The Iran War Is Not Just Trump’s End


A US official told Axios that on Monday that Donald Trump read to Benjamin Netanyahu an act of violence for wanting to launch a strike in Beirut, which could tear apart the US-Iran talks. The message, the officer said, “You’re crazy. You’d be in jail if it weren’t for me. I’m saving your ass. Everyone hates you now. Everyone hates Israel because of this.” Later that evening, the official White House account has been published “HOPE TRUMP. ‘Just sit back and relax, everything will work out in the end—Always!'”

An interesting explosion, which Trump confirmed today, it shows a bigger problem. With a nuclear deal with Iran not being reached, Trump seems content to postpone the problems he faces rather than face them. There may be an end to the violence, but any peace will be temporary and inherently unstable. The war will probably start again sometime in the next few years, and the consequences are huge for all involved.

Trump clearly does not want to go back to all-out war right now. Depending for Washington ExaminerA senior administration official has confirmed Trump’s belief that the only way to achieve meaningful change in Iran is through a major escalation. Perhaps this means ground operations, which could cause heavy American losses, or infrastructure strikes, which could lead to Iran retaliating against similar targets in the Gulf.

“You can, of course, give more pain,” the official said, but the question is whether this can give anything worth the cost. He said that the Iranian regime has undergone “significant” changes, and that pragmatists are “more influential than they were before.”

But one of those supposed pragmatists, Iran’s chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, has been published on X: “We take the agreement not by negotiation, but by missiles; in negotiation, we make them understand.” He added, “The winner of any agreement is the one who is best prepared for war from the next day.”

In other words, Tehran seems to see dialogue not as an alternative to confrontation but as a phase within it. It is not willing to give up on negotiations that could not be removed from the war.

In Washington, some Iran hawks agree. Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies he argued that Trump should use the ceasefire to get the American economy back on track, and then only later, in the summer, “start thinking about returning to major military operations but not before the midterms, when the consequences could be very difficult for him politically.”

The US and Iran are too far apart to be connected to a permanent solution. Instead, they are moving toward a narrow deal: the United States lifting its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran allowing ships to pass in exchange for economic compensation. The nuclear issue—including what to do with Iran’s highly enriched uranium—would be deferred to later negotiations, which few expect to succeed.

The US-China trade war may provide a clue as to how this will end. Trump imposed initial tariffs on China as early as 2025. Over the next few months, both sides escalated, leading to a full-blown trade war by April. Then, as now, Trump knew that the economic cost would rise over time — in the case of a trade war, because inventories of essential goods from China would decline.

In mid-May, Washington and Beijing agreed to a moratorium and put the issues under long-term talks. Some small announcements have come out of the talks, but the big deal remains unclear. However, the talks have allowed Trump to say that relations with China are in good shape and that both countries are holding back. National security officials meanwhile worry that Trump is welcoming China and failing to take the necessary steps to protect US interests.

Something similar seems to be happening to Iran. Deadlines may be extended. Small steps can be set as big progress. As long as Iran doesn’t embarrass Trump by restarting its nuclear program, the president can call it a victory.

But what comes next is not entirely about Trump. Washington had an ally in its war on Iran—Netanyahu’s Israel—and Israel has viewed the conflict as a strategic obstacle. Jerusalem may begrudgingly accept a temporary ceasefire with Iran out of necessity, but it is unwilling to allow Tehran to rebuild its missile program or its allies. Nor will it want to be constrained in its struggle with Hezbollah—or to ensure that it will not attack Iran again in the future. As Iran begins to regroup in preparation for resuming hostilities, Israel may take preventive measures.

When Trump began his second term, Iran was weaker than it had been since the early 1980s. It was willing to make greater concessions in negotiations than anything it had agreed to before, although it still fell short of completely eliminating its enrichment capacity. The 12-day war, in June 2025, set back Iran’s nuclear program by years. Trump could reach a deal, or he could just bide his time and let pressure on the vulnerable government build. But instead he and Netanyahu saw an opportunity to deal the Iranian regime what they thought was a major blow from which it would never recover.

Efforts to solve the Iran problem permanently have made it impossible to solve. Iran is now strategically strengthened, although its military assets have been destroyed. Having seen that it can close the channel at will, Tehran now knows that it has power in the Gulf and a powerful deterrent to use against the United States. The regime, previously led by an elderly and ailing dictator, was facing a succession crisis but has now consolidated its power and found new sources of income.

Israel will not accept the military re-establishment of the Iranian regime. And the Iranian regime seems to believe that it needs to escalate to stop Israeli and American attacks. Yesterday, for example, is was launched missiles against Kuwait and Bahrain to avenge the US attack on the island of Qeshm. If Israel strikes Iran in the next few years, Iran will likely respond by closing the loop—and strike the Gulf states if they or the United States facilitate Israeli operations in any way.

Further conflict seems structurally inevitable. Trump will not be fooled by the fake-and-extend ceasefire approach. The war began as a demonstration of extraordinary US-Israeli military cooperation, but as the Trump-Netanyahu call for action shows, managing its outcome will be a permanent source of tension between Washington and Jerusalem.



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