The rapid expansion of China’s nuclear submarine fleet and long-range missile arsenal is fueling its growing ability to target Australia, a threat that could expand rapidly over the next decade, a new analysis warns.
The Lowy Institute paper, to be released on Monday, finds that China’s existing ability to strike Australia will be driven by a game changer: the addition of a new long-range bomber to its arsenal, as well as the ability to move existing assets near Australia through a military base in the Pacific.
The magazine, which focuses on open-source intelligence on China’s military modernization, finds China’s navy is set to have 25 nuclear-powered attack submarines by 2035, up from nine today’s estimates.
Australia is scheduled to acquire its second such ship – a US Virginia-class submarine by this date under the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine contract.
Australia’s distance from China remains a strategic asset, but analysts Sam Roggeveen and David Vallance see the threat of a direct strike “is real and growing, particularly through surface-to-air missiles, submarines, and potentially from China’s territory”.
“China can already attack northern Australia with ballistic missiles deployed from its outposts in the South China Sea, and its ability to attack Australian soil from Chinese territory will increase over the next decade,” Roggeveen and Vallance state. Understanding China’s military threat to Australia.
“As China’s submarine fleet grows in size and sophistication, its ability to use these platforms to engage targets on the Australian mainland will also increase.”
Roggeveen was particularly interested in China’s expansion of its fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, which can travel long distances without having to refuel.
“They seem to be at the peak of the construction boom,” he said.
The report finds that the Bohai shipyard in Liaoning province is ramping up to produce between 4.5 and six submarines a year, including three to four nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) and two ballistic missile submarines.
“Of the 25 SSNs we estimate will be operational by 2035, all are likely to deploy cruise missiles or perhaps hypersonic missiles,” the authors say.
The 25 ships will give China “the ability to prosecute sustained strike operations against Australian targets, rotating boats through patrol cycles to maintain continuous threat coverage”, they find.
The US aims to produce 2.33 Virginia-class submarines per year by the early 2030s, but annual production has stagnated at about 1.3. The US Navy has 53 nuclear attack submarines, and hopes to increase that number to 66 by the mid-2030s.
China’s navy is also rapidly increasing its surface fleet, including destroyers, aircraft carriers and frigates.
The authors emphasize that they do not argue that China intends to attack Australia, and that Beijing’s main military focus is closer to home, specifically the Taiwan Strait.
“I don’t think it’s scary to examine the magnitude of the threat through careful, fact-based analysis,” Roggeveen said.
“The likelihood of a Chinese attack on Australia is low, but governments must look at capabilities, not just intentions.”
Chinese President Xi Jinping showcased China’s military progress in a lavish parade held in Beijing last year.
The authors say it is important for Australia to understand China’s military capabilities to manage its defense plans.
“Governments cannot plan their defense on the basis of what the country can do, because
intentions can change in a short time,” they say.
“Military action against Australia could occur as part of a larger war involving the United States or as a small campaign to coerce Australia.”
They are looking for scenarios including China hitting an offshore oil terminal or attacking ports, airports, bridges or railway facilities as a form of economic coercion.
The Lowy report found that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is China’s most effective long-range strike against Australia.
“In the event of a major regional conflict, bases across northern Australia would be PLARF targets,” the authors say.
“The crown jewel of the PLARF is the DF-26, the only conventional Chinese system that can reach Australia without first being carried into launch range by a bomber, ship or submarine.”
The DF-26, a non-nuclear ballistic missile that entered service in 2016, can reach northern Australia, but only when launched from one of Beijing’s artificial islands in the South China Sea.
The biggest increase in China’s missile arsenal has been its stockpile of intermediate-range missiles. Their distance of 4000-8000 km places them in the possibility of reaching northern Australia.
China had no intermediate-range missile capability in 2016, but forecasts show it could have more than 1,000 such systems by 2035.
China’s H-6 long-range bombers currently only have a limited ability to attack Australian targets. The report finds that this would change dramatically if it could establish a Pacific island military base.
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Matthew Knott is the foreign affairs and national security correspondent for The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age.Connect through X, Facebook or email address.
