecurity still high in the Red Sea, Syria is proposing to serve as a direct land route.
When Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed in December 2024, Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced that he would embrace a “zero-problems” foreign policy, in hopes that it would help break the country’s isolation and solve some of its economic problems. The prospect of a stable Syria attracted at least $28 billion in investment deals from Middle Eastern countries in 2025, and. even more has been safe until now in 2026.
The continuation of that trend amid the current war with Iran has boosted Syria’s geopolitical and economic centrality—that it could become a potentially transformative conduit for energy flows, commercial trade, and technological connectivity connecting Asia and Europe through the Middle East’s hub. With the Strait of Hormuz still closed and insecurity still high in the Red Sea, Syria is proposing to serve as a direct land route.
Depending on the timing of Syria’s geographical position, its finance minister was asked to do so to attend G-7 summit in May and Sharaa has been invited share at the G-7 summit in mid-June. The sudden rise in Syria’s cooperation with nations like the G-7 speaks to the importance of what Syria offers as long-term solutions to the problems arising from the Iran war.
One such opportunity was presented at an emergency EU summit in Cyprus in April, when Sharaa pitched Syria as a solution to Europe’s energy security concerns. “Syria, which in the past was a field of conflict for others, today has chosen … to be a bridge of security and the main pillar of the solution,” he said. he saidcalling his country “an alternative and safe vein that connects Central Asia and the Gulf to the center of the European continent.”
In Cyprus, Sharaa proposed the establishment of the old and never-before-achieved “Four Seas” project, in which Syria will act as a center for commercial communication and logistics through railways, roads, and pipelines that connected sea routes in the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and the Gulf.
Such an international project would significantly reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz by establishing a network of land routes through the Middle East to Europe. The public offering came after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky he visited Damascus and Turkey he announced abolition of customs barriers with Armenia – all necessary opportunities for access and use of the Caspian and Black seas.
By any reckoning, the vision presented by Sharaa will take many years to achieve. Today’s Syria has no money to pay its public sector workers and the country’s reconstruction bill is hundreds of billions of dollars.
Important, though faster In terms of speed, the land route cannot replace what the sea traffic is able to move relatively. Until the current war with Iran, 27 percent oil of the world, 20 percent of liquefied natural gas, and 30 percent of the world’s fertilizers passed through the Strait of Hormuz. In terms of consumer products, at least 26 million containers pass through the channel every year, making its closure a threat to international imports. For the Gulf states, food security is a major concern, and approx 85 percent of their collective food supply imported through the ocean current.
But if Syria were to realize its ambitions and become an international transportation and commercial corridor, that would remove the world’s heavy reliance on the Strait of Hormuz. Syria could be one alternative underground vein in a the new networkfrom the Gulf, to Egypt, to Jordan.
This will be of great international importance—for regional states and Gulf energy producers, for European customers, and, of course, for Syria itself. Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz has also increased insurance rates for marine vessels, which, even if peace returns, are not expected to return to pre-conflict levels, making land transport structurally competitive. More broadly, if it were what many now hope, Syria’s recovery and prosperity would have a positive ripple effect on its neighbors, fostering the kind of stability and regional integration the Levant has rarely, if ever, seen.
It is no coincidence that Sharaa’s economic vision, which aims to attract international support for the revival of Syria, is in line with the current security and diplomatic challenges in the world. Without geographic reasons, Syria’s call for investment may fall on deaf ears. A moment of caution assessment that remember how damaged Syria’s infrastructure is right now is of course correct, everything has to start somewhere. And rarely has the Middle East needed reasons for hope that promise to facilitate connection and mutual benefit as much as today.
Another Syrian opening comes in the face of serious food security concerns in the Gulf, where 85 percent food is imported into the country through the Strait of Hormuz. While the region’s large food reserves and the short-term ability to finance additional supplies from other sources have prevented any major shortages, long-term uncertainty has led to consideration of alternatives. For example, Saudi Arabia is evaluating the possibility of a high-speed railway to transport food and other commercial goods from Syria through Jordan to the northern Saudi city of Arar.
Meanwhile, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey have formed a tripartite body aimed at establishing a regional trade corridor that uses roads and, eventually, a revitalized Hejaz Railway line connecting the port of Aqaba with Turkish ports via Syria. Again, the creation of such regional corridors will remove dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and place Syria at the center of an alternative route.
Regional energy connectivity is also set to change in the coming years, with at least four major international oil and gas pipeline projects undergoing technical evaluation for rehabilitation and restart, or expansion to Syria and beyond – namely the Arab Gas Pipeline (from Egypt to Turkey, via Jordan and Syria), the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline between Iraq, Jordan and Syria, Qatar and Syria, Qatar, Turkey and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Syria and Lebanon (via Jordan).
Already, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline connecting Azerbaijan to Turkey and north to Europe has been extended south to Aleppo, stabilizing northern Syria’s electricity grid. The massive pipeline projects would redirect the flow of oil and gas from sea lanes through the Strait of Hormuz and ease Europe’s energy security concerns.
While these large-scale projects will undoubtedly take time to materialize, regional energy producers are already using Syria as an alternative. Iraq is moving oil through Syria and on to Mediterranean and European buyers, and other reports suggest that the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf states are doing the same.
These strategic projects will require significant investment from stakeholders who want to benefit from the new approach. In the region, Saudi Arabia and Qatar were early donors, concluding investment agreements in energy, aviation, and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, establishing Eastern to Mediterranean Data Belt. The UAE is now increasing its involvement, too, including in its ownership and expansion of the port of Tartus. Currently, many Middle Eastern energy players have already concluded agreements in the oil and gas sector, including QatarEnergy and Arabian Drilling.
Another champion has been the Trump administration, through the rapid relief of sanctions, political support, and mediation of American energy companies in the Syrian market, including agreements signed with Chevron and ConocoPhillips. That support remains crucial, as does US President Donald Trump’s pledge to de-designate Assad-era Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Supporting continued stability and integration of Syria into the international economic and trade system will also require two of Syria’s enemies to retreat. One of them, Iran, has suffered heavy losses in recent months and is likely to deal with reconstruction itself for the foreseeable future.
But another enemy, Israel, continues to pursue a policy of weakening and dividing Syria. In fact, for no discernible reason, Israel has increased significantly its military operations inside Syria over the past two weeks—more than twice ground invasion into Syria and three artillery strikes. Such actions not only threaten to disrupt Syria’s political transition, but also risk destroying important opportunities for long-term economic security in an unstable and unpredictable region.
