The US war with Israel and Iran has been tough on Saudi Arabia.
Already facing economic pressures, the Saudis have been forced to cut spending and extend the duration of major projects that were supposed to be physical manifestations of the kingdom’s transformation. The Public Investment Fund will do now consider its focus on renewable energy, advanced manufacturing, logistics, water and renewables, tourism, and Neom, the futuristic city the Saudis are building along the country’s northwest coast. Also, in what should be a surprise to anyone given the current crisis, Riyadh will continue to invest in its defense industrial base and increase its arms purchases. The Saudi authorities are to arrange to pull the plug on Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s start-up golf league and I’ve already got it sold out 70 percent of Al Hilal football club in the country.
The US war with Israel and Iran has been tough on Saudi Arabia.
Already facing economic pressures, the Saudis have been forced to cut spending and extend the duration of major projects that were supposed to be physical manifestations of the kingdom’s transformation. The Public Investment Fund will do now consider its focus on renewable energy, advanced manufacturing, logistics, water and renewables, tourism, and Neom, the futuristic city the Saudis are building along the country’s northwest coast. Also, in what should be a surprise to anyone given the current crisis, Riyadh will continue to invest in its defense industrial base and increase its arms purchases. The Saudi authorities are to arrange to pull the plug on Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s start-up golf league and I’ve already got it sold out 70 percent of Al Hilal football club in the country.
As for the war itself, the Saudis got a public relations black eye at the end of February, when Washington Post information that Mohammed bin Salman—like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—persuaded US President Donald Trump to attack Iran. The Saudis denied it. A few weeks later, when Trump was claiming that the war would end in a few days, the New York Times information that the prince was once again persuading the president, this time to end the work against Tehran. Again, the Saudis denied. However, despite publicly insisting that it does not want war, has nothing to do with Operation Epic Fury, and supports a diplomatic solution to the conflict, Saudi Arabia has repeatedly taken fire from Iran and its allies in Iraq. In response, the Saudis have announced that “reserve the right” to bring back but so far they have chosen not to pull the trigger.
This does not mean that Saudi Arabia should enter the war, but it does reveal that the country that claims to be the most powerful and important country in the Middle East is between and between while its neighbor is burning. The Saudis clearly have interests at stake, but instead of taking action, they have been making strong rhetoric while others, including their enemies, are shaping the region. It seems that Riyadh would be better off taking decisive action to protect its interests. What’s the saying about it’s better to be at the table than to be a meal?
To be fair, the Iran war is difficult for the Saudis. After making a trillion dollar bet on their economic transformation, Saudi leaders want nothing more than regional stability. From their point of view, no one seems to be helping: not Hamas, not Syria, not the United Arab Emirates, not Iran, and especially not Israel and the United States. Faced with the fact that Riyadh’s closest ally, Washington, has destabilized the region (along with Israel), the Saudis have been trying to find the best way to defend themselves under circumstances beyond their control that may lead to one of three outcomes.
The first is the state of stalemate: Trump is tired of the conflict and declared the victory of the United States without changing the tactical success into a strategic victory while the American forces remain in the region and the sanctions against Iran continue to exist. This will not be the worst outcome for the Saudis, although they may remain under the Iranian drone and missile threat.
The second is a real victory for the United States, which would continue in a row from Iran being no longer able to threaten its neighbors with a complete regime change. This is the best outcome for Saudi Arabia (and others in the region).
A third possible outcome is also worse: an Iranian victory defined as sanctions relief, Tehran’s role in managing the Strait of Hormuz, the survival of the regime, and a US withdrawal from the region.
Each of these scenarios is possible, but with the way the Saudis have approached the conflict so far, they seem to be discounting the possibility of an American victory in favor of a stalemate or an Iranian victory. That’s why they walk the finer lines, denying that they were in favor of war from the start, running away from reports that they don’t want Trump to end hostilities prematurely, and repeatedly threatening the Iranians with retaliation but never making good on those threats.
This way of dealing with the region should have become a thing of the past for the Saudi leaders. While it’s tempting to suggest that this is a matter of old habits dying hard, it’s more accurate to highlight the dire position the Saudis find themselves in. Saudi Arabia does not have as much power and influence as its rhetoric suggests, leaving it dependent on the United States, which has joined forces with Israel in trying to change the Middle East. Mohammed bin Salman may agree with that goal, but not how the United States and Israel went about achieving it. Under these circumstances, Riyadh is trying to be all things for all possible outcomes.
Given the stakes—Vision 2030 and all that goes with it are at stake—the Saudis would be better off if they got out from under their mess and took a real stand on the war. It will be something along the lines of: Iran is a threat to Saudi security; Saudi Arabia has sought rapprochement, but the Iranians have not lived up to their end of the bargain; Riyadh preferred to take a long-term view and hoped that the Iranian people would withdraw from the regime; the Saudi leadership did not defend this conflict, but the Iranians have attacked the kingdom and threatened its economic well-being; Saudi Arabia will participate in naval efforts to open the Strait of Hormuz and will retaliate against Iran for attacks on the kingdom. Some Saudis may dispute this or view it as inflammatory. But they also want to be seen as powerful, influential, and able to create territory. If so, how does Riyadh do it?
Of course Saudi Arabia is mad about what the US and Israel have done. Until February 28, the area was not exactly stable, but manageable. Now the US and Israel have unleashed forces they cannot control. The Saudis will add Operation Epic Fury to their long list of half-cocked Washington actions that have empowered Iran, including the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Iran’s non-response to an attack on Saudi oil facilities in 2019, and more. The Iran war will soon become part of the usual Saudi-American harangue, and no one should blame them for that. The decision to go to war was reckless.
Still, the best way to soften the blow from an ill-advised event by Trump is to take a clear stand on the issue, take some risks, and take responsibility for it. The Saudis seem incapable of doing this. Instead, they demonstrate that they are not in the same league as the Israelis or the Iranians.
