When US President Donald Trump agreed memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Iran in mid-June, he promised to make a final agreement which love “To bring peace and security throughout the region.” Since then, however, the conversation has been it’s stuckfighting has it started againUnited States restrictions have been returned, and American warships once again is blocked Iran. In short, we are back to normal a stalled battle we thought we were done a month ago.
All of this raises an important question: Can Trump deliver the peace he promised?
If history is any guide, there is a possibility. US presidents certainly cannot end the stalemated wars they are starting. Trump can overcome these events if he taps into his more pragmatic side or if Congress pressures him to do so. Both are long shots, however—meaning there’s a greater chance of a final peace from Trump’s successor, who will have a better chance of admitting that this war didn’t work and making the kinds of concessions to get the deal that Trump should, but couldn’t.
What history shows us is that when presidents take a nation to war, they see themselves as having a unique contribution to the conflict, be it political, psychological or reputational. Things like sunk cost to think (“we’ve invested so much, we need to show some kind of return”) and worry about honesty (“Going back will hurt our image abroad”) pushing out good cost-benefit ideas and leading them to try to save something that values victory before making peace.
Especially when faced with a very resolved enemy like Iranthis usually means that the deadlock is moving forward as the clock runs out on the president’s term.
This pattern has played out in every US stalemate since World War II. After the Korean War ended in the summer of 1951, President Harry Truman’s anxiety about looking at hard communism at home, American loyalty, and high costs pushed him to follow strict conditions in the ceasefire talks. He left power without a peace treaty.
After the Tet offensive of 1968, President Lyndon Johnson anxiety about his standing at home, sunk costs, and the loyalty of the United States also pushed him to take a strong position in the peace talks. “I can’t get out, I can’t finish it with what I have,” he said he lamented. “So what should I do guys?”
After President Barack Obama’s promise to increase the war to end the war in Afghanistan failed, he has been discontinued withdrawal of all troops in 2015. Obama anxietyin part, about being the president of “losing” Afghanistan, with a repeat the political destruction that followed the withdrawal of Iraq in 2011 and that contributed to the rise of the Islamic State.
Trump faces similar challenges in ending the war with Iran, which stalled when Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in early March. As with previous U.S. standoffs, the costs of this war outweigh the benefits to U.S. security, which remains limited due to declining U.S. interests in the Middle East and the rise of more pressing challenges elsewhere, especially in Asia.
Like his predecessors, Trump is mounting pressure to get the right kind of deal.
Above all, he wants a a better nuclear program than Obama achieved with Iran, after repeatedly criticizing that “one-sided horror“the deal”it should never be done.” Trump now feels intense pressure to prove he was right to abandon Obama’s nuclear deal in 2018 and begin his high-pressure policy.
More broadly, Trump wants to transform the Middle East in ways that past presidents have tried and failed to do. “Look, for 47 years, no president was willing to do what I’m doing” on Iran, Trump he said soon.
Since the Iran war stalled, this reputational concern has had a major impact on negotiations. The MOU talks dragged on for weeks, in part because Trump—who lost a lot of leverage with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz—couldn’t agree on a deal that made him look bad.
Trump often he told it assistants needs something that looks like “victory,” such as the extension of the Abraham Accords or the Iran pledge give up its highly enriched uranium. Two weeks before the MOU was signed, he he refused final draft knocked out and they negotiated and were accepted by the Iranians because he said it was similar to “silver pallets” in the Obama nuclear deal.
Concerns about Trump’s reputation carry more weight at this point.
For starters, unlike the MOU—which was a cease-fire and mostly an agenda setting—the two sides are now trying to set terms on concrete issues that are close to and dear to Trump’s credentials. With his legacy on the line, Trump shows little willingness to bend in these negotiations; he cannot easily change the terms of the final contract the way he could reduce the firm MOU. That compels him to do so maximalist needs as before the war—which we have seen tips since the conversation started.
A decrease in economic pressure in the United States-which may be the opposite if new fighting continues—for the signing of the MOU has not helped in getting an agreement. And the price of oilcoming down after the MOU went into effect, Trump has been under the gun to get a final agreement than he was to negotiate the MOU. That means that meritocracy has had more room to roam, so to speak, in his decision-making.
In fact, this has already derailed the conversation outright on at least one occasion.
When the terms of the MOU were released on June 17, Trump took a lot heat from critics who he claimed — and, by extension, Trump — was weak, too accommodating to Iran. He has been especially anger in comparison to Obama. To counter that sentiment, Trump broke up the first round of high-profile talks by offering a tough one statement about how he is going to “bomb” Iran and take it over. Iranians he went outtalks have gone nowhere since then, and Trump’s recent return to war appears to be another classic case of a war-mongering president desperately trying to save face amid an embarrassing failure.
Standing wars do not lasting forever, of course. But generally it is the successor of the president who started the war who brings the resolution.
Why? Because successors are more free from the constraints of their predecessors. They didn’t start the war, so they feel less obligated to continue it, look for more room to accept defeat, and can easily adjust the terms of negotiations to get an agreement. Trump and former President Joe Biden both campaigned to end the unpopular war in Afghanistan, then followed through on their promises when they came to office.
Given that Trump is the most controversial unusual president in the history of the United States, he could break the mold of his predecessors. Last year, for example, he put aside concerns about credibility and appearing weak when he ended a meaningless air battle with The Houthisand he has refused enter US troops in the Iran conflict. In both cases, Trump correctly considered the costs and benefits to US national security.
History is still more likely to rule than not for Iran, however. Trump seems more personally invested in a victory here than against the Houthis. Moreover, his weak The process of making national security means a check on its decisions few. Trump appears disinterested in new perspectives, even if it is available from his team.
Although it is also harsh, the best hope for a temporary slowdown and peace probably comes from external pressure from Congress, which should start by opposing Trump’s new plan. claim for another 60 days of unrestricted heating authority under War Powers Resolution.
Congress probably won’t stop the war altogether – which has never happened under the resolution. But it can exercise more oversight through hearings, cut funding, and impose conditions on future funding that help break the war fever within the administration, push Trump back to peace talks, and reduce escalating military action. Even if Congress continued to approve war funding, this type of legal intervention helped eventually force peace in Vietnam and curtail the military escalation in Iraq in 2007. It also prevented the escalation in El Salvador in the 1980s by making policy “like walking in a swamp,” according to former US Secretary of State George Shultz.
There should be no deception here, though. Trump won’t give up the war easily, and historically, the tug-of-war between executives and lawmakers over warming has allowed room for conflict to continue. Congress it increased attention and pressure to end Vietnam in 1966. Still, a peace treaty it didn’t come until 1973.
It is likely, then, that Trump will leave office without a peace deal, and his successor will need to fix the Iran mess.
Whoever that is, hopefully unpopularity of war and congressional pressure produces the pragmatism of doing two things that Trump will not do: Admit defeat and relax the terms to get an agreement to end the conflict permanently. President Richard Nixon showed that kind of pragmatism in ending direct US involvement in the Vietnam War, just as Trump did in bringing peace to Afghanistan.
With Iran, that kind of pragmatism would mean accepting its red lines to enrich uranium and ensure some form of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, which is Tehran’s main cause. restarted conflict recently. Although this agreement will not be as painful as many make it out to be, considering that younger US interests in the Middle East will still be a tough pill to swallow. But that is the unfortunate result of losing a war that should never have started in the first place.
