Almost two centuries after US President James Monroe warned European powers against meddling in the Western World, the United States is once again facing a geopolitical challenge in the region. In the past two decades, China has significantly expanded its economic, technological and strategic presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. But today’s environment is fundamentally different from that of the past The Monroe Doctrine.
The Monroe Doctrine was a strategy of isolation: It tried to prevent outside powers from establishing territorial and political control in the Western Hemisphere. The system does not reflect the competitive reality of the 21st century. China does not expand its influence in Latin America through conquest or occupation. Instead, Beijing is focused on regional infrastructure, trade networks, energy systems, digital ecosystems, and strategic sectors.
China exerts its influence less through force than through economic integration, technological dependence, and structural modernization. Now it is a main business partner in the region, a major source of finance, and an important market for agricultural products and exports. For many Latin American governments facing persistent infrastructure deficits, sluggish growth, and poor long-term investment, engaging with China isn’t ideological — it’s an economic imperative.
The United States cannot literally exclude China from South America. Nor should it try to force governments in the region to make two choices between Washington and Beijing. Many countries in the world seek only various economic relations and greater strategic independence.
Not all forms of Chinese involvement carry the same strategic importance. Instead of retroactively opposing all Chinese trade activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States should choose to eliminate China’s influence in sectors that have the greatest geopolitical and national security implications. For Washington, this means moving from strategic denial to what I call strategic displacement.
First, the United States must prioritize strategic infrastructure. Chinese companies have expanded their presence in ports, logistics corridors, transportation hubs, and energy systems all over the world. These properties are not just commercial enterprises. They create trade flows, supply chain access, maritime connectivity, and strategic mobility. Control of critical infrastructure and trade can create lasting forms of political and economic leverage.
The Port of Chancay in Peru, which opened in 2024, shows this situation. The port has been developed in large part by Chinese giant Cosco, to connect South America directly to Asian markets while promoting China’s position in Pacific trade routes and regional supply chains. The United States cannot simply oppose such projects—it must provide Latin American countries with competitive financing and infrastructure alternatives.
Second, the United States must compete more aggressively in digital infrastructure, telecommunications and data management across Latin America. Chinese technology companies such as Huawei and ZTE have focused on telecommunications infrastructure, cloud systems, surveillance technologies, smart city initiatives, and digital payment systems across the region.
These systems are not based on any political party. They shape data management standards, create potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and ultimately could expand opportunities for China’s intelligence gathering and political influence operations. Chinese supported by Venezuelafather’s card” system, developed with support from ZTE, provides an extreme example of how digital systems can transform into instruments of political surveillance and social control.
Third, Washington must turn its growing focus on precious metals into a sustainable hemispheric strategy. Latin America has large reserves of lithium, copper, rare earth elements, and other minerals important for advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, energy technology, and defense systems. China is already organized in the extraction, processing and transportation networks associated with these resources, especially in what is known as the Internet. lithium triangle of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile.
The United States should focus on financing banking projects in countries where market conditions make cooperation efficient, such as Argentina and Chile, while supporting processing, upgrading and disposal agreements that place more of the value chain within the world. The goal should not only be access to raw materials but mineral supply chains that reduce dependence on Chinese-controlled processing and facilities.
Fourth, the United States should treat hemispheric energy resilience as a strategic priority. Chinese state-owned companies have expanded investments in electricity distribution, renewable energy, oil production, and broader energy infrastructure across the region. In Lima, Peru, for example, Chinese companies hold senior positions in the production, distribution and distribution systems of electricity.
While many of these projects may make commercial sense in isolation, collectively they promote Beijing’s role in sectors that are critical to national resilience and long-term economic development.
Fifth, the United States must pay more attention to space and dual-use infrastructure around the world. Chinese investments related to satellite systems, space cooperation, artificial intelligence, and advanced communications can support legitimate commercial goals while also expanding Beijing’s strategic reach and intelligence capabilities.
Chinese operated deep space station in Neuquén, Argentina, shows the complexity surrounding many of these projects. Although it is civilian, the station’s limited transparency and links to China’s military-linked space facilities have raised ongoing concerns among US and regional officials.
The US-China rivalry in Latin America is not ideological—it is structural. For too long, the United States has oscillated between neglect and concern in the region. His approach has been inconsistent, framing almost all of China’s activities as a threat while failing to increase US economic alternatives. The strategy misunderstands the nature of the Chinese government and the economic and development pressures facing governments across the region.
Take the new Bogotá A metro system built by the Chinese. The United States has viewed the project through the lens of geopolitical competition. Yet the project’s relationship with China is unlikely to determine the hemispheric balance of power. Washington also often treats this type of isolated trade dispute as if it constitutes a strategic victory while ignoring sectors that have far greater long-term consequences.
The United States should focus less on blocking China-backed infrastructure projects and more on competing aggressively in sectors that create long-term strategic resilience.
China’s advantage in the Western Hemisphere is not only based on lower costs or faster infrastructure delivery schedules. It is based on Beijing’s ability to align financing, diplomacy, industrial policy, and corporate activities behind long-term geopolitical goals. The United States does not need to imitate China an example of state capitalismbut it needs a coordinated system to encourage American companies to compete in sectors with strategic consequences for national security.
This strategic move will inevitably face setbacks. Countries like Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Chile are not quiet arenas for great power competition; they own their national interests, development priorities, and concepts of strategic independence. Many Latin American governments oppose systems that seem to force geopolitical alignment or revive perceptions of US paternalism.
Brazil, for example, increasingly sees itself as an independent international actor pursuing various forms of cooperation with Beijing and Washington. China belongs to Brazil largest trading partner and a major investor in the agriculture, energy, infrastructure and technology sectors.
Similar trends exist in much of South America. Any US strategy based on complete isolation from China will fail politically and economically. What’s more, Beijing will not just give up its strategic position: It has invested decades to build trade relations, financial dependence, diplomatic influence, and institutional presence throughout the region.
If Washington wants US companies to compete more effectively in key sectors across Latin America, it must reduce the financial and political risks associated with long-term investment in the region. That means more aggressively supporting institutions such as the United States Fund for International Development, the Export-Import Bank, and other public financing methods to stimulate private sector participation.
Most importantly, the United States must re-engage the economic world with focus and resilience. For many Latin American countries, China’s influence grew because the United States was absent, inconsistent, or over-committed in its approach to the region. Countries around the world are not looking to become a geopolitical battleground. They are looking for investment, modernization, and reliable long-term partnerships.
The United States still has significant advantages over China in Latin America and the Caribbean: geographic proximity, deep cultural ties, educational networks, private sector innovation, financial depth, and long-standing democratic partnerships. Capitalizing on those advantages requires competitive skills, not reactive rhetoric.
